Where have all the general’s cheerleaders gone? I

Arun Shourie: Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Ulti ho gayin sab tadbirein, kuchch na dawa ne kaam kiya — every stratagem has boomeranged, no potion works. That’s Pervez Musharraf’s predicament today, writes Arun Shourie in a three-part series on Pakistan beginning today

The only persons who could have been surprised by what Musharraf has done are the Americans - who had invested everything in him, and as a consequence just would not see - and Musharraf’s acolytes here in India. Here is one of the most deceitful men we have had to deal with. It is not just that he was the architect of Kargil. Here is a general who insisted that the Pakistani army had nothing to do with Kargil, so much so that he did one of the most dishonourable things that any armyman can do: he refused to accept bodies of soldiers who had died in the operation he had himself planned. And yet the same man claims in his book that Kargil was one of the most successful operations of the Pakistani army! Here is a man who has repeatedly dishonoured his word — pledged to the people of Pakistan, to its courts — about sticking to his office. Here is a man who has repeatedly issued decrees exempting himself from law, from his pledged word. Here, then, has been a personification of deceit. And yet, what a buildup he has had in India — eulogising him has been almost a fashion-statement among many Indian journalists.

And not just among journalists. The very highest in this government allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Americans that we should do something that would strengthen Musharraf, as he was the best, it would seem the only option for us. Of course, they were nudged into accepting American ‘advice’ by that one mental ability they have in abundance — the ability to conjure wishfulfilling thoughts, thoughts that exempt them from standing the ground. This combination — American ‘theses’ and conjured rationalisations — led them to almost make a grand gesture of Siachin to bolster Musharraf, and yet again buy ‘peace in our time’, and that too under the exact camouflage that an American think-tank had stitched up. We have to thank Musharraf: by the morass he has created for himself, he has saved us from our do-gooders.

Yet his cleverness had convinced me long ago about the pass he would reach. For, in the end, few things do a ruler in as surely as cleverness. This is especially so when cleverness is combined with audacity, the ‘commando’s audacity’ that so many among our chatterati came to admire in Musharraf. For this audacity spurs the person to, among other things, lie outright. Soon, though not soon enough, karma catches up. A stage arrives when everything such a ruler does, recoils.

If he moves against the Taliban, he is in trouble. If he does not, he is in trouble. If he does not let American forces chase the Taliban into Pakistani territory, he is in trouble. If he lets them do so, he is in deeper trouble. If he does not storm the Lal Masjid, he is in trouble. If he does, he is in deeper trouble. If he does not remove the chief justice, he is in trouble. If he removes him, his troubles are just beginning. If he gives up his uniform, he can’t rely on the army. If he does not, he can’t rely either on his nemesis, the Supreme Court, or his sole prop, the Americans. If he lets Nawaz Sharif stay, he is in trouble. If he does not, he is in trouble. If he rigs elections again, he has to rely even more on the religious parties and fundamentalists, and he falls deeper in trouble. If he does not rig them, he is finished. Unless he throws the judges out, he is out. Now that he has thrown them out, even his patrons are insisting he bring them back — ulti ho gayin sab tadbirein — every stratagem has boomeranged — kuchch na dawa ne kaam kiya — no potion works!

Once a ruler reaches this pit, anyone and everyone who associates with him, gets tarnished. Americans and Musharraf got conflated: Musharraf came to be seen as the stooge of the Americans; Americans came to be seen as the ventriloquists. Whatever he did was attributed to them: ‘He could do none of this but for the fact that the Americans are behind him.’ And whatever the Americans did came to be pasted on him. As they came to be seen to be waging an out-and-out war against Islam, he came to be seen as the instrument of the enemies of Islam. Convinced, though, they have remained that he is indispensable for them, even the Americans came to realise the heavy cost that association with him was bringing upon them. But the Chinese came to suffer too: they were seen to have been the immediate trigger for the assault on the Lal Masjid, as it followed the kidnapping of Chinese women on the charge that they were running a brothel in Islamabad. (For their part, the Chinese have been increasingly concerned about the Uighurs who have been receiving training in Pakistani madrassas and terrorist camps.) The Saudis too, were shocked by the wave of resentment that hit them upon their being parties to the deportation of Nawaz Sharif. This was one of the main reasons for their subsequent decision to endorse Sharif’s proposal that he return.

And so did everyone within Pakistan who was associated with Musharraf. The ‘Q’ in the name of the faction of the Muslim League that had walked over to him — the PML-Q — came to stand not for ‘Quaid’ after Jinnah, but for an abuse. Look at Benazir till the attack on her procession. She lost heavily when it became known that she had struck a deal with Musharraf. Of course, the ignominy was compounded by two factors: as the deal was seen to have been authored by the Americans, it was contaminated from the very start. Worse, it became known that Benazir had been negotiating terms with Musharraf even as she was signing the Charter of Democracy with Nawaz Sharif — a charter in which both of them pledged that they would never have anything to do with a military dictator. It is only the attack on her procession, and the subsequent snuffing out of the Constitution that has helped restore some of her reputation. But no institution has suffered as much by association with Musharraf as the army: as he came to be seen as the instrument of the enemy, the army, which he controlled, came to be seen as the instrument of the instrument of the enemy...

What a pass for a ruler to reach.

And rulers are brought to this pass by their own stratagems. No ruler after Zia ul Haq gave as big a boost to religious parties and to terrorist groups as Musharraf. It is because of the way he rigged the assembly and provincial elections and the alliance he formed with them that the religious parties — which used to get 5 to 7 per cent of the popular vote — got to form governments in NWFP as well as Balochistan, and to become such a significant factor in the National Assembly. The consequence was as predictable as it has been disastrous. With governance in the hands of religious parties, for instance, the Taliban and Al Qaida acquired an open field in NWFP, and from there into FATA.

Similarly, his premise — one that he set out in as many words — that jihad is an instrument of state policy, and the way he patronised and facilitated terrorism in Kashmir, for instance, has had the same consequence. In her recent study, The Counterterror Coalitions, Cooperation with Pakistan and India, Christine Fair puts it well: one consequence of the jihad in Kashmir and that for the acquisition of Afghanistan, she writes, has been that ‘the concept of jihad has attained an unassailable stature,’ and ‘the political capital’ of groups engaged in it has multiplied several fold. And you can see the end result, even for Musharraf: recall the way he and his government remained paralysed for months in the face of what was being done in and around Lal Masjid. Second, she points out, it has meant that organised criminal groups have been able to extend their operations and reach within Pakistan itself under the banner of jihad. Third, over the past few years, new alliances and coalitions have come to be formed among the various groups. The operational consequence of the latter is just as evident, and it is one of the things that eventually led even his patrons in the US to conclude that he was not doing enough to curb terrorists: when the US or NATO allies were told that steps had indeed been taken against the terrorist groups whom they wanted brought to heel, they were soon disillusioned. And for the obvious reason: when one of the groups was targeted, all that its members had to do was to shift to the adjacent group in the coalition.

Two other features broke through during the last few months: that Musharraf was losing control, and that he had lost touch with what was happening. As for the first, recall how, for months and months, fundamentalists from the Northwest could go on piling up arms in the Lal Masjid right in Islamabad — and the military dictator with all his intelligence agencies should not have known. As for losing touch, recall how gravely Musharraf misjudged the way the public would react to the sacking of the chief justice.

Lessons for us

There has been a veritable industry in India urging concessions: when Pakistan or a ruler of Pakistan has appeared strong, when terrorism sponsored by it and him has been at its murderous height, concessions have been urged on the ground, “but how long can we live with a permanently hostile neighbour?” When he has been facing difficulties, the same concessions have been urged on the ground, “he is our best bet.” Such specious reasoning has almost prevailed when we have had, as we have now, a weak and delusional government, a government that does not have the grit to stay the course; when we have a government over which suggestions from abroad have sway of the kind they have today; when we have a government the higher reaches of which are as bereft of experience in national security affairs as in the government today. We must never sacrifice a national interest in the delusion that someone is the ‘best bet’ — he will soon be gone, and our interest would have been sacrificed in perpetuity. Nor should we ever sacrifice an interest in the delusion that doing so will assuage that ruler, country or ‘movement’.

The concession will only whet his appetite. To the ruler/country/movement, it will be proof that he can extract the next capitulation. Second, we should think for ourselves, and not be led by others, howsoever powerful they may be. One of the great strategic blunders of the US in regard to its ‘War on Terrorism’ has been to have believed, indeed to have proclaimed, that Musharraf is indispensable. The consequence has been predictable. Their having come to think of him as indispensable, Musharraf has done what suited him, not that war: look at the selective way in which he went after the terrorists. He first targeted only the Al Qaida in whom the Americans were interested; then, those who targeted him; then those who targeted the Pakistani state. The organisations that he, his army, the ISI had reared for breaking India, he left alone. The Americans had to shut their eyes. “You are putting all your eggs in one basket,” they were told. “But there aren’t that many baskets in Pakistan,” they said. Soon, they got their desserts too, and twice over. First, as was noted above, given the fungibility among such groups, the former set of terrorists had just to don the garb of the latter and continue to recruit, to rearm, to regroup. And then, Musharraf having come to be seen as merely their stooge, he couldn’t keep the system going — for them any more than for himself. In a word, powers, howsoever well endowed, can be dead wrong in their assessment even of their own interest. In any event, it is their own interest they shall be pursuing. Their own interest as perceived by a handful. Their own interest as perceived by a handful at that moment.

Today Saddam is good because he is a counter to Iran; tomorrow he is evil. Today the Taliban are mujahideen, freedom fighters, as they are necessary for throwing the Soviets out; tomorrow they are evil. Today the Kurds are good as a counter to Sunnis in Iraq; tomorrow they are evil as the fellows are dragging Turkey into the arena... This is not to blame the Americans or anyone else: through such twists and turns they are merely pursuing their interest. The lesson is for us: how very wrong, how very shortsighted it would be for us to outsource our thinking to others.

The even more important lesson is illustrated vividly by the relief we have had in Kashmir in the last few months days. As Balochistan, NWFP, and now FATA have flared up, Pakistan has had to withdraw its troops and other resources from its border with India to its western border. The killings and explosions in Kashmir have gone down. Just a coincidence?

Now notice two things. First, as Pakistan has had to move its troops away from the border with Kashmir, an orchestra has started in India demanding that we thin our troops in Kashmir: just another coincidence? Second, recall the ‘remedies’ that our secularists have been urging — ‘autonomy’ and the rest. “The Kashmiris feel alienated,” they have been declaiming. “That is the root-cause of terrorism... give them autonomy...” A formula-factory came into being: ‘Musharraf’s 7-regions’ formula...’

None of those ‘solutions’ has been put in place. Yet, the killings have gone down. Which is the medicine that has worked? The potion — ‘autonomy’ — we did not administer? Or the medicine that Pakistan has administered to itself? That it has got into trouble on its western borders? A lesson there...

The Media in Crises

Arun Shourie
The US campaign of bombing erstwhile Taliban positions in Afghanistan had not been on for 10 days, and our experts began pronouncing it a failure: "Osama bin Laden is still at large, the Taliban have just dispersed into the hills, the Northern Alliance is stuck where it was, Bush�s Grand Alliance is coming apart... The winter is about to set in," they said. "The Afghan is a hardy fighter, they said. He will just tie an onion and a roti (bread), fling his blanket over his shoulder, and disappear into the nearest mountain; and these American GIs � they cannot fight without their Coca Colas, their hot meals... Just look at them on TV � they are loaded with so much equipment, they have difficulty just walking. These jokers are going to fight the Taliban? Secure on the mountaintop, the Taliban Jehadi will pick them one by one as they try to clamber up the mountain. Remember Kargil? These slopes in the Afghan mountains are even steeper than the ones our soldiers had to scale."

"And remember: this is Afghanistan � no foreigner has been able to rule the country. Ever. The British in the 19th century, the Russians in the 1980s � each one of them was thrown out by the indomitable Afghans... And this generation of Afghans is even more battle-hardened than the average Afghan: the country has been at war continuously for 20 years. In contrast, the Americans who will be lumbering out of their helicopters against them have not seen action at all."

"And you do not understand the difference motivation makes: on the one side there are jehadis fired up with religion, ready to embrace shahadat (martyrdom); on the other, gum-chewing Americans dying to get back to their girl friends... Bush has ignited the entire Muslim world. Protests in Indonesia... Twenty thousand Mujahideen are crossing over from Pakistan...."

What happened in fact? The Taliban did not just collapse, they fled. The Pakistanis fled faster. As for being fired up with the narcotic of shahadat, should our experts not have wondered how being fired up by prospects of houries in jannat would make one invulnerable to bombs? As for history -- from Greeks to the Kushans, from Kanishka to Maharaja Ranjit Singh... As many �outsiders� had ruled Afghanistan as northern India. The Bamiyan Buddhas -- whose destruction was so recent that even our �experts� could not have forgotten it -- were themselves reminders of the time when Afghanistan was under the sway of the Buddhist rulers of India! As for the indomitable spirit and fighting qualities of the Afghan, should our experts and commentators have so swiftly forgotten that the Taliban had acquired most of its sway without any fighting at all? The silver bullet had worked the magic. Should that not have led them to wonder whether the same sequence could not be repeated in reverse this time round?

Exactly the same sort of �analyses� had been the order of the day during the Gulf War: "battle-hardened troops of Saddam Hussein, the inhospitable desert, �General Desert Storm� which blows around this time of the year and will blind the American GIs... Have you forgotten Vietnam? The Americans cannot stand the sight of body-bags..."

"General Desert Storm" failed to turn up. The hardening that the troops of Saddam Hussein had gone through did not make them invulnerable to bombs, to gigantic war machines that just buried thousands alive. True, the Americans cannot stand the sight of bodies being brought home. But, while we were basking in vicarious memories of Vietnam, American war strategists and technologists had fashioned weapons and devised an entire war strategy that minimized the commitment of American troops. We were exulting in the last war; they had devised ways and means to make the next one an entirely different one.

In one sense, of course, this conformed to the standard of the Cold War days: the costless fashion of being anti-American. But, there is something deeper that accounted for the �analyses� : a defeatism so ingrained that by now it has become part of the nature of the Indian literati.

The proximate manifestation of this is the conviction that the government -- which government is in office makes little difference -- will not be able to handle the crisis. Yashwant Sinha had gone to Ottawa, Canada, to attend a meeting of Finance Ministers in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.1 At the meeting, Sinha recounted, speaker after speaker lauded India for maintaining a 4.8 per cent growth rate when the richer countries other than China were struggling at growth rates of 1 to 3 per cent. Talking of the prospects for the coming months, speaker after speaker had maintained that two countries would help pull the world out of the recession: China and India. And here, in India, the refrain is the opposite, Sinha said. Here, the refrain is that if the September 11 attacks had occurred in India, the government would not have been able to handle the situation; therefore, it is nikammi (useless); therefore, it must go!

But even this particular species -- this pessimism about the governments we have -- is just the immediate manifestation of defeatism. The conviction is not just that the government will not be able to handle the crisis. We seem convinced that whatever the government is doing will in fact boomerang and recoil on India. Indeed, even that too is just the second layer of defeatism. Beneath that layer is the conviction that whatever is happening -- not just what the government is doing, but events in general -- will in fact turn against India.

"But should Jaswant Singh have rushed into announcing support for the Americans?" people asked -- within government as much as outside. "That is bound to enrage the Taliban. We have unnecessarily made ourselves a target."

Days had not passed, and the refrain became the opposite: "But Pakistan has stolen a march over us again. They offered support, and see how the Americans are wooing them. They are going to give them billions of dollars. Military aid too is being resumed. And Pakistan is sure as hell going to use it against India."

But on the logic of a few days earlier, by announcing that it was joining the international coalition against terrorism, was Pakistan not enraging the Taliban? Would the Taliban not target Pakistan rather than India? True, Pakistan was trying to extract a few extra dollars: but the very effort was bound to deepen distrust in the US and Europe, it was bound to confirm apprehensions about its nature. Bartering the very ones in whom it had taken so much pride, the Taliban, for dollars was bound to corrode the psyche of its people, to demean them in their own eyes. Dollars or no dollars, Pakistan was inviting the recoil of a defeated Taliban within Pakistan. All this was obvious, it was elementary, yet it was completely buried under our pessimism about what events -- any set of events -- are liable to entail for India.

Events had so conspired that the US and other countries were at last joining the war we in India have been fighting for two decades. For 15 years, as our people were being mowed down by terrorists trained, equipped and indoctrinated by Pakistan, the US had asked us, �But where is the evidence?� That very country had been awakened. Was that not the opportunity that we ought to grab? It was no one�s case that the US or any other country is going to solve our problem for us. Nor that any new bond that may be forged because of the events that had shaken the US was going to last forever. The premise underlying the Indian government�s response was merely that the events had provided a moment of congruence.

Consider the alternative. Supposing the response had been ambiguous, supposing we had delayed the announcement of support. Within days, scores and scores of countries, specifically including China and Pakistan, had announced that they would be part of the coalition to fight terrorism. Supposing we had announced our support for the American campaign after these other countries had signed up. Would the critics not have fumed that the government had humiliated India -- that it had reduced the country to being just the tail of even Pakistan?

Even a fool could have seen the reason for which the US and others were paying attention to Pakistan: it was not just its geographical position; the real �asset� Pakistan had was that its intelligence agencies and Army are the ones that had the closest links with the Taliban. To secure vital information about the disposition of Taliban troops, their arsenal, to learn who among them could be weaned away by bribes and through whom -- for all this the government that could help most and in the least possible time was that of Pervez Musharraf. And just as obvious were the effects that signing up in the campaign to destroy the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would inflict on Pakistan.

After all, till the other day, Pakistan had been preening itself on how, by installing the Taliban, it had acquired �strategic depth� vis-�-vis India. It had been projecting itself in the Islamic world as the country whose guidance, support and patronage had rid the area of the godless government of the atheist Communists; it had been projecting itself as the country which had helped usher in �the rule of the pure.� Till recently, it had been insisting, its intellectuals had been declaiming about, how popular the Taliban were with the people of Afghanistan -- the Taliban have brought peace, they said, they have purged society of what the people realised were the decadent values of the Christian West... And now, suddenly, the success of Pakistan was that it had positioned itself among those who were destroying the same Taliban. Would that not delegitimize the religious rationale itself? Would that delegitimization in turn not gravely affect Pakistan�s self-perception? Of its being the �fortress of Islam�? Of its being an Islamic state? Indeed, would it not undermine the religious underpinning of Pakistan -- its raison d��tre, the very basis of its self-definition as the country that is the "Not-Hindustan"?

All of this was elementary. Yet, none of it was allowed to dilute pessimism.

"But they have not banned the Jaish-e-Mohammed [JeM] and other organisations operating in India as yet." And then, the day after a news report that the US had in fact moved to proscribe some of these, The Indian Express lead story was, "Ban to have little effect on the ground." This was followed with some glee by stories to the effect that while one part of the US Administration had proposed the ban, the ban had yet to be formalised. And if the US had banned them? Without a doubt, we would have been back to "But what difference will that make on the ground? After all, these organisations do not use banking channels. Their members do not wait to get visas. In any case, they have had so much warning time, by now they must have moved their finances to safer havens." Soon, the opposite became the subject to beat our chests about:

"Isn�t it a humiliation? We offered help, but no one is taking us up on the offer? Yes, there is a war on terrorism, but where are we in that war?" In fact, there was active co-operation: intelligence sharing, access to many in the Northern Alliance with whom India had been in close touch for years.

And soon, just ten-twelve days into the bombing campaign: "The campaign is a failure, bin Laden is still at large, the Taliban have just scattered into the hills, the Northern Alliance is stuck where it was. Bush�s Grand Alliance is coming apart..."

By now more than a habit, our very nature

During the days he spent in India, the then US President, Bill Clinton made several statements which went in favour of the Indian position. In the hours that he spent on his way through Pakistan, Clinton addressed the people of that country directly, and delivered a hiding that no self-respecting country can possibly stomach. "But these are just statements," said some about the statements that underscored the Indian position: when some secondary official like Robin Raphael used to say a few words -- "Kashmir is disputed territory"2 -- these very persons used to scare us, "See, the US has come out so decisively in favour of the Pakistani position." Now, when the President of that very country was so decisively and so many times speaking against the Pakistani position, "So what? These are just statements." During a discussion on Clinton�s visit, a Star News anchorperson went a step further. The very fact that the statements were so strongly in favour of Indian perceptions and the Indian position, she saw working against India! "But don't you think that such statements may anger Pakistan so much that it adopts an even more aggressive posture?," she asked. I had to ask in turn, "Why have we got into such a negative mould? What if even one of the statements had been in favour of the Pakistani position? Would we not have been shouting, "See, the US has endorsed the Pakistani position... A colossal failure for Indian diplomacy?" She merely smiled.

When all else fails there is always China to enable us to hold on to despondence. And so it was during Clinton�s visit: "But his real motive is to use us to counter China," went the argument. Till the other day, the lament had been, "See, the US is out to undermine us. On the one side it is doing everything possible to ignore what Pakistan is doing -- in exporting terrorism, in building up its nuclear arsenal, its missile capability; in particular what it is doing in developing missiles, atomic weapons -- with the help of China, in manifest violation of international agreements, what the two together are doing in manifest disregard of the US� own laws and admonitions. On the other, the US is bending backwards to deepen its links with China." Suddenly, that the refrain became, "But Clinton's real intention is to use India to counter China."

Is it not up to us to ensure that we get the best out of an arrangement, to ensure that the other country is not able to use us? Of course, in Afghanistan, the US is acting in its own interest. But so would we, indeed so are we.

So pervasive has this habit become that the fact that the replacement of the Taliban regime would be a boon for us -- one factory manufacturing terrorists less, a major defeat for militant Islam, the patrons and guides of the terrorists either crushed or made busy protecting themselves, fissures in Pakistani society widened -- all this was all but obscured in the anxiety to discover the latest shred by which the government could be pilloried, or the gloominess confirmed.

Nor is this phenomenon limited to foreign or security affairs. Over the decades, an entire industry has grown up whose sole function is to frighten us about the future. I well remember the seemingly learned essays that the Economic and Political Weekly used to carry during the Green Revolution days. They were written by prominent economists and we had to mug them up for our exams. The new seed varieties will increase productivity per acre, the argument went. That will make land more valuable. The rich �kulaks� -- a much favoured term then -- will buy up the holdings of small and marginal farmers. The latter will sink into being landless labourers... Progressive immiserisation of the masses... The Green Revolution will turn red... What happened in fact? Productivity did increase. Land did become more valuable. So valuable that no one would sell it...

The �Dunkel Draft�, the new regime on Intellectual Property Rights, allowing foreign investment in the insurance sector, the much-denounced �terminator seeds�� The �debate� on each has followed the identical course.

Bleakness is deduced whichever of the opposites comes to pass. If the West gives aid; �It is trying to entangle us in the coils of international capitalism.� If it does not, "It is heartless, to say nothing of access to its markets, it is denying us even aid." If the multinationals invest, �They are taking over.� If they do not, �But where is the investment?� If caps for foreign investment are raised, �Multinationals will swallow us up.� When evidence suggests that they are themselves on the run � that these companies are being threatened by newcomers every other day, �But all the more reason for them to invade territories in which they can establish themselves more easily.� If fertiliser subsidies are lowered, �This is an anti-farmer Government.� If they are not, �Chemical fertilisers and pesticides are poisoning our land, our rivers, our bodies. The Government is subsidising cancer.�

For years, papers had been writing about the pollution that Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses had been causing. As the Delhi Administration had done little in the matter other than keep asking for time, the Supreme Court eventually ordered that a class of the worst polluters be taken off the road. The Hindustan Times story now was, "School children to be affected by SC order"!

Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam was delivering the first lecture in the Ideas that have worked series that I had started under the auspices of the Administrative Reforms Department.3 He had just given a gripping account of what it had been to work under prominent scientists Vikram Sarabhai, Satish Dhawan and Brahmaprakash; of what it had been to participate in projects to build rockets that would carry satellites into space; of what it had been to be present at the launching of those satellites, of being present for Pokharan-II. "So, we have a rocket," a member of the audience began. "But what has that done for the common man?" Kalam had to justify rocket research by recalling how it had helped develop the Reddy-Kalam stent for heart patients!

Ever so often, the gloom is induced by utter misrepresentation. If you take a twig from the neem-tree, you will have to pay royalty to the multinationals, it was said at the height of the propaganda against the �Dunkel Draft.� The reader will recall the pamphlet that was put out over the signatures of the formidable Dattopant Thengdi4 denouncing the Sankhya Vahini proposal.5 Who is Dr. Raj Reddy? it asked -- actually he was... But the Carnegie Mellon University has little standing in information technology, it declared - in fact,... And the clincher, �Is the project not a violation of the Indian Telegraph Act?� A project in the year 2000, a project in a sphere in which a new product is overtaken within 12 to 18 months, in which entire technologies are overtaken in 24 to 36 months, a project in such an area was being criticised on the ground that it was in violation of a law passed in 1885!

As the controversy built up, I studied the proposal. The case against it was patently a contrivance. I took up the matter with a prominent ideologue of such critiques. "There has been a mistake," he said. "It was thought that this was a project of Pramod Mahajan [Union Minister for Information Technology, Communications and Parliamentary Affairs]. That is why the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh] decided that it must not go through." It had turned out that the sponsor of the project had actually been some other minister � indeed, one who was in the very good books of the RSS. But, supposing the Sankhya Vahini had in fact been Mahajan's project. Was that a good enough reason to kill it? "In any case, the pamphlet was not written by anyone in the RSS," the person explained. "It was written by an ex-civil servant." But the high personage had lent his name to the specious argumentation. It is precisely because Dattopant Thengdi had lent his name to the critique that it had been so consequential. "I am myself going to write a note to Dattopantji on this pamphlet," the person said. "Send me the points that strike you." But the controversy killed the project.

In 1993, Motorola had approached India with a proposal to set up a plant to produce computer chips. They wanted some facilities. We spurned them. They packed their bags and went over to Malaysia. Today, Malaysia is the world�s leading exporter of computer chips,6 and we are importers� Our activists drove out Monsanto, and its experiments on genetically modified cotton.7 Today, 40 per cent of China�s cotton is produced from those seeds. They have obviated the need for pesticides. Productivity per acre is almost 35-40 per cent higher than the varieties we use, with the result that our textile industry is at an even greater handicap.

Such prophecies fulfil themselves. We frighten ourselves about the future. As a result, we are less able to focus on the task at hand. And, so the prophecy comes true. In India, being in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has become yet another occasion for us to frighten ourselves and to accuse each other of selling the country�s interests down the drain. In China, the prospect of joining WTO was converted into a timetable -- for implementing reforms.

Respective tasks

It is nobody�s case that the Press should not be critical. Criticising a government and pillorying it is most certainly not �anti-national�. It is the media�s job to keep governments on their toes. But, at the same time, it is an error to mistake contrariness for independence. Correspondingly, it is the job of governments to explain the reasons that have led them to a policy or measure. But, that done, it is the duty of governments to go ahead -- in the face of criticism if necessary. Waiting for a consensus to emerge will be to wait forever -- specially in view of what being out of office has come to mean in India today: that because the person or group is in the Opposition, its job is to denounce, it is to block everything anyone in office proposes to do; even the things that the person was doing when he was in office; in fact, even the things that he is doing where he is in office today. In a word, governments must explain, but, having set out the facts and reasons, it is their duty to do what the country requires. They must proceed in the confidence that 10 years later there will be a consensus around the new configuration that would have come about because of the measures that are being taken now.

As far as the media are concerned, the point is not that they must support what some government is doing. The point is about presumption. The presumption that an Indian government just will not be able to handle a situation.

The presumption has meant that, for the media, India cannot be in the right -- whether on terrorism in Punjab, or in combating the assault on Kashmir, or with regard to the demographic invasion from Bangladesh. The presumption that leads commentators to see virtue in someone else doing something and when India does the same thing -- when it even attempts to do same thing -- it makes our commentators detect fascism, communalism and evil. Indian liberals are awe struck when they see Muslims go through the postures of namaz: �What devotion, what surrender,� they exclaim as ten thousand Muslims in the local Jama Masjid bend and rise in unison. But, when Hindus flock to their temples in thousands, or when thirty million of them gather at the sangam for the Kumbh mela, the very persons sneer, �Look at those ignoramuses, steeped neck deep in superstition. How will you ever get these people to develop?� When Bill Clinton was not able to get two of his nominees to be appointed as Attorneys General because they had employed an unregistered alien for the briefest of times, that was taken as evidence of the great respect the American system has for law. Here, whenever a government has made some effort -- however small -- to send Bangladeshis back, a howl has been raised, so great a howl that governments have given up making even an effort to deport illegal immigrants.

As India cannot be right, the presumption that everyone who speaks up for the country, everyone who stands up for it, who risks his life for it, also cannot be right. Recall the total fabrications that were put out about �atrocities committed by the Army� in Kashmir -- fabrications nailed in the Press Council report, Crisis and Credibility.8 Recall the way self-serving, backdated letters of a Brigadier were used by the press to put the armed forces in the wrong during the Kargil war.

The presumption finally that every development is liable to work against India.

This addiction to the negative is compounded by laziness. Anyone can say anything. So long as it is negative, it will get him headlines in the media. A natural disaster occurs -- an earthquake in the Kumaon hills or Gujarat, a cyclone tears a region apart in Orissa or Gujarat, and Sonia Gandhi is sure to arrive. And on each occasion, she has the same comment: the government has completely failed to provide adequate relief to the victims. On not a single occasion has she documented her charge. But each time she gets headlines, �Sonia blasts Government.� Natwar Singh and other spokespersons of the Congress, after the May 1998 atomic tests -- condemning the Government one day for betraying the traditions of Buddha, Ashoka and Gandhi, and the next on the ground that it had not yet taken the requisite steps for �atomic weaponisation�: headlines on both days. The drivel of Kapil Sibal and others during the Kargil war...

On December 13, 2001, terrorists entered the premises of Parliament. Guns, grenades, RDX -- it was a huge assault. The next day, The Hindu carried on its front page, in bold type, the statement of Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) from Pakistan: the attack has been engineered by Indian intelligence agencies, the paper reported him saying, so as to pressurise Parliament into passing the anti-terrorist ordinance, and to pressurise the international alliance against terrorism "to bracket the Kashmir freedom struggle with terrorism"! The same day, opposite the edit-page that paper carried a dispatch -- again in bold type -- from a conspicuous commentator-correspondent: �Who called in the Army?� he asked; had the "well established procedures" been followed for this "entirely irregular requisitioning of Army units?" he wanted to know. What an occasion for Constitutionalism!

It is as if press persons and others in the media feel that, by printing something negative -- even if it be drivel of this kind -- they prove that they are independent; that, conversely, were they to say, or even report anything positive they would be damned as having �sold themselves�, as having become chamchas. Indeed, so pervasive is this habit that it seems that they are afraid not just that others will conclude that they have �sold out�, but that in their own eyes they would have done so.

There is thus, first the laziness -- anything anyone says is just swallowed and vomited; specially if what that person says casts doubt, specially if he hurls an allegation. Recall the play that Ajit Jogi�s calumny got: "Three officers -- one in the Prime Minister's Office, one in the Disinvestment Department, one in my Government -- have pocketed Rs. 100 Crore in the [Bharat Aluminium Company] BALCO disinvestment."9 In no country would that kind of calumny, especially when made by that kind of a person, be reproduced � here it became headline news. Where is that calumny today? Actually, we know where it is; "...the facts herein show that a fair, just and equitable procedure has been followed in carrying out this disinvestment," the Supreme Court has held in its judgement on the BALCO case. "The allegations of lack of transparency or that the decision was taken in a hurry or that there has been an arbitrary exercise of power are without any basis. We strongly deprecate such unfounded averments which have been made by an officer of the State..." But what is the remedy for the immense harm that was done by those who broadcast those allegations -- without the slightest examination?

Next, there is the sudden switch. A dacoit is caught; suddenly, he becomes an �under-trial� � till yesterday the Press was full of jeers about the government�s ham-handedness because of which it was not being able to apprehend him; the moment he is caught, the same Press is after the police and jail officials for not respecting his rights.

One day the question is, "But why are you not talking to Pakistan? After all, what is the harm in just talking?" The moment a step is taken to talk, suddenly the question becomes, "You had said you won�t talk to Pakistan so long as cross-border terrorism continues. It has not stopped. Why are you thinking of talking to Musharraf now? In any case, what has come out of your talks in the past?"

When the hijacked Indian aircraft IC-81410 was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, media were full of the shouting of the relatives of the passengers. This barrage, I can testify from personal knowledge, weighed heavily on the key decision-makers. It was one of the main factors that led them to decide that there was no alternative but to accept the demands of the hijackers and to release the Pakistani terrorists that the hijackers had demanded. The moment the terrorists were released, the same newspapers were pontificating about the �abject surrender to terrorism�, they were contrasting the pusillanimity of the Indian government with the example of Israel, they were lecturing the same government they had, by their selective coverage, pressurised with reminders of the policy of the US -- �No negotiations with terrorists.�

The moment there is some massacre by terrorists, our papers are full of pictures of corpses. But I heard some of the same editors remark with admiration at the way the American media had covered the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon: �Not one gory scene, not one image that could dishearten the people... Look at the way they are building up Bush. After all, his IQ could not have shot up all of a sudden. They were making fun of him till yesterday, and suddenly he is being made to come across as such a decisive, knowledgeable leader, as one in full control...�

Socialism for the masses. Patriotism for other countries! As in government so in media: there is paralysis by analysis. Recall, China during the Gulf War: it quietly got the post-Tiananmen sanctions lifted; here in India we encoiled ourselves in acrimonious accusations about whether we should give America refuelling facilities. The accusations about offering to assist in the campaign against the Taliban regime ended only because the Taliban collapsed so soon, and so ignominiously. In a word, while other countries get down to doing what their interest requires, we debate the alternatives to death even before we have chosen one of them.

Two basic factors

Beyond these proximate factors are two. First, by now the notion that a newspaper is �a product�, like soap, the notion that media persons are in the �infotainment business�, not in public service, has indeed triumphed. Superciliousness has become the reigning ideology. Being bothered about the country is to be hysterical. Examining a matter in depth is to be a bore. So, on the one hand, the smart question, and on the other the �sound-byte� is all.

Every event, every situation -- war as much as some development project -- is yet another spectator sport. Media do not feel that they have any responsibility at all for helping find a solution: it is satiated when, in its own view, it has punctured any and every proposal that has been put forward by others. And when, on the rare occasion, a �solution� is urged, it is simplicity itself: �Advani must go,� �Fernandes should resign,� �The Government should...�

But the fundamental cause is deeper. Beneath the presumptions that we have noticed, lies indoctrination of a hundred and fifty years: the notions that we have taken in from the elder Mill, Macaulay, Marx, and the missionaries. Our commentators are hybrids of these forbears. India is not a country, Indians are not a nation. It is a zoo, to recall Girilal Jain�s description of their view. There are monkeys in it, zebras, elephants, the whole lot. But each of these is a separate species. When a Vivekananda or a Gandhi looks at the people, what strikes him are the myriad common elements. But when these persons see the very same people, what strikes them on the other hand is what is different! India is not real, they declare, it is but a geographical expression. It was never one country. It was put together only recently � and that too by the British. Not one country? Ever heard of a group of pilgrims being stopped as they crossed from one �kingdom� into the next one? India is not real, they declare; caste is real, being Hindu or Muslim, being Tamil or Bengali -- that is what is real.

As India is not one, it is not entitled to defend its position in Kashmir, it has no right to throw out Bangladeshis on the ground that they are �outsiders�. When the Pakistani government, having financed, patronised and controlled madrasas (seminaries) for decades, at last announces moves to regulate them, that announcement, though just an announcement, becomes proof positive that the government is taking a giant step towards secularism, that it is taking a bold step towards modernising that country, that it is giving up the past and is ready to establish peace with India -- and if peace does not come about, that is only because the Indian Government, indeed India itself has not liberated itself from phobias it has conjured up about the past.

This disengagement from our past, from our country, from our people, from our very being, has become so extreme that anything alien is the fashion of choice. And the more alien, the more fashionable. A singer from Pakistan, even when he or she is little above the mediocre; even better, a couple of singers from Pakistan singing �Sufi music�, when neither the singers nor their caveman-like braying has the remotest link with Sufis -- what a fashion it is to swoon over them! Advocating what in fact is the Pakistani line on an issue -- even when that issue is one that concerns our defence forces, even when it concerns our territorial integrity -- doing so establishes the commentator�s �independence.� "I am ...," a well-known editor said as he met Musharraf at Agra for that breakfast meeting, adding with evident and defiant pride, "In India I am known as a Pakistani agent, and I am proud of that."

When he was the Pakistani Ambassador in Delhi, Riaz Khokhar was in effect editing three of Delhi's dailies without using newsprint -- so easily was he able to get the Pakistani slant into reports and editorial comments on Kashmir and the rest. Having made nationalism a dirty word, having made it synonymous with �fascism�, the media has altered its reflexes. Its natural reaction is to strike a pose -- and that pose which will advertise the fact that it is not �fascist�!

END NOTES

1. A meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors took place on November 16-17, 2001 in Ottawa.

2. She declared the whole of Kashmir as "disputed" with three contending parties-India, Pakistan and Kashmir. See Parama Sinha Palit, "The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas", Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, vol. XXV, no. 6, September 2001, p. 791.

3. Dr. Kalam, the then Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India, delivered the first lecture on March 11, 2000 in New Delhi. It was organised by the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances in collaboration with the Civil Services Officers� Institute (CSOI) and the Government of Andhra Pradesh. See "India Needs Double Digit GDP to Remove Poverty : Dr. Kalam", Link

4. Thengdi is the chief of Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), a trade union affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

5. Sankhya Vahini was a joint venture project that envisages a high-speed data communication network to serve as India�s high bandwidth Internet backbone. Sankhya Vahini India Limited (SVIL), with an authorised share capital of Rs.1,000 crores, is a collaborative venture between the Department of Telecommunications/Department of Telecom Services (DoT/DTS), some premier educational institutions, the Department of Electronics (DoE), the Ministry of Information Technology (MIT) and the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) of the United States, through a U.S.-based company called IUNet Inc. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 16, 1998. Dr. V S Arunachalam and Dr. Raj Reddy, both attached to the CMU, are principle designers of the network. See, for instance, "Sankhya Vahini and some questions," Frontline, Chennai, vol. 17, no. 11, May 27 � June 09, 2000. Link.

6. See "Developing SE Asia: Singapore and Malaysia", Link.

7. "Indian peasants torch crops amid fear of losing home-grown seed", The Guardian, London, October 6, 1999.

8. Crisis and Credibility, Report of the Press Council of India, January and July 1991, Lancer Paper 4, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991. In December 1990, the Press Council of India (PCI) appointed a Committee to study the role of the press and its functioning in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the alleged reports of excesses by the armed forces against civilians of the State. The Committee paid a visit to the State and its report was adopted by the PCI in July 1991. The findings indicated that reports of excesses "have been 'grossly exaggerated or invented." The Committee consisted of B G Verghese, K Vikram Rao and Jamna Das Akhtar.

9. Ajit Jogi, Chief Minister of Chhatisgarh, had alleged that a bribe of Rs 100 crore was paid to the officers in the Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) disinvestment case. See "Shourie asks Jogi to come out with proof of corruption charges", Daily Excelsior, Jammu, March 11, 2001. Also see "Jogi says there is massive corruption in Balco deal", The Financial Express, New Delhi, March 19, 2001.

10. The Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was hijacked from Kathmandu, Nepal on December 24, 1999. The incident culminated with the terrorists-for-hostages swap on December 31, 1999 at Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The Media in Crises

Arun Shourie
The US campaign of bombing erstwhile Taliban positions in Afghanistan had not been on for 10 days, and our experts began pronouncing it a failure: "Osama bin Laden is still at large, the Taliban have just dispersed into the hills, the Northern Alliance is stuck where it was, Bush�s Grand Alliance is coming apart... The winter is about to set in," they said. "The Afghan is a hardy fighter, they said. He will just tie an onion and a roti (bread), fling his blanket over his shoulder, and disappear into the nearest mountain; and these American GIs � they cannot fight without their Coca Colas, their hot meals... Just look at them on TV � they are loaded with so much equipment, they have difficulty just walking. These jokers are going to fight the Taliban? Secure on the mountaintop, the Taliban Jehadi will pick them one by one as they try to clamber up the mountain. Remember Kargil? These slopes in the Afghan mountains are even steeper than the ones our soldiers had to scale."

"And remember: this is Afghanistan � no foreigner has been able to rule the country. Ever. The British in the 19th century, the Russians in the 1980s � each one of them was thrown out by the indomitable Afghans... And this generation of Afghans is even more battle-hardened than the average Afghan: the country has been at war continuously for 20 years. In contrast, the Americans who will be lumbering out of their helicopters against them have not seen action at all."

"And you do not understand the difference motivation makes: on the one side there are jehadis fired up with religion, ready to embrace shahadat (martyrdom); on the other, gum-chewing Americans dying to get back to their girl friends... Bush has ignited the entire Muslim world. Protests in Indonesia... Twenty thousand Mujahideen are crossing over from Pakistan...."

What happened in fact? The Taliban did not just collapse, they fled. The Pakistanis fled faster. As for being fired up with the narcotic of shahadat, should our experts not have wondered how being fired up by prospects of houries in jannat would make one invulnerable to bombs? As for history -- from Greeks to the Kushans, from Kanishka to Maharaja Ranjit Singh... As many �outsiders� had ruled Afghanistan as northern India. The Bamiyan Buddhas -- whose destruction was so recent that even our �experts� could not have forgotten it -- were themselves reminders of the time when Afghanistan was under the sway of the Buddhist rulers of India! As for the indomitable spirit and fighting qualities of the Afghan, should our experts and commentators have so swiftly forgotten that the Taliban had acquired most of its sway without any fighting at all? The silver bullet had worked the magic. Should that not have led them to wonder whether the same sequence could not be repeated in reverse this time round?

Exactly the same sort of �analyses� had been the order of the day during the Gulf War: "battle-hardened troops of Saddam Hussein, the inhospitable desert, �General Desert Storm� which blows around this time of the year and will blind the American GIs... Have you forgotten Vietnam? The Americans cannot stand the sight of body-bags..."

"General Desert Storm" failed to turn up. The hardening that the troops of Saddam Hussein had gone through did not make them invulnerable to bombs, to gigantic war machines that just buried thousands alive. True, the Americans cannot stand the sight of bodies being brought home. But, while we were basking in vicarious memories of Vietnam, American war strategists and technologists had fashioned weapons and devised an entire war strategy that minimized the commitment of American troops. We were exulting in the last war; they had devised ways and means to make the next one an entirely different one.

In one sense, of course, this conformed to the standard of the Cold War days: the costless fashion of being anti-American. But, there is something deeper that accounted for the �analyses� : a defeatism so ingrained that by now it has become part of the nature of the Indian literati.

The proximate manifestation of this is the conviction that the government -- which government is in office makes little difference -- will not be able to handle the crisis. Yashwant Sinha had gone to Ottawa, Canada, to attend a meeting of Finance Ministers in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.1 At the meeting, Sinha recounted, speaker after speaker lauded India for maintaining a 4.8 per cent growth rate when the richer countries other than China were struggling at growth rates of 1 to 3 per cent. Talking of the prospects for the coming months, speaker after speaker had maintained that two countries would help pull the world out of the recession: China and India. And here, in India, the refrain is the opposite, Sinha said. Here, the refrain is that if the September 11 attacks had occurred in India, the government would not have been able to handle the situation; therefore, it is nikammi (useless); therefore, it must go!

But even this particular species -- this pessimism about the governments we have -- is just the immediate manifestation of defeatism. The conviction is not just that the government will not be able to handle the crisis. We seem convinced that whatever the government is doing will in fact boomerang and recoil on India. Indeed, even that too is just the second layer of defeatism. Beneath that layer is the conviction that whatever is happening -- not just what the government is doing, but events in general -- will in fact turn against India.

"But should Jaswant Singh have rushed into announcing support for the Americans?" people asked -- within government as much as outside. "That is bound to enrage the Taliban. We have unnecessarily made ourselves a target."

Days had not passed, and the refrain became the opposite: "But Pakistan has stolen a march over us again. They offered support, and see how the Americans are wooing them. They are going to give them billions of dollars. Military aid too is being resumed. And Pakistan is sure as hell going to use it against India."

But on the logic of a few days earlier, by announcing that it was joining the international coalition against terrorism, was Pakistan not enraging the Taliban? Would the Taliban not target Pakistan rather than India? True, Pakistan was trying to extract a few extra dollars: but the very effort was bound to deepen distrust in the US and Europe, it was bound to confirm apprehensions about its nature. Bartering the very ones in whom it had taken so much pride, the Taliban, for dollars was bound to corrode the psyche of its people, to demean them in their own eyes. Dollars or no dollars, Pakistan was inviting the recoil of a defeated Taliban within Pakistan. All this was obvious, it was elementary, yet it was completely buried under our pessimism about what events -- any set of events -- are liable to entail for India.

Events had so conspired that the US and other countries were at last joining the war we in India have been fighting for two decades. For 15 years, as our people were being mowed down by terrorists trained, equipped and indoctrinated by Pakistan, the US had asked us, �But where is the evidence?� That very country had been awakened. Was that not the opportunity that we ought to grab? It was no one�s case that the US or any other country is going to solve our problem for us. Nor that any new bond that may be forged because of the events that had shaken the US was going to last forever. The premise underlying the Indian government�s response was merely that the events had provided a moment of congruence.

Consider the alternative. Supposing the response had been ambiguous, supposing we had delayed the announcement of support. Within days, scores and scores of countries, specifically including China and Pakistan, had announced that they would be part of the coalition to fight terrorism. Supposing we had announced our support for the American campaign after these other countries had signed up. Would the critics not have fumed that the government had humiliated India -- that it had reduced the country to being just the tail of even Pakistan?

Even a fool could have seen the reason for which the US and others were paying attention to Pakistan: it was not just its geographical position; the real �asset� Pakistan had was that its intelligence agencies and Army are the ones that had the closest links with the Taliban. To secure vital information about the disposition of Taliban troops, their arsenal, to learn who among them could be weaned away by bribes and through whom -- for all this the government that could help most and in the least possible time was that of Pervez Musharraf. And just as obvious were the effects that signing up in the campaign to destroy the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would inflict on Pakistan.

After all, till the other day, Pakistan had been preening itself on how, by installing the Taliban, it had acquired �strategic depth� vis-�-vis India. It had been projecting itself in the Islamic world as the country whose guidance, support and patronage had rid the area of the godless government of the atheist Communists; it had been projecting itself as the country which had helped usher in �the rule of the pure.� Till recently, it had been insisting, its intellectuals had been declaiming about, how popular the Taliban were with the people of Afghanistan -- the Taliban have brought peace, they said, they have purged society of what the people realised were the decadent values of the Christian West... And now, suddenly, the success of Pakistan was that it had positioned itself among those who were destroying the same Taliban. Would that not delegitimize the religious rationale itself? Would that delegitimization in turn not gravely affect Pakistan�s self-perception? Of its being the �fortress of Islam�? Of its being an Islamic state? Indeed, would it not undermine the religious underpinning of Pakistan -- its raison d��tre, the very basis of its self-definition as the country that is the "Not-Hindustan"?

All of this was elementary. Yet, none of it was allowed to dilute pessimism.

"But they have not banned the Jaish-e-Mohammed [JeM] and other organisations operating in India as yet." And then, the day after a news report that the US had in fact moved to proscribe some of these, The Indian Express lead story was, "Ban to have little effect on the ground." This was followed with some glee by stories to the effect that while one part of the US Administration had proposed the ban, the ban had yet to be formalised. And if the US had banned them? Without a doubt, we would have been back to "But what difference will that make on the ground? After all, these organisations do not use banking channels. Their members do not wait to get visas. In any case, they have had so much warning time, by now they must have moved their finances to safer havens." Soon, the opposite became the subject to beat our chests about:

"Isn�t it a humiliation? We offered help, but no one is taking us up on the offer? Yes, there is a war on terrorism, but where are we in that war?" In fact, there was active co-operation: intelligence sharing, access to many in the Northern Alliance with whom India had been in close touch for years.

And soon, just ten-twelve days into the bombing campaign: "The campaign is a failure, bin Laden is still at large, the Taliban have just scattered into the hills, the Northern Alliance is stuck where it was. Bush�s Grand Alliance is coming apart..."

By now more than a habit, our very nature

During the days he spent in India, the then US President, Bill Clinton made several statements which went in favour of the Indian position. In the hours that he spent on his way through Pakistan, Clinton addressed the people of that country directly, and delivered a hiding that no self-respecting country can possibly stomach. "But these are just statements," said some about the statements that underscored the Indian position: when some secondary official like Robin Raphael used to say a few words -- "Kashmir is disputed territory"2 -- these very persons used to scare us, "See, the US has come out so decisively in favour of the Pakistani position." Now, when the President of that very country was so decisively and so many times speaking against the Pakistani position, "So what? These are just statements." During a discussion on Clinton�s visit, a Star News anchorperson went a step further. The very fact that the statements were so strongly in favour of Indian perceptions and the Indian position, she saw working against India! "But don't you think that such statements may anger Pakistan so much that it adopts an even more aggressive posture?," she asked. I had to ask in turn, "Why have we got into such a negative mould? What if even one of the statements had been in favour of the Pakistani position? Would we not have been shouting, "See, the US has endorsed the Pakistani position... A colossal failure for Indian diplomacy?" She merely smiled.

When all else fails there is always China to enable us to hold on to despondence. And so it was during Clinton�s visit: "But his real motive is to use us to counter China," went the argument. Till the other day, the lament had been, "See, the US is out to undermine us. On the one side it is doing everything possible to ignore what Pakistan is doing -- in exporting terrorism, in building up its nuclear arsenal, its missile capability; in particular what it is doing in developing missiles, atomic weapons -- with the help of China, in manifest violation of international agreements, what the two together are doing in manifest disregard of the US� own laws and admonitions. On the other, the US is bending backwards to deepen its links with China." Suddenly, that the refrain became, "But Clinton's real intention is to use India to counter China."

Is it not up to us to ensure that we get the best out of an arrangement, to ensure that the other country is not able to use us? Of course, in Afghanistan, the US is acting in its own interest. But so would we, indeed so are we.

So pervasive has this habit become that the fact that the replacement of the Taliban regime would be a boon for us -- one factory manufacturing terrorists less, a major defeat for militant Islam, the patrons and guides of the terrorists either crushed or made busy protecting themselves, fissures in Pakistani society widened -- all this was all but obscured in the anxiety to discover the latest shred by which the government could be pilloried, or the gloominess confirmed.

Nor is this phenomenon limited to foreign or security affairs. Over the decades, an entire industry has grown up whose sole function is to frighten us about the future. I well remember the seemingly learned essays that the Economic and Political Weekly used to carry during the Green Revolution days. They were written by prominent economists and we had to mug them up for our exams. The new seed varieties will increase productivity per acre, the argument went. That will make land more valuable. The rich �kulaks� -- a much favoured term then -- will buy up the holdings of small and marginal farmers. The latter will sink into being landless labourers... Progressive immiserisation of the masses... The Green Revolution will turn red... What happened in fact? Productivity did increase. Land did become more valuable. So valuable that no one would sell it...

The �Dunkel Draft�, the new regime on Intellectual Property Rights, allowing foreign investment in the insurance sector, the much-denounced �terminator seeds�� The �debate� on each has followed the identical course.

Bleakness is deduced whichever of the opposites comes to pass. If the West gives aid; �It is trying to entangle us in the coils of international capitalism.� If it does not, "It is heartless, to say nothing of access to its markets, it is denying us even aid." If the multinationals invest, �They are taking over.� If they do not, �But where is the investment?� If caps for foreign investment are raised, �Multinationals will swallow us up.� When evidence suggests that they are themselves on the run � that these companies are being threatened by newcomers every other day, �But all the more reason for them to invade territories in which they can establish themselves more easily.� If fertiliser subsidies are lowered, �This is an anti-farmer Government.� If they are not, �Chemical fertilisers and pesticides are poisoning our land, our rivers, our bodies. The Government is subsidising cancer.�

For years, papers had been writing about the pollution that Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses had been causing. As the Delhi Administration had done little in the matter other than keep asking for time, the Supreme Court eventually ordered that a class of the worst polluters be taken off the road. The Hindustan Times story now was, "School children to be affected by SC order"!

Dr. A P J Abdul Kalam was delivering the first lecture in the Ideas that have worked series that I had started under the auspices of the Administrative Reforms Department.3 He had just given a gripping account of what it had been to work under prominent scientists Vikram Sarabhai, Satish Dhawan and Brahmaprakash; of what it had been to participate in projects to build rockets that would carry satellites into space; of what it had been to be present at the launching of those satellites, of being present for Pokharan-II. "So, we have a rocket," a member of the audience began. "But what has that done for the common man?" Kalam had to justify rocket research by recalling how it had helped develop the Reddy-Kalam stent for heart patients!

Ever so often, the gloom is induced by utter misrepresentation. If you take a twig from the neem-tree, you will have to pay royalty to the multinationals, it was said at the height of the propaganda against the �Dunkel Draft.� The reader will recall the pamphlet that was put out over the signatures of the formidable Dattopant Thengdi4 denouncing the Sankhya Vahini proposal.5 Who is Dr. Raj Reddy? it asked -- actually he was... But the Carnegie Mellon University has little standing in information technology, it declared - in fact,... And the clincher, �Is the project not a violation of the Indian Telegraph Act?� A project in the year 2000, a project in a sphere in which a new product is overtaken within 12 to 18 months, in which entire technologies are overtaken in 24 to 36 months, a project in such an area was being criticised on the ground that it was in violation of a law passed in 1885!

As the controversy built up, I studied the proposal. The case against it was patently a contrivance. I took up the matter with a prominent ideologue of such critiques. "There has been a mistake," he said. "It was thought that this was a project of Pramod Mahajan [Union Minister for Information Technology, Communications and Parliamentary Affairs]. That is why the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh] decided that it must not go through." It had turned out that the sponsor of the project had actually been some other minister � indeed, one who was in the very good books of the RSS. But, supposing the Sankhya Vahini had in fact been Mahajan's project. Was that a good enough reason to kill it? "In any case, the pamphlet was not written by anyone in the RSS," the person explained. "It was written by an ex-civil servant." But the high personage had lent his name to the specious argumentation. It is precisely because Dattopant Thengdi had lent his name to the critique that it had been so consequential. "I am myself going to write a note to Dattopantji on this pamphlet," the person said. "Send me the points that strike you." But the controversy killed the project.

In 1993, Motorola had approached India with a proposal to set up a plant to produce computer chips. They wanted some facilities. We spurned them. They packed their bags and went over to Malaysia. Today, Malaysia is the world�s leading exporter of computer chips,6 and we are importers� Our activists drove out Monsanto, and its experiments on genetically modified cotton.7 Today, 40 per cent of China�s cotton is produced from those seeds. They have obviated the need for pesticides. Productivity per acre is almost 35-40 per cent higher than the varieties we use, with the result that our textile industry is at an even greater handicap.

Such prophecies fulfil themselves. We frighten ourselves about the future. As a result, we are less able to focus on the task at hand. And, so the prophecy comes true. In India, being in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has become yet another occasion for us to frighten ourselves and to accuse each other of selling the country�s interests down the drain. In China, the prospect of joining WTO was converted into a timetable -- for implementing reforms.

Respective tasks

It is nobody�s case that the Press should not be critical. Criticising a government and pillorying it is most certainly not �anti-national�. It is the media�s job to keep governments on their toes. But, at the same time, it is an error to mistake contrariness for independence. Correspondingly, it is the job of governments to explain the reasons that have led them to a policy or measure. But, that done, it is the duty of governments to go ahead -- in the face of criticism if necessary. Waiting for a consensus to emerge will be to wait forever -- specially in view of what being out of office has come to mean in India today: that because the person or group is in the Opposition, its job is to denounce, it is to block everything anyone in office proposes to do; even the things that the person was doing when he was in office; in fact, even the things that he is doing where he is in office today. In a word, governments must explain, but, having set out the facts and reasons, it is their duty to do what the country requires. They must proceed in the confidence that 10 years later there will be a consensus around the new configuration that would have come about because of the measures that are being taken now.

As far as the media are concerned, the point is not that they must support what some government is doing. The point is about presumption. The presumption that an Indian government just will not be able to handle a situation.

The presumption has meant that, for the media, India cannot be in the right -- whether on terrorism in Punjab, or in combating the assault on Kashmir, or with regard to the demographic invasion from Bangladesh. The presumption that leads commentators to see virtue in someone else doing something and when India does the same thing -- when it even attempts to do same thing -- it makes our commentators detect fascism, communalism and evil. Indian liberals are awe struck when they see Muslims go through the postures of namaz: �What devotion, what surrender,� they exclaim as ten thousand Muslims in the local Jama Masjid bend and rise in unison. But, when Hindus flock to their temples in thousands, or when thirty million of them gather at the sangam for the Kumbh mela, the very persons sneer, �Look at those ignoramuses, steeped neck deep in superstition. How will you ever get these people to develop?� When Bill Clinton was not able to get two of his nominees to be appointed as Attorneys General because they had employed an unregistered alien for the briefest of times, that was taken as evidence of the great respect the American system has for law. Here, whenever a government has made some effort -- however small -- to send Bangladeshis back, a howl has been raised, so great a howl that governments have given up making even an effort to deport illegal immigrants.

As India cannot be right, the presumption that everyone who speaks up for the country, everyone who stands up for it, who risks his life for it, also cannot be right. Recall the total fabrications that were put out about �atrocities committed by the Army� in Kashmir -- fabrications nailed in the Press Council report, Crisis and Credibility.8 Recall the way self-serving, backdated letters of a Brigadier were used by the press to put the armed forces in the wrong during the Kargil war.

The presumption finally that every development is liable to work against India.

This addiction to the negative is compounded by laziness. Anyone can say anything. So long as it is negative, it will get him headlines in the media. A natural disaster occurs -- an earthquake in the Kumaon hills or Gujarat, a cyclone tears a region apart in Orissa or Gujarat, and Sonia Gandhi is sure to arrive. And on each occasion, she has the same comment: the government has completely failed to provide adequate relief to the victims. On not a single occasion has she documented her charge. But each time she gets headlines, �Sonia blasts Government.� Natwar Singh and other spokespersons of the Congress, after the May 1998 atomic tests -- condemning the Government one day for betraying the traditions of Buddha, Ashoka and Gandhi, and the next on the ground that it had not yet taken the requisite steps for �atomic weaponisation�: headlines on both days. The drivel of Kapil Sibal and others during the Kargil war...

On December 13, 2001, terrorists entered the premises of Parliament. Guns, grenades, RDX -- it was a huge assault. The next day, The Hindu carried on its front page, in bold type, the statement of Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) from Pakistan: the attack has been engineered by Indian intelligence agencies, the paper reported him saying, so as to pressurise Parliament into passing the anti-terrorist ordinance, and to pressurise the international alliance against terrorism "to bracket the Kashmir freedom struggle with terrorism"! The same day, opposite the edit-page that paper carried a dispatch -- again in bold type -- from a conspicuous commentator-correspondent: �Who called in the Army?� he asked; had the "well established procedures" been followed for this "entirely irregular requisitioning of Army units?" he wanted to know. What an occasion for Constitutionalism!

It is as if press persons and others in the media feel that, by printing something negative -- even if it be drivel of this kind -- they prove that they are independent; that, conversely, were they to say, or even report anything positive they would be damned as having �sold themselves�, as having become chamchas. Indeed, so pervasive is this habit that it seems that they are afraid not just that others will conclude that they have �sold out�, but that in their own eyes they would have done so.

There is thus, first the laziness -- anything anyone says is just swallowed and vomited; specially if what that person says casts doubt, specially if he hurls an allegation. Recall the play that Ajit Jogi�s calumny got: "Three officers -- one in the Prime Minister's Office, one in the Disinvestment Department, one in my Government -- have pocketed Rs. 100 Crore in the [Bharat Aluminium Company] BALCO disinvestment."9 In no country would that kind of calumny, especially when made by that kind of a person, be reproduced � here it became headline news. Where is that calumny today? Actually, we know where it is; "...the facts herein show that a fair, just and equitable procedure has been followed in carrying out this disinvestment," the Supreme Court has held in its judgement on the BALCO case. "The allegations of lack of transparency or that the decision was taken in a hurry or that there has been an arbitrary exercise of power are without any basis. We strongly deprecate such unfounded averments which have been made by an officer of the State..." But what is the remedy for the immense harm that was done by those who broadcast those allegations -- without the slightest examination?

Next, there is the sudden switch. A dacoit is caught; suddenly, he becomes an �under-trial� � till yesterday the Press was full of jeers about the government�s ham-handedness because of which it was not being able to apprehend him; the moment he is caught, the same Press is after the police and jail officials for not respecting his rights.

One day the question is, "But why are you not talking to Pakistan? After all, what is the harm in just talking?" The moment a step is taken to talk, suddenly the question becomes, "You had said you won�t talk to Pakistan so long as cross-border terrorism continues. It has not stopped. Why are you thinking of talking to Musharraf now? In any case, what has come out of your talks in the past?"

When the hijacked Indian aircraft IC-81410 was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, media were full of the shouting of the relatives of the passengers. This barrage, I can testify from personal knowledge, weighed heavily on the key decision-makers. It was one of the main factors that led them to decide that there was no alternative but to accept the demands of the hijackers and to release the Pakistani terrorists that the hijackers had demanded. The moment the terrorists were released, the same newspapers were pontificating about the �abject surrender to terrorism�, they were contrasting the pusillanimity of the Indian government with the example of Israel, they were lecturing the same government they had, by their selective coverage, pressurised with reminders of the policy of the US -- �No negotiations with terrorists.�

The moment there is some massacre by terrorists, our papers are full of pictures of corpses. But I heard some of the same editors remark with admiration at the way the American media had covered the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon: �Not one gory scene, not one image that could dishearten the people... Look at the way they are building up Bush. After all, his IQ could not have shot up all of a sudden. They were making fun of him till yesterday, and suddenly he is being made to come across as such a decisive, knowledgeable leader, as one in full control...�

Socialism for the masses. Patriotism for other countries! As in government so in media: there is paralysis by analysis. Recall, China during the Gulf War: it quietly got the post-Tiananmen sanctions lifted; here in India we encoiled ourselves in acrimonious accusations about whether we should give America refuelling facilities. The accusations about offering to assist in the campaign against the Taliban regime ended only because the Taliban collapsed so soon, and so ignominiously. In a word, while other countries get down to doing what their interest requires, we debate the alternatives to death even before we have chosen one of them.

Two basic factors

Beyond these proximate factors are two. First, by now the notion that a newspaper is �a product�, like soap, the notion that media persons are in the �infotainment business�, not in public service, has indeed triumphed. Superciliousness has become the reigning ideology. Being bothered about the country is to be hysterical. Examining a matter in depth is to be a bore. So, on the one hand, the smart question, and on the other the �sound-byte� is all.

Every event, every situation -- war as much as some development project -- is yet another spectator sport. Media do not feel that they have any responsibility at all for helping find a solution: it is satiated when, in its own view, it has punctured any and every proposal that has been put forward by others. And when, on the rare occasion, a �solution� is urged, it is simplicity itself: �Advani must go,� �Fernandes should resign,� �The Government should...�

But the fundamental cause is deeper. Beneath the presumptions that we have noticed, lies indoctrination of a hundred and fifty years: the notions that we have taken in from the elder Mill, Macaulay, Marx, and the missionaries. Our commentators are hybrids of these forbears. India is not a country, Indians are not a nation. It is a zoo, to recall Girilal Jain�s description of their view. There are monkeys in it, zebras, elephants, the whole lot. But each of these is a separate species. When a Vivekananda or a Gandhi looks at the people, what strikes him are the myriad common elements. But when these persons see the very same people, what strikes them on the other hand is what is different! India is not real, they declare, it is but a geographical expression. It was never one country. It was put together only recently � and that too by the British. Not one country? Ever heard of a group of pilgrims being stopped as they crossed from one �kingdom� into the next one? India is not real, they declare; caste is real, being Hindu or Muslim, being Tamil or Bengali -- that is what is real.

As India is not one, it is not entitled to defend its position in Kashmir, it has no right to throw out Bangladeshis on the ground that they are �outsiders�. When the Pakistani government, having financed, patronised and controlled madrasas (seminaries) for decades, at last announces moves to regulate them, that announcement, though just an announcement, becomes proof positive that the government is taking a giant step towards secularism, that it is taking a bold step towards modernising that country, that it is giving up the past and is ready to establish peace with India -- and if peace does not come about, that is only because the Indian Government, indeed India itself has not liberated itself from phobias it has conjured up about the past.

This disengagement from our past, from our country, from our people, from our very being, has become so extreme that anything alien is the fashion of choice. And the more alien, the more fashionable. A singer from Pakistan, even when he or she is little above the mediocre; even better, a couple of singers from Pakistan singing �Sufi music�, when neither the singers nor their caveman-like braying has the remotest link with Sufis -- what a fashion it is to swoon over them! Advocating what in fact is the Pakistani line on an issue -- even when that issue is one that concerns our defence forces, even when it concerns our territorial integrity -- doing so establishes the commentator�s �independence.� "I am ...," a well-known editor said as he met Musharraf at Agra for that breakfast meeting, adding with evident and defiant pride, "In India I am known as a Pakistani agent, and I am proud of that."

When he was the Pakistani Ambassador in Delhi, Riaz Khokhar was in effect editing three of Delhi's dailies without using newsprint -- so easily was he able to get the Pakistani slant into reports and editorial comments on Kashmir and the rest. Having made nationalism a dirty word, having made it synonymous with �fascism�, the media has altered its reflexes. Its natural reaction is to strike a pose -- and that pose which will advertise the fact that it is not �fascist�!

END NOTES

1. A meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors took place on November 16-17, 2001 in Ottawa.

2. She declared the whole of Kashmir as "disputed" with three contending parties-India, Pakistan and Kashmir. See Parama Sinha Palit, "The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas", Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, vol. XXV, no. 6, September 2001, p. 791.

3. Dr. Kalam, the then Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India, delivered the first lecture on March 11, 2000 in New Delhi. It was organised by the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances in collaboration with the Civil Services Officers� Institute (CSOI) and the Government of Andhra Pradesh. See "India Needs Double Digit GDP to Remove Poverty : Dr. Kalam", Link

4. Thengdi is the chief of Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), a trade union affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

5. Sankhya Vahini was a joint venture project that envisages a high-speed data communication network to serve as India�s high bandwidth Internet backbone. Sankhya Vahini India Limited (SVIL), with an authorised share capital of Rs.1,000 crores, is a collaborative venture between the Department of Telecommunications/Department of Telecom Services (DoT/DTS), some premier educational institutions, the Department of Electronics (DoE), the Ministry of Information Technology (MIT) and the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) of the United States, through a U.S.-based company called IUNet Inc. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 16, 1998. Dr. V S Arunachalam and Dr. Raj Reddy, both attached to the CMU, are principle designers of the network. See, for instance, "Sankhya Vahini and some questions," Frontline, Chennai, vol. 17, no. 11, May 27 � June 09, 2000. Link.

6. See "Developing SE Asia: Singapore and Malaysia", Link.

7. "Indian peasants torch crops amid fear of losing home-grown seed", The Guardian, London, October 6, 1999.

8. Crisis and Credibility, Report of the Press Council of India, January and July 1991, Lancer Paper 4, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991. In December 1990, the Press Council of India (PCI) appointed a Committee to study the role of the press and its functioning in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the alleged reports of excesses by the armed forces against civilians of the State. The Committee paid a visit to the State and its report was adopted by the PCI in July 1991. The findings indicated that reports of excesses "have been 'grossly exaggerated or invented." The Committee consisted of B G Verghese, K Vikram Rao and Jamna Das Akhtar.

9. Ajit Jogi, Chief Minister of Chhatisgarh, had alleged that a bribe of Rs 100 crore was paid to the officers in the Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) disinvestment case. See "Shourie asks Jogi to come out with proof of corruption charges", Daily Excelsior, Jammu, March 11, 2001. Also see "Jogi says there is massive corruption in Balco deal", The Financial Express, New Delhi, March 19, 2001.

10. The Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was hijacked from Kathmandu, Nepal on December 24, 1999. The incident culminated with the terrorists-for-hostages swap on December 31, 1999 at Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Kargil: Who and What is Responsible?

Arun Shourie

To attribute the occupation by Pakistanis of such extended stretches in Kargil to "an intelligence failure" is too facile. It is an evasion -- an evasion of the basic cause, an evasion of responsibility.

The basic reason why we are always taken by surprise lies in the notions of political correctness in which we have imprisoned discourse, and through that policy. Anyone who talks of the plans of Pakistan, its single-point programme to harm India, indeed anyone who talks about anything to do with our security is dubbed a war-monger. Agencies like RAW are routinely traduced. Hurling allegations at our security forces -- fabrications about human rights violations by them, and the rest -- is de rigueur. When persons who have put their lives on the line to save the country are encoiled in false cases -- as officers and men of the Punjab police have been encoiled -- not a soul raises a finger to support them.

You can do a little exercise. Look up papers or Parliamentary proceedings of the last year, and find out what happened each time Mr L K Advani drew attention to the continuing murderous activities of the ISI, and what they portended for the country, he was set upon -- in Parliament, in newspapers, in public meetings. War-monger, right-wing Hindu chauvinist, alarmist, deliberately embarrassing the Prime Minister who is trying to improve relations with our neighbour...

At my own minuscule level I have had this experience first-hand. I have had occasion to write about the way Pakistan perceives itself -- as "the not-India"; about the sway that fundamentalism has acquired there; about how this is drilled into the populace -- from quaidas to history books; about what organizations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba are openly proclaiming as their agenda -- to break India, to kill Hindu kafirs; about the vast resources and facilities which Pakistan's ruling establishment is channeling to them.

Each of those write-ups has been based entirely on published material, on material published in Pakistan. But each time I have written on these things, I have invariably been set upon. He is pursuing an anti-Islam agenda, he is just using Pakistan as a device to malign Muslims and Islam, he is out to create disharmony between communities...

Consider a recurring example. Today we are very exercised about occupation of some spots in Kargil by Pakistani forces and mercenaries. They are a few hundred -- assume a figure higher than anything anyone has mentioned as yet, say they are a thousand. The peaks where they have dug in are isolated, uninhabited. Recall now that on the estimates put together by the Home Ministry -- not now, but in 1992 -- over two crore Bangladeshis have made their way into India. As a result of this demographic invasion, large tracts of our country -- for instance, in Assam -- are such that the state police does not dare to even enter them. But the moment the matter is raised, the shout, "Anti-Bengali," "Anti-Muslim"...

This shutting of eyes is being made worse by the new ideology. Take out the newspapers of the last three weeks, the period during which the enemy has been killing our soldiers, during which, diplomatese apart, we have been invaded and have been at war. Total up the relative space that these papers devoted to the cricket World Cup and to the fighting in Kargil. Now, it is not the case that the country has suddenly become sports-minded during the last five years. It is just that corporations invested vast amounts to make use of the event to advertise their products. Papers have reported figures ranging up to eight hundred crores. These amounts having been invested, a hype about it was created.

One part is the obscenity of it, I can think of no other word: that our soldiers should be laying down their lives, and our papers should be whipping up lather about matches in England. The other thing is the effect such hype has on, literally, the ability of a country to prosecute a war. Ridding an area so remote, an area with terrain of the type Kargil has is not a one-day match. Every inch has to be fought for, with lives. The engagement is bound to take long. And, given the singular aim of a country like Pakistan, wresting the area back is not going to be the end of the matter by any means: ensuring that Pakistan will not get an opportunity to reoccupy the place will require protracted, arduous, meticulous work. A people who hear about Kargil for three-four minutes in the evening news, and then settle down to watch the day's match for four-five hours will never have the staying power that defence against a focused, indoctrinated enemy requires.

It is this atmosphere -- not just the failure of some one agency -- which paves the way for an enemy. Mental habits are fatal by themselves But so feeble has our State and our society become that we will not be able to put even crass self-interest away for the defence of our land, certainly not in any substantial way, certainly not for more than a moment. Take the failure to detect the occupation in Kargil itself. To prevent intrusion in that kind of area requires continuous physical presence. It requires sophisticated equipment. Maintaining a presence in Siachin costs the country Rs 3.5 crores a day. Armymen say that maintaining an equivalent presence in the entire Kargil area will cost three to four times that amount. That would amount to 10 to 12 crores a day. A person like me certainly believes that as such amounts are required, they must be provided, that the way we are placed leaves us no option. And the amounts can be found: half the total amount can be found by cutting just one boondoggle -- just eliminate the 2 crores which is placed at the disposal of every Member of Parliament to spend on "development projects" in his constituency. You will get sixteen hundred crores by doing just that little thing.

But here is an exercise. Find the MPs who will agree to abolish this largesse they have conferred on themselves. Or find a group which will accept a reduction in the subsidy which it has wrested from the State.

So, when we say there has been an "intelligence failure" we are stating an important fact, but we are also just using a phrase. By it we are evading the basic cause. We are diverting attention from our own responsibility in the matter.

I have already dealt with what happens when, even on such a matter, we deal with our ministers and governments as if they were the enemy who is to be trapped, and made a fool of. That itself is just the symptom -- it results from the basic mental fashion: not to be finding fault with those defending our country, not to be denouncing those who are speaking up for it is seen as being a primitive. The release of the Parvez Musharraf tapes holds another lesson. At least on occasion we should have faith in what our governments are saying. Repeatedly, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister hinted that what they had said about who had known what in Pakistan was based on evidence. But pressmen and politicians were so intent on finding fault that they paid no attention. And now?

A sense of priorities, a little faith, and an even more elementary thing: a little work. Pakistan, like all countries in our neighbourhood, is important for our future. But how many of us take the trouble to read even the newspapers of Pakistan? I will give an example of what we would have learnt if we had been glancing at those papers, and make a forecast based on them. The first has a dual advantage: it shows what we would have been alerted to, and it also nails what Pakistan has been trying to cover up.

In reading what follows please bear in mind that while small, stray news items had been appearing earlier, it was only on the 27th of May, the day after air-strikes were launched, that Kargil became big news in our papers.

On 9 April, 1999, The Nation of Pakistan carried an interview with Zakiu Rehman Lakhvi, the Amir of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, one of the most rabid organizations which has been spawned by Pakistan's intelligence agencies. "We are extending our network inside India," he declared, "and have carried out various attacks on Indian installations successfully in Himachal Pradesh last year." An open, unambiguous claim. Also a revealing one, for it gives us a glimpse into the mentality of this kind: the "installations" they annihilated were poor workers constructing a road -- such is their concept of jihad in the cause of Allah! But I am on another allusion in the interview: the paper reported him as saying, "the task to hit specially the Indian artillery targeting Azad Kashmir's border population has been given."

On 7 May, apropos nothing, The Nation suddenly reported a huge attack from India, and claimed that it had been repulsed. It said that Indian forces had launched an unprovoked attack in the Shyok sector, and that "valiant Pakistani troops, displaying traditional courage and determination to defend every inch of the country's territory, thwarted the attack in which a large number of intruders were killed and several others injured. The Indian Army withdrew in disarray and even failed to retrieve the bodies of its soldiers..." India denied any such attack, saying the Pakistanis had fired at a routine forward patrol. But the patriotic reporting told the tale: a case was being prepared.

On 15 May, successes of the Pakistani Army were being claimed on the authority of "a senior Indian official"! "A senior Indian official," The Nation claimed in a dispatch datelined New Delhi, "confirmed that the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Home Affairs received a message on May 13 evening that Pakistani troops had advanced in Kargil and wrested five posts in a 5 km radius from the township...." Could a Pakistani correspondent really have access of that kind? Would "a senior official" in New Delhi be sharing such information with him?

The News of 16th May was more specific. It reported -- ostensibly from Srinagar! --that there had been intense shelling and deployment by Indians, and said that these had come "amid reports that Pakistani troops on May 14th captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass, some 160 km southwest of Srinagar." "Some 40 shells pounded snow-covered Drass and adjoining areas before Pakistani troops took control of the village located on the Line of Control."

By the 17th of May, several papers were proclaiming triumphs, and attributing them -- not to some ghostly mujahidin but -- to the Pakistani Army. "With shelling and firing between Pakistani and Indian troops on the LoC continuing for the last seven days," The Nation observed in its editorial, "our forces have captured another seven Indian posts in the Kargil sector..., captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass..., and severely disrupted the Indian Army's logistics by taking control of important passes in the Kargil sector, choking off the Jammu-Kargil highway. The Indian troops in the Ladakh region too are facing pressure from the Pakistani forces as well as Kashmiri freedom fighters... It is gratifying that the state of preparedness and capability of our armed forces have prevented Indian adventurism on the LoC from making any gains..."

That very day, that is on 17 May, The Frontier Post reported, "Indian troops after having been defeated in the Kargil sector where the Pakistan Army seized five very important Indian posts with a radius of more than 28 km, have opened fire in almost all the sectors of the LoC... The gain of the Pakistan Army at Siachin has disrupted the communication system of the Indian troops..."

"War between India and Pakistan has started in the Kargil sector," proclaimed the Jasarat of 17 May. "According to Army sources, in this war some special units of the Pakistan Army are participating as they are full of martyrdom sentiments for the country..."

The paper from Lahore, Khabrain, reported on 18 May, "Twelve Indian Army posts have come under the control of Pakistani forces. The Indian Army movement on the Ladakh-Srinagar road has completely stopped..."

In its editorial the next day, the Nawai Waqt said, "Clashes are continuing between the Indian and Pakistani forces along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector..."

Reviewing developments over the preceding days, on 27 May, The Nation observed, " ...The concentration of Indian troops in the Kargil sector started taking place after they suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Pakistani troops..."

No circumlocution about who had scored the victories, is there? As countries began blaming Pakistan more and more, references to the Pakistan Army disappeared, and were replaced by acclaim for the so-called mujahideen!

Our Government had the Parvez Musharraf transcripts all the while. Their statements were in part based on these. Had our papers been keeping us posted about what was appearing in Pakistani papers we would have been quite up-to-date on our own.

Nor would we have needed any confidential briefings about what the objective of the Pakistan Army has been. In prescribing what should be done, General Hamid Gul, the pir and ideologue of fundamentalism within the Pakistan Army, revealed what the aim has been. Speaking to Nawai Waqt he said that Pakistani men who had occupied the heights in Kargil must at all costs be enabled to continue there for four or five months. The area would become totally inaccessible after that. They would then be able to choke off the Indian highway completely. India would have to vacate Siachin, and after that it would lose Ladakh...

And now for the forecast. Look around Tamil Nadu. It is at peace. There are no communal clashes. There are no caste clashes. But listen to the former head of the ISI, Lt. General (retd.) Javed Nasir. The Jang of 23 April reported his talk to the Jang Forum. "Gen. Javed also said that if the Kashmir issue goes on for three years more, then Tamils will also rise against India and the country would disintegrate within three years...." That is not an astrologer's forecast. It reveals one of the key areas that ISI is concentrating on. Surprised at the explosives that keep turning up in the state?

In a word, a sense of proportion, some faith in our agencies and authorities, and a little work -- don't wait to get hold of some secret document, read what is being published. Specially what is being proclaimed over loudspeakers by the opponent.

Intelligence is too important to be left to intelligence agencies.

India Connect
June 14, 1999