Arun Shourie
"Congress insists PM ignored I-B reports on Kargil," ran the six column heading of The Indian Express on 16 September. Other papers too gave much prominence to the allegation. This time the Congress spokesman had used as his peg a front-page story in The Tribune of that morning about a "strategy backgrounder" which the paper said the Army had prepared and circulated.
Entitled, "PM ignored intelligence reports," the front page story of The Tribune was an elaborate one. It claimed that the Army Headquarters "has gone to the extent of blaming Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for ignoring intelligence reports on the intrusion." "The strategy paper, 'Important issues: Case of Brigadier Surinder Singh,' prepared and circulated recently by the AHQ clearly states that it was possible that the Prime Minister may have been given some information of Pakistan's designs by RAW and IB, but he ignored it, 'in the context of the Lahore Bus ride.' " "The paper has made allegations against the Government for ignoring its needs," The Tribune reported. But not just against the Government, it would seem! For The Tribune went on to report that "the strategy paper makes allegations against all and sundry." "Similarly, the Joint Intelligence Committee, whose responsibility is to carry out an assessment of threat and prepare position papers, never did so," the newsreport quoted the strategy paper to have said...
Every syllable of the story smacked of concoction. The title, Army Headquarters suddenly going back on what it has itself been maintaining, its doing so before the internal review instituted by the Army Chief has been completed, its doing so before the Subramanyam Committee has completed even its hearings.
The story was replete with nonsense so patent that even a fool would have spotted it. Recall that sentence -- the one on which the Congress based its charge of the day -- "The strategy paper... clearly states that it was possible that the Prime Minister may have been given some information of Pakistan's designs by RAW and IB, but he ignored it, 'in the context of the Lahore Bus ride.' " That something "was possible". What was possible? That the Prime Minister "may have been given." And what may have he been given? "Some information of Pakistan's designs..."!
In one para -- and that too on the basis of "may be" raised to the power 3 -- the Army was said to have "clearly state(d)" that the Prime Minister may have been given information. Two paragraphs later the Army paper was said to have hurled allegations "at all and sundry."
"The failure is of external intelligence agencies," The Tribune quoted the "strategy backgrounder" to have observed, only to elaborate, "Military Intelligence Directorate is responsible for external intelligence"! Not only would that imply that Army Headquarters was owning up to the failure, it would imply that Army Headquarters does not know what the function of the Directorate of Military Intelligence is!
Within hours of the newspaper being available, the Army issued a strongly worded press release. "It is categorically stated that no 'strategy backgrounder' as mentioned in the article has either been prepared or disseminated to any source," the Army said. " ...The news item under reference is baseless, malicious and has been presented to tarnish the apolitical image of the Army," it stated. "The article appearing in The Tribune dated 15 September 1999 appears to be sponsored / published by an aggrieved party for self-motivated reasons best known to the individual sponsor. The Army Headquarters once again most emphatically denies preparation / dissemination of such a document."
The Prime Minister's Office also issued a denial -- just as categorical.
Both statements were available by early afternoon. But of course the Congress could not allow mere facts to come in the way of hurling its allegation-for-the-day!
The headlines secured, the Congress forgot all about the "strategy backgrounder" at its press briefing the next day!
But not The Asian Age! By the 18th September, it had an altogether new theory. It could not argue that the so-called "strategy backgrounder" was genuine. While earlier newspapers had been insinuating that the Army and the Government had been working hand-in-glove to cover up failure on the Kargil front, the paper now asserted that the Government had left the Army to fend for itself during the Kargil conflict, that the Army was incensed that the PM had kept silent on the controversies kicked up around Brigadier Surinder Singh. So much so that, without citing any source, the paper asserted, as the headline across the top of its front page proclaimed, that a war" had erupted between the PMO and the Army!
As for the Congress, The Tribune fabrication have been squeezed for such milk as it could yield, its allegation for the next day had at its prop statements which Niaz Naik, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, and Sartaj Aziz, its current Foreign Minister had made. These gentlemen have to contend with the political turmoil that encircles Nawaz Sharief and his circle there. There is a war of statements going on there: that ex-diplomat had alleged that India and Pakistan had come close to an agreement on Kashmir, and it is the Pakistan Army which had killed it by its incursion into Kargil; the Foreign Minister -- who had earlier been saying that the Pakistan Army had done nothing in Kargil -- had countered by saying that whatever the Pakistan Army had done in Kargil was in the interests of Pakistan! That is the impulse and origin of statements emanating from Pakistan these days. But the sole concern of the Congress was to locate some news peg for its allegation-of-the-day.
Brajesh Mishra, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, who is the one who had dealt with Niaz Naik, stated on record that no secret deal had been in the works. But for the Congress, the Indian Army is not to be believed, Indian civil servants are not to be believed, of course the Indian Prime Minister is not to be believed. But every tid bit from Pakistan is gospel truth.
Telling reciprocity! During the Kargil war the statements of Sonia Gandhi and her spokesmen were of such succour to Pakistan that they became top stars on Pakistan TV. During the elections, the statements from Pakistan have become props for the Congress!
The consequences are obvious. By making statements of Pakistani personnel as the basis for charges here, these spokesmen contrive a situation in which Pakistan can set the agenda of debate even during elections in India: they can say whatever they think will help the side they think is better for them.
The other side is that there are statements and statements of Pakistani politicians. To which of these would these spokesmen of the Congress respond? In her interview to the magazine Sunday of 1-7 August, 1999, Benazir Bhutto maintains that she and Rajiv came to an agreement about, among other things, "withdrawal from Siachin". As Indian forces alone are in control of Siachin, this would imply that Rajiv had agreed to withdraw Indian forces from Siachin. Benazir provides a circumstantial detail: she says that when she was at the Commonwealth meeting, Rajiv telephoned her and told her that while he could not see through the agreement during elections, he would implement it after the elections. The Congress lost.
Going by its criteria, would the Congress, therefore, explain how its much-vaunted Prime Minister agreed to hand back Siachin? Moreover, going by its daily mud-slinging about non-existent "secret deals", would the Congress explain whether Rajiv Gandhi took Parliament, to say nothing of the country into confidence before coming to such an agreement -- an agreement to vacate land which our Army has sacrificed so much to retain?
While it is at the job, will the Congress explain whether Pandit Nehru took the country, did he even take Parliament into confidence before halting our advancing troops in 1948, and thereby inflicting a loss of 83,100 sq km of territory on our country? Did he work out a national consensus, did he work out a consensus even in the Cabinet before needlessly referring Kashmir to the UN, and thus saddling us with the problem that plagues us to this day? He did not: Sardar Patel was ever so opposed to this unnecessary show of internationalism -- in fact, even Liaquat Ali was pleasantly surprised as even he had not asked for this to be done.
Dr P N Dhar, one of the main participants in the Simla negotiations, who later became Principal Secretary to Mrs Indira Gandhi, has disclosed on record that she and Z A Bhutto came to an agreement to convert the Line of Control into the international border between Indian and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. Indeed, this would have been a part of the documents signed at Simla but for Bhutto saying that such a step would disable him on his return, that instead it should be left out for the moment and he would see it through within a few months. Did Mrs Gandhi take the country or Parliament into confidence before coming to such an understanding?
Rajiv Gandhi commenced aid to LTTE: that has caused a lethal civil war in a neighbour which has been our friend for centuries, it has caused the death of over 1500 Indian soldiers. Did he take the country or Parliament into confidence before doing so? It is known, in fact, that even after he sent the Indian Army to fight the very terrorists that he had foolishly agreed to arm and equip, his Government continued assistance to those very terrorists. Is there a single instance of another Government arming terrorists who were killing its own soldiers? Did he work out a national consensus or take Parliament into confidence to continue assisting terrorists so that they could kill our soldiers?
But today, cock and bull concoctions about secret deals, peremptory demands about taking the country into confidence!
And in any case, where does the Congress allegation based on Niaz Naik's statement stand now? For just two days after the Congress built up its conspiracy theory on his reported assertion, Niaz Naik repudiated what had been attributed to him! The report which had him saying that India and Pakistan had been close to a secret deal was a "fabrication", he stated in a written statement.
No problem for the Congress. It had passed on to the next allegation!
Forgeries have of course been an industry with the Congress since Rajiv's time.
The "letter" which was supposed to have been written by the then Director of CIA, William Casey, to the President of the conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation of the USA -- spelling out a design to destabilise Rajiv's Government.
The forgeries to establish that V. P. Singh and his son, Ajeya Singh, had a foreign account in St. Kitts, that $ 21 million had been paid into it as kickbacks.
The forged letter by which my colleagues, S. Gurumurthy and A. Janakiraman were arrested, and V. P. Singh hounded on the ground that a foreign detective agency had been engaged to excavate facts about Rajiv's associates.
The "letter" which V. P. Singh was supposed to have written to the President naming his colleagues, Arun Nehru and Arif Mohammed Khan as having been involved in corrupt deals.
The "letter" JP was supposed to have written in which he was said to have called V. P. Singh "spineless" and much else.
The "hotel bills" proving Arun Nehru's stay in New York, and "telephone records" that established that he had been calling tax havens in the West Indies.
The "letter" to that same American detective in which V. P. Singh is supposed to have asked him to locate the foreign accounts of his colleagues -- including ones who were dead, like Karpoori Thakur! And so on.
In each case, there was a pattern. The forgery would be elaborate, as was the one in The Tribune, with details and all. It would appear in one, preferably out-of station paper: the St. Kitts forgeries started in distant Middle east, in The Arab Times! It would be picked up by one or two papers -- The Telegraph and The Hindustan Times led the rest in the St. Kitts affair. Waving these "news reports" Congressmen would hurl their falsehoods.
A well-practised routine, therefore. But even by the lamentable standards of the Congress, forgeries in this round mark a new low. They seek to implicate not just political opponents. They have implicated the Army of the country. First, spokesmen of the Congress talked of a letter and file that contained intelligence information that had been furnished to the Government about the Pakistani buildup. They spelled out an elaborate number. They declared that if the Government denied the existence of the letter and file, they would produce it. The Army stated that it wasn't just that there was no letter or file of that number, there was no numbering system that matched the number that had been put out. The Congress spokesmen just let the matter drop!
Next, they and friendly magazines like Outlook, flaunted "letters" that Brigadier Surinder Singh was said to have written in August and November, 1998, in which he was said to have warned the Army about the Pakistani build up. The letters had never been received in Army Headquarters, nor at any other level or part of the Army.
The Congress spokesman then flaunted a receipt which he said established that the letters had been received. Friendly papers -- some of which have been campaigning even more energetically for the Congress than Congressmen -- ran with this receipt. "Lying Kargil Generals nailed," ran the headline across the front page of The Asian Age. They reproduced the facsimile of the receipt.
The legend on the top of the receipt itself said that it was for a "Redressal of Grievance" communication from the Brigadier -- the officer had been transferred, he had filed an appeal against it. Moreover, it was dated 28 June, 1999. How could it prove the receipt of letters in August and November in the preceding year? On inquiry I learnt that this oddity had not been noticed!
But the next day the paper compounded the fib. "Army acknowledges receiving the letters," it proclaimed. What the Army had done was to state what the receipt itself stated, that the Redressal of Grievance communication had been received -- on 28 June, 1999. How did this amount to an acknowledgment that the letters in question -- ostensibly written in eight and eleven months earlier had been received?
But the paper was no less zealous than the Congress!
The remedies are obvious. Things have reached such a pit that readers should as a rule disbelieve what papers say till the record of the publication or journalist in question establishes to the contrary.
Second, newspapers should scrutinize each other's work, and report the findings to the reading public.
And in the present case so should at least two other institutions. The Election Commission has been so concerned about things that may affect the fairness of the election process. Surely, nothing but nothing has so polluted the electoral atmosphere, no one has done as much to mislead voters as the liars in the Congress. Why not make a study of the allegations which were hurled, and give us your finding about their veracity?
The other institution of course is the Press Council. Its function is to help maintain standards in the press. It is evident that the fabrications would have got nowhere -- not in 1987-89, not now -- without the active collaboration of some of our leading newspapers and magazines. Why not examine the allegations they broadcast, and what the basis was for them?
After all, to purvey a libel uttered by another is libel. To broadcast falsehood uttered by another is to compound it.
India Connect
September 21, 1999
Showing posts with label indian army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label indian army. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Sunday, May 25, 2008
Kargil: Who and What is Responsible?
Arun Shourie
To attribute the occupation by Pakistanis of such extended stretches in Kargil to "an intelligence failure" is too facile. It is an evasion -- an evasion of the basic cause, an evasion of responsibility.
The basic reason why we are always taken by surprise lies in the notions of political correctness in which we have imprisoned discourse, and through that policy. Anyone who talks of the plans of Pakistan, its single-point programme to harm India, indeed anyone who talks about anything to do with our security is dubbed a war-monger. Agencies like RAW are routinely traduced. Hurling allegations at our security forces -- fabrications about human rights violations by them, and the rest -- is de rigueur. When persons who have put their lives on the line to save the country are encoiled in false cases -- as officers and men of the Punjab police have been encoiled -- not a soul raises a finger to support them.
You can do a little exercise. Look up papers or Parliamentary proceedings of the last year, and find out what happened each time Mr L K Advani drew attention to the continuing murderous activities of the ISI, and what they portended for the country, he was set upon -- in Parliament, in newspapers, in public meetings. War-monger, right-wing Hindu chauvinist, alarmist, deliberately embarrassing the Prime Minister who is trying to improve relations with our neighbour...
At my own minuscule level I have had this experience first-hand. I have had occasion to write about the way Pakistan perceives itself -- as "the not-India"; about the sway that fundamentalism has acquired there; about how this is drilled into the populace -- from quaidas to history books; about what organizations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba are openly proclaiming as their agenda -- to break India, to kill Hindu kafirs; about the vast resources and facilities which Pakistan's ruling establishment is channeling to them.
Each of those write-ups has been based entirely on published material, on material published in Pakistan. But each time I have written on these things, I have invariably been set upon. He is pursuing an anti-Islam agenda, he is just using Pakistan as a device to malign Muslims and Islam, he is out to create disharmony between communities...
Consider a recurring example. Today we are very exercised about occupation of some spots in Kargil by Pakistani forces and mercenaries. They are a few hundred -- assume a figure higher than anything anyone has mentioned as yet, say they are a thousand. The peaks where they have dug in are isolated, uninhabited. Recall now that on the estimates put together by the Home Ministry -- not now, but in 1992 -- over two crore Bangladeshis have made their way into India. As a result of this demographic invasion, large tracts of our country -- for instance, in Assam -- are such that the state police does not dare to even enter them. But the moment the matter is raised, the shout, "Anti-Bengali," "Anti-Muslim"...
This shutting of eyes is being made worse by the new ideology. Take out the newspapers of the last three weeks, the period during which the enemy has been killing our soldiers, during which, diplomatese apart, we have been invaded and have been at war. Total up the relative space that these papers devoted to the cricket World Cup and to the fighting in Kargil. Now, it is not the case that the country has suddenly become sports-minded during the last five years. It is just that corporations invested vast amounts to make use of the event to advertise their products. Papers have reported figures ranging up to eight hundred crores. These amounts having been invested, a hype about it was created.
One part is the obscenity of it, I can think of no other word: that our soldiers should be laying down their lives, and our papers should be whipping up lather about matches in England. The other thing is the effect such hype has on, literally, the ability of a country to prosecute a war. Ridding an area so remote, an area with terrain of the type Kargil has is not a one-day match. Every inch has to be fought for, with lives. The engagement is bound to take long. And, given the singular aim of a country like Pakistan, wresting the area back is not going to be the end of the matter by any means: ensuring that Pakistan will not get an opportunity to reoccupy the place will require protracted, arduous, meticulous work. A people who hear about Kargil for three-four minutes in the evening news, and then settle down to watch the day's match for four-five hours will never have the staying power that defence against a focused, indoctrinated enemy requires.
It is this atmosphere -- not just the failure of some one agency -- which paves the way for an enemy. Mental habits are fatal by themselves But so feeble has our State and our society become that we will not be able to put even crass self-interest away for the defence of our land, certainly not in any substantial way, certainly not for more than a moment. Take the failure to detect the occupation in Kargil itself. To prevent intrusion in that kind of area requires continuous physical presence. It requires sophisticated equipment. Maintaining a presence in Siachin costs the country Rs 3.5 crores a day. Armymen say that maintaining an equivalent presence in the entire Kargil area will cost three to four times that amount. That would amount to 10 to 12 crores a day. A person like me certainly believes that as such amounts are required, they must be provided, that the way we are placed leaves us no option. And the amounts can be found: half the total amount can be found by cutting just one boondoggle -- just eliminate the 2 crores which is placed at the disposal of every Member of Parliament to spend on "development projects" in his constituency. You will get sixteen hundred crores by doing just that little thing.
But here is an exercise. Find the MPs who will agree to abolish this largesse they have conferred on themselves. Or find a group which will accept a reduction in the subsidy which it has wrested from the State.
So, when we say there has been an "intelligence failure" we are stating an important fact, but we are also just using a phrase. By it we are evading the basic cause. We are diverting attention from our own responsibility in the matter.
I have already dealt with what happens when, even on such a matter, we deal with our ministers and governments as if they were the enemy who is to be trapped, and made a fool of. That itself is just the symptom -- it results from the basic mental fashion: not to be finding fault with those defending our country, not to be denouncing those who are speaking up for it is seen as being a primitive. The release of the Parvez Musharraf tapes holds another lesson. At least on occasion we should have faith in what our governments are saying. Repeatedly, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister hinted that what they had said about who had known what in Pakistan was based on evidence. But pressmen and politicians were so intent on finding fault that they paid no attention. And now?
A sense of priorities, a little faith, and an even more elementary thing: a little work. Pakistan, like all countries in our neighbourhood, is important for our future. But how many of us take the trouble to read even the newspapers of Pakistan? I will give an example of what we would have learnt if we had been glancing at those papers, and make a forecast based on them. The first has a dual advantage: it shows what we would have been alerted to, and it also nails what Pakistan has been trying to cover up.
In reading what follows please bear in mind that while small, stray news items had been appearing earlier, it was only on the 27th of May, the day after air-strikes were launched, that Kargil became big news in our papers.
On 9 April, 1999, The Nation of Pakistan carried an interview with Zakiu Rehman Lakhvi, the Amir of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, one of the most rabid organizations which has been spawned by Pakistan's intelligence agencies. "We are extending our network inside India," he declared, "and have carried out various attacks on Indian installations successfully in Himachal Pradesh last year." An open, unambiguous claim. Also a revealing one, for it gives us a glimpse into the mentality of this kind: the "installations" they annihilated were poor workers constructing a road -- such is their concept of jihad in the cause of Allah! But I am on another allusion in the interview: the paper reported him as saying, "the task to hit specially the Indian artillery targeting Azad Kashmir's border population has been given."
On 7 May, apropos nothing, The Nation suddenly reported a huge attack from India, and claimed that it had been repulsed. It said that Indian forces had launched an unprovoked attack in the Shyok sector, and that "valiant Pakistani troops, displaying traditional courage and determination to defend every inch of the country's territory, thwarted the attack in which a large number of intruders were killed and several others injured. The Indian Army withdrew in disarray and even failed to retrieve the bodies of its soldiers..." India denied any such attack, saying the Pakistanis had fired at a routine forward patrol. But the patriotic reporting told the tale: a case was being prepared.
On 15 May, successes of the Pakistani Army were being claimed on the authority of "a senior Indian official"! "A senior Indian official," The Nation claimed in a dispatch datelined New Delhi, "confirmed that the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Home Affairs received a message on May 13 evening that Pakistani troops had advanced in Kargil and wrested five posts in a 5 km radius from the township...." Could a Pakistani correspondent really have access of that kind? Would "a senior official" in New Delhi be sharing such information with him?
The News of 16th May was more specific. It reported -- ostensibly from Srinagar! --that there had been intense shelling and deployment by Indians, and said that these had come "amid reports that Pakistani troops on May 14th captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass, some 160 km southwest of Srinagar." "Some 40 shells pounded snow-covered Drass and adjoining areas before Pakistani troops took control of the village located on the Line of Control."
By the 17th of May, several papers were proclaiming triumphs, and attributing them -- not to some ghostly mujahidin but -- to the Pakistani Army. "With shelling and firing between Pakistani and Indian troops on the LoC continuing for the last seven days," The Nation observed in its editorial, "our forces have captured another seven Indian posts in the Kargil sector..., captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass..., and severely disrupted the Indian Army's logistics by taking control of important passes in the Kargil sector, choking off the Jammu-Kargil highway. The Indian troops in the Ladakh region too are facing pressure from the Pakistani forces as well as Kashmiri freedom fighters... It is gratifying that the state of preparedness and capability of our armed forces have prevented Indian adventurism on the LoC from making any gains..."
That very day, that is on 17 May, The Frontier Post reported, "Indian troops after having been defeated in the Kargil sector where the Pakistan Army seized five very important Indian posts with a radius of more than 28 km, have opened fire in almost all the sectors of the LoC... The gain of the Pakistan Army at Siachin has disrupted the communication system of the Indian troops..."
"War between India and Pakistan has started in the Kargil sector," proclaimed the Jasarat of 17 May. "According to Army sources, in this war some special units of the Pakistan Army are participating as they are full of martyrdom sentiments for the country..."
The paper from Lahore, Khabrain, reported on 18 May, "Twelve Indian Army posts have come under the control of Pakistani forces. The Indian Army movement on the Ladakh-Srinagar road has completely stopped..."
In its editorial the next day, the Nawai Waqt said, "Clashes are continuing between the Indian and Pakistani forces along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector..."
Reviewing developments over the preceding days, on 27 May, The Nation observed, " ...The concentration of Indian troops in the Kargil sector started taking place after they suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Pakistani troops..."
No circumlocution about who had scored the victories, is there? As countries began blaming Pakistan more and more, references to the Pakistan Army disappeared, and were replaced by acclaim for the so-called mujahideen!
Our Government had the Parvez Musharraf transcripts all the while. Their statements were in part based on these. Had our papers been keeping us posted about what was appearing in Pakistani papers we would have been quite up-to-date on our own.
Nor would we have needed any confidential briefings about what the objective of the Pakistan Army has been. In prescribing what should be done, General Hamid Gul, the pir and ideologue of fundamentalism within the Pakistan Army, revealed what the aim has been. Speaking to Nawai Waqt he said that Pakistani men who had occupied the heights in Kargil must at all costs be enabled to continue there for four or five months. The area would become totally inaccessible after that. They would then be able to choke off the Indian highway completely. India would have to vacate Siachin, and after that it would lose Ladakh...
And now for the forecast. Look around Tamil Nadu. It is at peace. There are no communal clashes. There are no caste clashes. But listen to the former head of the ISI, Lt. General (retd.) Javed Nasir. The Jang of 23 April reported his talk to the Jang Forum. "Gen. Javed also said that if the Kashmir issue goes on for three years more, then Tamils will also rise against India and the country would disintegrate within three years...." That is not an astrologer's forecast. It reveals one of the key areas that ISI is concentrating on. Surprised at the explosives that keep turning up in the state?
In a word, a sense of proportion, some faith in our agencies and authorities, and a little work -- don't wait to get hold of some secret document, read what is being published. Specially what is being proclaimed over loudspeakers by the opponent.
Intelligence is too important to be left to intelligence agencies.
India Connect
June 14, 1999
To attribute the occupation by Pakistanis of such extended stretches in Kargil to "an intelligence failure" is too facile. It is an evasion -- an evasion of the basic cause, an evasion of responsibility.
The basic reason why we are always taken by surprise lies in the notions of political correctness in which we have imprisoned discourse, and through that policy. Anyone who talks of the plans of Pakistan, its single-point programme to harm India, indeed anyone who talks about anything to do with our security is dubbed a war-monger. Agencies like RAW are routinely traduced. Hurling allegations at our security forces -- fabrications about human rights violations by them, and the rest -- is de rigueur. When persons who have put their lives on the line to save the country are encoiled in false cases -- as officers and men of the Punjab police have been encoiled -- not a soul raises a finger to support them.
You can do a little exercise. Look up papers or Parliamentary proceedings of the last year, and find out what happened each time Mr L K Advani drew attention to the continuing murderous activities of the ISI, and what they portended for the country, he was set upon -- in Parliament, in newspapers, in public meetings. War-monger, right-wing Hindu chauvinist, alarmist, deliberately embarrassing the Prime Minister who is trying to improve relations with our neighbour...
At my own minuscule level I have had this experience first-hand. I have had occasion to write about the way Pakistan perceives itself -- as "the not-India"; about the sway that fundamentalism has acquired there; about how this is drilled into the populace -- from quaidas to history books; about what organizations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba are openly proclaiming as their agenda -- to break India, to kill Hindu kafirs; about the vast resources and facilities which Pakistan's ruling establishment is channeling to them.
Each of those write-ups has been based entirely on published material, on material published in Pakistan. But each time I have written on these things, I have invariably been set upon. He is pursuing an anti-Islam agenda, he is just using Pakistan as a device to malign Muslims and Islam, he is out to create disharmony between communities...
Consider a recurring example. Today we are very exercised about occupation of some spots in Kargil by Pakistani forces and mercenaries. They are a few hundred -- assume a figure higher than anything anyone has mentioned as yet, say they are a thousand. The peaks where they have dug in are isolated, uninhabited. Recall now that on the estimates put together by the Home Ministry -- not now, but in 1992 -- over two crore Bangladeshis have made their way into India. As a result of this demographic invasion, large tracts of our country -- for instance, in Assam -- are such that the state police does not dare to even enter them. But the moment the matter is raised, the shout, "Anti-Bengali," "Anti-Muslim"...
This shutting of eyes is being made worse by the new ideology. Take out the newspapers of the last three weeks, the period during which the enemy has been killing our soldiers, during which, diplomatese apart, we have been invaded and have been at war. Total up the relative space that these papers devoted to the cricket World Cup and to the fighting in Kargil. Now, it is not the case that the country has suddenly become sports-minded during the last five years. It is just that corporations invested vast amounts to make use of the event to advertise their products. Papers have reported figures ranging up to eight hundred crores. These amounts having been invested, a hype about it was created.
One part is the obscenity of it, I can think of no other word: that our soldiers should be laying down their lives, and our papers should be whipping up lather about matches in England. The other thing is the effect such hype has on, literally, the ability of a country to prosecute a war. Ridding an area so remote, an area with terrain of the type Kargil has is not a one-day match. Every inch has to be fought for, with lives. The engagement is bound to take long. And, given the singular aim of a country like Pakistan, wresting the area back is not going to be the end of the matter by any means: ensuring that Pakistan will not get an opportunity to reoccupy the place will require protracted, arduous, meticulous work. A people who hear about Kargil for three-four minutes in the evening news, and then settle down to watch the day's match for four-five hours will never have the staying power that defence against a focused, indoctrinated enemy requires.
It is this atmosphere -- not just the failure of some one agency -- which paves the way for an enemy. Mental habits are fatal by themselves But so feeble has our State and our society become that we will not be able to put even crass self-interest away for the defence of our land, certainly not in any substantial way, certainly not for more than a moment. Take the failure to detect the occupation in Kargil itself. To prevent intrusion in that kind of area requires continuous physical presence. It requires sophisticated equipment. Maintaining a presence in Siachin costs the country Rs 3.5 crores a day. Armymen say that maintaining an equivalent presence in the entire Kargil area will cost three to four times that amount. That would amount to 10 to 12 crores a day. A person like me certainly believes that as such amounts are required, they must be provided, that the way we are placed leaves us no option. And the amounts can be found: half the total amount can be found by cutting just one boondoggle -- just eliminate the 2 crores which is placed at the disposal of every Member of Parliament to spend on "development projects" in his constituency. You will get sixteen hundred crores by doing just that little thing.
But here is an exercise. Find the MPs who will agree to abolish this largesse they have conferred on themselves. Or find a group which will accept a reduction in the subsidy which it has wrested from the State.
So, when we say there has been an "intelligence failure" we are stating an important fact, but we are also just using a phrase. By it we are evading the basic cause. We are diverting attention from our own responsibility in the matter.
I have already dealt with what happens when, even on such a matter, we deal with our ministers and governments as if they were the enemy who is to be trapped, and made a fool of. That itself is just the symptom -- it results from the basic mental fashion: not to be finding fault with those defending our country, not to be denouncing those who are speaking up for it is seen as being a primitive. The release of the Parvez Musharraf tapes holds another lesson. At least on occasion we should have faith in what our governments are saying. Repeatedly, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister hinted that what they had said about who had known what in Pakistan was based on evidence. But pressmen and politicians were so intent on finding fault that they paid no attention. And now?
A sense of priorities, a little faith, and an even more elementary thing: a little work. Pakistan, like all countries in our neighbourhood, is important for our future. But how many of us take the trouble to read even the newspapers of Pakistan? I will give an example of what we would have learnt if we had been glancing at those papers, and make a forecast based on them. The first has a dual advantage: it shows what we would have been alerted to, and it also nails what Pakistan has been trying to cover up.
In reading what follows please bear in mind that while small, stray news items had been appearing earlier, it was only on the 27th of May, the day after air-strikes were launched, that Kargil became big news in our papers.
On 9 April, 1999, The Nation of Pakistan carried an interview with Zakiu Rehman Lakhvi, the Amir of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, one of the most rabid organizations which has been spawned by Pakistan's intelligence agencies. "We are extending our network inside India," he declared, "and have carried out various attacks on Indian installations successfully in Himachal Pradesh last year." An open, unambiguous claim. Also a revealing one, for it gives us a glimpse into the mentality of this kind: the "installations" they annihilated were poor workers constructing a road -- such is their concept of jihad in the cause of Allah! But I am on another allusion in the interview: the paper reported him as saying, "the task to hit specially the Indian artillery targeting Azad Kashmir's border population has been given."
On 7 May, apropos nothing, The Nation suddenly reported a huge attack from India, and claimed that it had been repulsed. It said that Indian forces had launched an unprovoked attack in the Shyok sector, and that "valiant Pakistani troops, displaying traditional courage and determination to defend every inch of the country's territory, thwarted the attack in which a large number of intruders were killed and several others injured. The Indian Army withdrew in disarray and even failed to retrieve the bodies of its soldiers..." India denied any such attack, saying the Pakistanis had fired at a routine forward patrol. But the patriotic reporting told the tale: a case was being prepared.
On 15 May, successes of the Pakistani Army were being claimed on the authority of "a senior Indian official"! "A senior Indian official," The Nation claimed in a dispatch datelined New Delhi, "confirmed that the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Home Affairs received a message on May 13 evening that Pakistani troops had advanced in Kargil and wrested five posts in a 5 km radius from the township...." Could a Pakistani correspondent really have access of that kind? Would "a senior official" in New Delhi be sharing such information with him?
The News of 16th May was more specific. It reported -- ostensibly from Srinagar! --that there had been intense shelling and deployment by Indians, and said that these had come "amid reports that Pakistani troops on May 14th captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass, some 160 km southwest of Srinagar." "Some 40 shells pounded snow-covered Drass and adjoining areas before Pakistani troops took control of the village located on the Line of Control."
By the 17th of May, several papers were proclaiming triumphs, and attributing them -- not to some ghostly mujahidin but -- to the Pakistani Army. "With shelling and firing between Pakistani and Indian troops on the LoC continuing for the last seven days," The Nation observed in its editorial, "our forces have captured another seven Indian posts in the Kargil sector..., captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass..., and severely disrupted the Indian Army's logistics by taking control of important passes in the Kargil sector, choking off the Jammu-Kargil highway. The Indian troops in the Ladakh region too are facing pressure from the Pakistani forces as well as Kashmiri freedom fighters... It is gratifying that the state of preparedness and capability of our armed forces have prevented Indian adventurism on the LoC from making any gains..."
That very day, that is on 17 May, The Frontier Post reported, "Indian troops after having been defeated in the Kargil sector where the Pakistan Army seized five very important Indian posts with a radius of more than 28 km, have opened fire in almost all the sectors of the LoC... The gain of the Pakistan Army at Siachin has disrupted the communication system of the Indian troops..."
"War between India and Pakistan has started in the Kargil sector," proclaimed the Jasarat of 17 May. "According to Army sources, in this war some special units of the Pakistan Army are participating as they are full of martyrdom sentiments for the country..."
The paper from Lahore, Khabrain, reported on 18 May, "Twelve Indian Army posts have come under the control of Pakistani forces. The Indian Army movement on the Ladakh-Srinagar road has completely stopped..."
In its editorial the next day, the Nawai Waqt said, "Clashes are continuing between the Indian and Pakistani forces along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector..."
Reviewing developments over the preceding days, on 27 May, The Nation observed, " ...The concentration of Indian troops in the Kargil sector started taking place after they suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Pakistani troops..."
No circumlocution about who had scored the victories, is there? As countries began blaming Pakistan more and more, references to the Pakistan Army disappeared, and were replaced by acclaim for the so-called mujahideen!
Our Government had the Parvez Musharraf transcripts all the while. Their statements were in part based on these. Had our papers been keeping us posted about what was appearing in Pakistani papers we would have been quite up-to-date on our own.
Nor would we have needed any confidential briefings about what the objective of the Pakistan Army has been. In prescribing what should be done, General Hamid Gul, the pir and ideologue of fundamentalism within the Pakistan Army, revealed what the aim has been. Speaking to Nawai Waqt he said that Pakistani men who had occupied the heights in Kargil must at all costs be enabled to continue there for four or five months. The area would become totally inaccessible after that. They would then be able to choke off the Indian highway completely. India would have to vacate Siachin, and after that it would lose Ladakh...
And now for the forecast. Look around Tamil Nadu. It is at peace. There are no communal clashes. There are no caste clashes. But listen to the former head of the ISI, Lt. General (retd.) Javed Nasir. The Jang of 23 April reported his talk to the Jang Forum. "Gen. Javed also said that if the Kashmir issue goes on for three years more, then Tamils will also rise against India and the country would disintegrate within three years...." That is not an astrologer's forecast. It reveals one of the key areas that ISI is concentrating on. Surprised at the explosives that keep turning up in the state?
In a word, a sense of proportion, some faith in our agencies and authorities, and a little work -- don't wait to get hold of some secret document, read what is being published. Specially what is being proclaimed over loudspeakers by the opponent.
Intelligence is too important to be left to intelligence agencies.
India Connect
June 14, 1999
Hazratbal Mosque Crisis: How and Why it Happened?
Arun Shourie
May I begin with a few passages from my book 'A Secular Agenda'? It was sent to the press in late September and comes out later this week. A chapter, "No time to relent", which concludes the section on Kashmir notes:
"On April 9, intelligence agencies received information that a number of militants had gathered at Hazratbal mosque. The army and the BSF surrounded the place. Eighteen high-level militants were inside. They were as good as in the bag -- it was just a question of waiting them out. But suddenly and insistently the army and the BSF were ordered... to lift the cordon. The militants escaped With great effort and at great risk -- three of them were caught subsequently one of them was the constable whose death became the occasion for the strike by police. Why in hell were they allowed to escape in the first place?
"The revolt by the J & K police showed three things -- the depth to which such nonsense had pushed the situation, the opportunity we still had if only we would let the army etc. work, and also how we were squandering every favorable turn. The policemen were all defiance and bravado. In just 10 minutes they were cowering before soldiers and pleading that the soldiers save the honour of the J & K police by not lowering the police flag! That was yet another moment to begin to re-establish authority. But like every turn it too was allowed to pass.
"The consequences were not long in coming. Since May, civilian and military intelligence had been reporting that mercenaries had begun entering Sopore. Intelligence and others urged decisive and early action. Nothing was done. By September, about 600 of them were reported not only to be there, they were reported to have entrenched themselves in bunkers dug out in some houses at various points in the town. Minimal action in May-June would have seen the end of them. By September, a Bluestar-type operation alone would have sufficed. And intelligence was warning that if that sort of action was not launched immediately, and the snow were allowed to set in, the mercenaries would get another four to five months to fortify their presence. What sort of an operation would be necessary then?
"Indeed with the governor's dithering the paralysis has crept from Sopore to Srinagar itself. Till April, the security forces used to enter and search whichever place they had reason to believe was being used by terrorists as a hide-out or a meeting place. In the following months, they were kept from entering Hazratbal, the medical and engineering colleges and other places. The result has been predictable. The terrorists and their civilian front-men have now a large presence at these sites and they have made arrangements so that, should the armed forces now attempt to storm the places, government must risk substantial civilian casualties..."
Now, this was not foresight. It is what I was being told by intelligence officers. They had been sending reports to this effect to every high quarter. It is because they were receiving absolutely no response at all to their warnings that they had reached out to others.
At the top, the persons agreed with everything, said they saw the gravity of the situation, that they would take requisite action swiftly, and did absolutely nothing.
I cannot pretend to have been shocked. I cannot even pretend that I was taken in by their "agreeing with everything": I have learnt that this is their way of avoiding the bother of going into the matter any further. I cannot even pretend that their deciding nothing, their just sitting-transfixed as possums was any surprise. But I was perturbed: The matters were so urgent, the officers were not getting a hearing. I, therefore, kept going back, and urging others to seize the matter. To no effect.
By late September-early October, communication between Srinagar and the home ministry had broken down completely. Mr Rajesh Pilot, the George Fernandes of the current round, who had wrecked so much by his bullishness, who along with Mr Farooq Abdullah had sponsored Gen (Retired) K V Krishna Rao, was by now blaming Gen Rao for the state of affairs; Gen Rao in turn was letting it be known that he had no time for junior ministers from Delhi. Mr Chavan was still in sulk. Everything, therefore, depended on Mr Rao. He saw how dear the 'personality clashes' were proving for the country. But habits ingrained deep by a life-time of lying low had left him little inclination to intervene. Mr Arjun Singh left him no time.
At about this time intelligence agencies reported that arms were being stored in the police barracks adjoining the Hazratbal mosque. And, that the barracks and the shrine were being used by the terrorists to 'interrogate' and torture those they charged with being informers. Even if the shrine is out of bounds, at least raid and clean up the barracks, the intelligence agencies urged. The proposal was vetoed. If not a raid, at least send senior officials on a surprise inspection. Even that was not done.
On October 14, the terrorists held what was virtually an exhibition of arms and ammunition they had piled up inside the shrine. This too was reported. Nothing was done. Then, it seems, came reports that the militants were going to whisk away otherwise damage the relic or the mosque. Then the army was asked to cordon off the place.
But three things were apparent at once. There was no plan about what was to be done after the cordoning, nothing had been decided about what the final objectives of the siege were going to be: To save the relic? To nab the militants? Yet the honour of the army, indeed of the country had been committed.
Second, Delhi still had no time. Don't ask me, I am completely out of it - that was Mr Pilot's refrain, Mr Chavan had not stepped forth: Mr Rao has left things to Mr Pilot -- that was his premise. Mr Rao in turn was busy - with the re-entry of Mr Asoke Sen, with scotching Mr Arjun Singh, with fobbing off the troubles in Karnataka, with fobbing off the pulling and tugging of rivals in Delhi, with bringing about a truce between Mr ND Tiwari and Mr Jitendra Prasad so that the list for UP could be put out... It was not till the fourth day of the siege that he found time to hear the officers.
The third fact was even worse. Every hour showed that the coterie of officers around Gen Rao was acting at cross purposes with the army. The moment the siege was laid it was decided, and announced, that water and electricity be cut off. In fact, they were not cut off till two-and-a-half days later by the army taking the matter in its own hands. We do not rule out force, said the corps commander. Forces shall not enter the shrine at all, said Gen Rao. On October 23, water supply was restored, and on the 24th, it was announced that food would be sent in -- the army had not been consulted about either decision.
The decisions were being taken, the 'negotiations' were being conducted by persons about whose tenacity, judgement, inclination there were gravest apprehensions among officials in Delhi. In their hands and Gen Rao's. They had many concerns, the country's interest must have been one of these. But their dominant concern was that they, and no one else was, and remained in charge. A scuttling of the decision of no less than the PM's just a few weeks earlier had been symptomatic. Mr Pilot had recommended the appointment of Mr K P S Gill as DGP, J&K. He had sent the file directly to the Prime Minister -- that he had not routed it through the home minister too had been symptomatic. Having been given the impression that his appointment was through, Mr Gill started discussions in Delhi about the state of affairs in the Valley and about what he would be doing. The Prime Minister eventually cleared the file, noting that he agreed with the proposal in principle, but adding that the home minister may also see. The file remained in transit for two days.
An authority in the highest echelons in Delhi (the person's identity seems to have been established conclusively) not only alerted the clique in Srinagar -- You will be nobodies, Mr Gill listens to no one -- he suggested the way out for them. The Governor had the 'constitutional authority' to appoint to the post an officer from within the state, he noted. The appointment of a local-cadre officer was swiftly announced, and the orders about Mr Gill scuttled.
During the tenure of Mr Jagmohan and of Mr G C Saxena, there was an inner group which decided things -- it included key persons from the army, military and civilian intelligence, the paramilitary and civil administration. That group has little authority now; and in a word, has been replaced by those officials. And it is not as if these latter are the fingers of one hand.
Yet decisions of the greatest moment -- the decisions which shall determine the fate of our country -- are in their hands. The sixth day into the siege, the standing committee of the N I C was called to meet. Some counselled 'utmost restraint' -- they did not spell out what it meant, and what else was the government doing in any case but be 'restrained'? Mr Biju Patnaik counselled either of two options impartially! Send the fellows packing to Pakistan, the world would then know, he said, or strorm the place. Mr Chandrashekhar said he was for neither course being determined in Delhi, such things ought to be left to the men on the spot.
It was not evident what precise level of devolution he had in mind. But the Prime Minister seized on what Mr Chandrashekhar had said. And Mr Rao wanted to assure all present that he had himself spoken to the governor that morning, and had assured him that the Governor was in charge. There would be no interference.
Several participants in the meeting were greatly troubled. It is not just that people on the spot working to cross purposes. It is that people on the spot can decide the logistics, the timing etc., of a specified option. How can they decide the option itself? The consequences of storming the structure, and of letting the terrorists go, will be very different -- they will range from effects on the morale of the forces and our surviving as one country to our foreign relations. The corps commnder on the spot, the governor cannot decide among such vastly different options. That was obvious. Yet the way Mr Rao seized upon Mr Chandrashekhar's observations, and 'summed up' the meeting, left participants feeling that once again devolution had dissolved into abdication.
There were a dozen things to convey -- that negotiations ought to be entrusted to officials who have been specifically trained to conduct them; that the Prime Minister must himself hear the assessment of the corps commander, of the officer in charge of state intelligence, of the governor, that he must hear them one-to-one. But no one could effectively convey these to him. "He will agree with everything..." said one. "He will misuse any meeting in private", said the other. "Who can push a string?" exclaimed the third.
Even though the situation has been allowed to deteriorate to this terrible extent, the country had sufficient competence to handle it -- human, technical, material. But whether that competence will at all be allowed to act depends on people whose competence, inclinations, priorities are attuned to anything but the peril our country is in.
The principal leaders taken together are from Mrs Gandhi's court. Taking orders, passing on decisions, obedience, in fact feigning obedience -- these are the skills that their years in those quarters honed, not that of taking decisions themselves. And their overwhelming concern too is not the peril of the country, but the other courtier -- their dread is not that the country might be broken but that this other fellow may trip them; their aspiration is not that our country be strong and vibrant, it is to plant the tale about that rival in the quarters. That is one factor which accounts for the blundering.
And there are the stratagems they picked up from Mrs Gandhi: Never have the sturdy and independent as colleagues; and never disturb them when they are quarreling and plotting to pull each other down. The consequence is before us: Squabbles of Mr Pilot and Mr Chavan, of Mr Pilot and Gen Rao... -- all have been allowed to fester. And suddenly that is the 'team' which must handle Hazratbal.
Notice too the doggedness with which that other stratagem has been applied -- of having only innocuous men in positions of authority: To the point that today we have a President who cannot give much advice, to say nothing of direction; a Vice-President so decent that he can be depended on never to be stern; an external affairs minister who is so totally dependent; a home minister who is a man of integrity but, how shall we put it?, so self-effacing and reticent; a defence minister who isn't there at all... But the end will be the same as it was in Mrs Gandhi's case: Everyone is too weak to hurt the Prime Minister, but no one is strong enough to help him either. Yet this is the 'team' that must suddenly handle Hazaratbal.
And, as if such hands were not unsteady enough, there are our intellectuals. Mr Pilot, himself an intellectual of note, recently set up a think-tank of intellectuals on Kashmir. Just a few days ago they declared, 'New hope in Kashmir.' And they named a group which, in their view, was promising focal point for commencing a dialogue. That group is today in the forefront of calling for processions to break the siege and liberate the shrine -- in the forefront of urging action that will help the terrorists. But, perhaps I judge too hastily -- the intellectuals haven't quite spoken since the terrorists took over the shrine.
For many of our papers too the siege is but a spectator sport. One paper finds the siege of the terrorists symbolic of the siege of the people of Kashmir Another focuses on cruelties of our forces -- not a word about what the jawans have to go through. Suddenly everyone is repeating the phrases of the Jamaat propagandists -- 'the holiest of shrines in Kashmir.' But till just last year the shrine was the special target of the venom of the Jamaat -- partly because worshipping relics is entirely impermissible in orthodox Islam, it being condemned as a species of idolatory; partly because of Shia-Sunni animosities; partly because the shrine had come to be associated so much with Sheikh Abdullah's cult. But 'the holiest' it suddenly is. 'But it isn't just the rulers , and the intellectuals, and the press. We contribute our mite no less: See the people throng to bazars, see them vie for tickets to Michael Jackson's concert -- is this a people concerned that the crown of their country is close to being sawn away?
The nemesis thus -- not just of the politics of our rulers, not just of the discourse and perceptions of our intellectuals and pressmen, the nemesis of our own ways.
If the country comes out of this episode with honor it will be in spite of us, and only because of the very forces our intellectuals and pressmen deride.
The Observer
October 27, 1993
May I begin with a few passages from my book 'A Secular Agenda'? It was sent to the press in late September and comes out later this week. A chapter, "No time to relent", which concludes the section on Kashmir notes:
"On April 9, intelligence agencies received information that a number of militants had gathered at Hazratbal mosque. The army and the BSF surrounded the place. Eighteen high-level militants were inside. They were as good as in the bag -- it was just a question of waiting them out. But suddenly and insistently the army and the BSF were ordered... to lift the cordon. The militants escaped With great effort and at great risk -- three of them were caught subsequently one of them was the constable whose death became the occasion for the strike by police. Why in hell were they allowed to escape in the first place?
"The revolt by the J & K police showed three things -- the depth to which such nonsense had pushed the situation, the opportunity we still had if only we would let the army etc. work, and also how we were squandering every favorable turn. The policemen were all defiance and bravado. In just 10 minutes they were cowering before soldiers and pleading that the soldiers save the honour of the J & K police by not lowering the police flag! That was yet another moment to begin to re-establish authority. But like every turn it too was allowed to pass.
"The consequences were not long in coming. Since May, civilian and military intelligence had been reporting that mercenaries had begun entering Sopore. Intelligence and others urged decisive and early action. Nothing was done. By September, about 600 of them were reported not only to be there, they were reported to have entrenched themselves in bunkers dug out in some houses at various points in the town. Minimal action in May-June would have seen the end of them. By September, a Bluestar-type operation alone would have sufficed. And intelligence was warning that if that sort of action was not launched immediately, and the snow were allowed to set in, the mercenaries would get another four to five months to fortify their presence. What sort of an operation would be necessary then?
"Indeed with the governor's dithering the paralysis has crept from Sopore to Srinagar itself. Till April, the security forces used to enter and search whichever place they had reason to believe was being used by terrorists as a hide-out or a meeting place. In the following months, they were kept from entering Hazratbal, the medical and engineering colleges and other places. The result has been predictable. The terrorists and their civilian front-men have now a large presence at these sites and they have made arrangements so that, should the armed forces now attempt to storm the places, government must risk substantial civilian casualties..."
Now, this was not foresight. It is what I was being told by intelligence officers. They had been sending reports to this effect to every high quarter. It is because they were receiving absolutely no response at all to their warnings that they had reached out to others.
At the top, the persons agreed with everything, said they saw the gravity of the situation, that they would take requisite action swiftly, and did absolutely nothing.
I cannot pretend to have been shocked. I cannot even pretend that I was taken in by their "agreeing with everything": I have learnt that this is their way of avoiding the bother of going into the matter any further. I cannot even pretend that their deciding nothing, their just sitting-transfixed as possums was any surprise. But I was perturbed: The matters were so urgent, the officers were not getting a hearing. I, therefore, kept going back, and urging others to seize the matter. To no effect.
By late September-early October, communication between Srinagar and the home ministry had broken down completely. Mr Rajesh Pilot, the George Fernandes of the current round, who had wrecked so much by his bullishness, who along with Mr Farooq Abdullah had sponsored Gen (Retired) K V Krishna Rao, was by now blaming Gen Rao for the state of affairs; Gen Rao in turn was letting it be known that he had no time for junior ministers from Delhi. Mr Chavan was still in sulk. Everything, therefore, depended on Mr Rao. He saw how dear the 'personality clashes' were proving for the country. But habits ingrained deep by a life-time of lying low had left him little inclination to intervene. Mr Arjun Singh left him no time.
At about this time intelligence agencies reported that arms were being stored in the police barracks adjoining the Hazratbal mosque. And, that the barracks and the shrine were being used by the terrorists to 'interrogate' and torture those they charged with being informers. Even if the shrine is out of bounds, at least raid and clean up the barracks, the intelligence agencies urged. The proposal was vetoed. If not a raid, at least send senior officials on a surprise inspection. Even that was not done.
On October 14, the terrorists held what was virtually an exhibition of arms and ammunition they had piled up inside the shrine. This too was reported. Nothing was done. Then, it seems, came reports that the militants were going to whisk away otherwise damage the relic or the mosque. Then the army was asked to cordon off the place.
But three things were apparent at once. There was no plan about what was to be done after the cordoning, nothing had been decided about what the final objectives of the siege were going to be: To save the relic? To nab the militants? Yet the honour of the army, indeed of the country had been committed.
Second, Delhi still had no time. Don't ask me, I am completely out of it - that was Mr Pilot's refrain, Mr Chavan had not stepped forth: Mr Rao has left things to Mr Pilot -- that was his premise. Mr Rao in turn was busy - with the re-entry of Mr Asoke Sen, with scotching Mr Arjun Singh, with fobbing off the troubles in Karnataka, with fobbing off the pulling and tugging of rivals in Delhi, with bringing about a truce between Mr ND Tiwari and Mr Jitendra Prasad so that the list for UP could be put out... It was not till the fourth day of the siege that he found time to hear the officers.
The third fact was even worse. Every hour showed that the coterie of officers around Gen Rao was acting at cross purposes with the army. The moment the siege was laid it was decided, and announced, that water and electricity be cut off. In fact, they were not cut off till two-and-a-half days later by the army taking the matter in its own hands. We do not rule out force, said the corps commander. Forces shall not enter the shrine at all, said Gen Rao. On October 23, water supply was restored, and on the 24th, it was announced that food would be sent in -- the army had not been consulted about either decision.
The decisions were being taken, the 'negotiations' were being conducted by persons about whose tenacity, judgement, inclination there were gravest apprehensions among officials in Delhi. In their hands and Gen Rao's. They had many concerns, the country's interest must have been one of these. But their dominant concern was that they, and no one else was, and remained in charge. A scuttling of the decision of no less than the PM's just a few weeks earlier had been symptomatic. Mr Pilot had recommended the appointment of Mr K P S Gill as DGP, J&K. He had sent the file directly to the Prime Minister -- that he had not routed it through the home minister too had been symptomatic. Having been given the impression that his appointment was through, Mr Gill started discussions in Delhi about the state of affairs in the Valley and about what he would be doing. The Prime Minister eventually cleared the file, noting that he agreed with the proposal in principle, but adding that the home minister may also see. The file remained in transit for two days.
An authority in the highest echelons in Delhi (the person's identity seems to have been established conclusively) not only alerted the clique in Srinagar -- You will be nobodies, Mr Gill listens to no one -- he suggested the way out for them. The Governor had the 'constitutional authority' to appoint to the post an officer from within the state, he noted. The appointment of a local-cadre officer was swiftly announced, and the orders about Mr Gill scuttled.
During the tenure of Mr Jagmohan and of Mr G C Saxena, there was an inner group which decided things -- it included key persons from the army, military and civilian intelligence, the paramilitary and civil administration. That group has little authority now; and in a word, has been replaced by those officials. And it is not as if these latter are the fingers of one hand.
Yet decisions of the greatest moment -- the decisions which shall determine the fate of our country -- are in their hands. The sixth day into the siege, the standing committee of the N I C was called to meet. Some counselled 'utmost restraint' -- they did not spell out what it meant, and what else was the government doing in any case but be 'restrained'? Mr Biju Patnaik counselled either of two options impartially! Send the fellows packing to Pakistan, the world would then know, he said, or strorm the place. Mr Chandrashekhar said he was for neither course being determined in Delhi, such things ought to be left to the men on the spot.
It was not evident what precise level of devolution he had in mind. But the Prime Minister seized on what Mr Chandrashekhar had said. And Mr Rao wanted to assure all present that he had himself spoken to the governor that morning, and had assured him that the Governor was in charge. There would be no interference.
Several participants in the meeting were greatly troubled. It is not just that people on the spot working to cross purposes. It is that people on the spot can decide the logistics, the timing etc., of a specified option. How can they decide the option itself? The consequences of storming the structure, and of letting the terrorists go, will be very different -- they will range from effects on the morale of the forces and our surviving as one country to our foreign relations. The corps commnder on the spot, the governor cannot decide among such vastly different options. That was obvious. Yet the way Mr Rao seized upon Mr Chandrashekhar's observations, and 'summed up' the meeting, left participants feeling that once again devolution had dissolved into abdication.
There were a dozen things to convey -- that negotiations ought to be entrusted to officials who have been specifically trained to conduct them; that the Prime Minister must himself hear the assessment of the corps commander, of the officer in charge of state intelligence, of the governor, that he must hear them one-to-one. But no one could effectively convey these to him. "He will agree with everything..." said one. "He will misuse any meeting in private", said the other. "Who can push a string?" exclaimed the third.
Even though the situation has been allowed to deteriorate to this terrible extent, the country had sufficient competence to handle it -- human, technical, material. But whether that competence will at all be allowed to act depends on people whose competence, inclinations, priorities are attuned to anything but the peril our country is in.
The principal leaders taken together are from Mrs Gandhi's court. Taking orders, passing on decisions, obedience, in fact feigning obedience -- these are the skills that their years in those quarters honed, not that of taking decisions themselves. And their overwhelming concern too is not the peril of the country, but the other courtier -- their dread is not that the country might be broken but that this other fellow may trip them; their aspiration is not that our country be strong and vibrant, it is to plant the tale about that rival in the quarters. That is one factor which accounts for the blundering.
And there are the stratagems they picked up from Mrs Gandhi: Never have the sturdy and independent as colleagues; and never disturb them when they are quarreling and plotting to pull each other down. The consequence is before us: Squabbles of Mr Pilot and Mr Chavan, of Mr Pilot and Gen Rao... -- all have been allowed to fester. And suddenly that is the 'team' which must handle Hazratbal.
Notice too the doggedness with which that other stratagem has been applied -- of having only innocuous men in positions of authority: To the point that today we have a President who cannot give much advice, to say nothing of direction; a Vice-President so decent that he can be depended on never to be stern; an external affairs minister who is so totally dependent; a home minister who is a man of integrity but, how shall we put it?, so self-effacing and reticent; a defence minister who isn't there at all... But the end will be the same as it was in Mrs Gandhi's case: Everyone is too weak to hurt the Prime Minister, but no one is strong enough to help him either. Yet this is the 'team' that must suddenly handle Hazaratbal.
And, as if such hands were not unsteady enough, there are our intellectuals. Mr Pilot, himself an intellectual of note, recently set up a think-tank of intellectuals on Kashmir. Just a few days ago they declared, 'New hope in Kashmir.' And they named a group which, in their view, was promising focal point for commencing a dialogue. That group is today in the forefront of calling for processions to break the siege and liberate the shrine -- in the forefront of urging action that will help the terrorists. But, perhaps I judge too hastily -- the intellectuals haven't quite spoken since the terrorists took over the shrine.
For many of our papers too the siege is but a spectator sport. One paper finds the siege of the terrorists symbolic of the siege of the people of Kashmir Another focuses on cruelties of our forces -- not a word about what the jawans have to go through. Suddenly everyone is repeating the phrases of the Jamaat propagandists -- 'the holiest of shrines in Kashmir.' But till just last year the shrine was the special target of the venom of the Jamaat -- partly because worshipping relics is entirely impermissible in orthodox Islam, it being condemned as a species of idolatory; partly because of Shia-Sunni animosities; partly because the shrine had come to be associated so much with Sheikh Abdullah's cult. But 'the holiest' it suddenly is. 'But it isn't just the rulers , and the intellectuals, and the press. We contribute our mite no less: See the people throng to bazars, see them vie for tickets to Michael Jackson's concert -- is this a people concerned that the crown of their country is close to being sawn away?
The nemesis thus -- not just of the politics of our rulers, not just of the discourse and perceptions of our intellectuals and pressmen, the nemesis of our own ways.
If the country comes out of this episode with honor it will be in spite of us, and only because of the very forces our intellectuals and pressmen deride.
The Observer
October 27, 1993
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