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Wednesday, May 28, 2008

Listen to the new India, hear success ring in your ears

Listen to the new India, hear success ring in your ears
Dated August 15, 2003
The Indian Express


Twenty to twenty-five years ago, even 10 years ago, few of us had heard of Information Technology. Today, exports from this industry are worth $10 billion - that is, over Rs. 45,000 crore a year. That figure is 20 per cent of our total exports.

In spite of the fact that each of the markets to which we supply IT software and solutions has been in the trough of recession for years, IT exports have grown by 26 per cent this year.

Infosys had not even been born 25 years ago. Wipro was a company selling vegetable oil. Indeed, other than the ''Tata'' in Tata Consultancy Services, there is scarcely a name in the IT industry that was known then.

And guess what the average age is in the industry? Just 26 and a half! These 26/27-year-olds have changed the world's perception of India. It's not just a country of snake-charmers; it's a country against which protectionist walls have to be erected. Of course, we can also charm snakes.

And not just, to pluck a phrase of Malcolm Muggeridge, snakes in snakes' clothing!

And these 26-year-olds are changing India's perception also of itself: that India can; that, therefore, we should face the world with confidence.

That is the situation in activity after activity. We lament the fact that, while we are ahead in software, we have lost out to China in IT hardware. That is true - as of the moment. We shooed away firms like Motorola when they approached us in the early 1990s for facilities to set up manufacturing operations in India. China welcomed them, it wooed them, it created every conceivable facility for hardware firms from Japan, of course, but also from Taiwan, a country at which 400 of its missiles are aimed. It has thereby leapt ahead.

But the game is hardly over. That world-class hardware can be produced in India is evident. How many of us would have heard of Moser-Baer? Located in unprepossessing Noida, it is the world's third largest optical media manufacturer, and the lowest-cost producer of CD-Recorders. Its exports are close to Rs. 1,000 crore.

The firm sells data-storage products to seven of the world's top 10 CD-R producers. And it produces them so efficiently that, to shield themselves, European competitors had to file an anti-dumping case to stop and penalize its exports to Europe. Moser-Baer fought on its own. And won.

A firm most of us have not heard of. A firm that is manufacturing products at the cutting edge of technology. A firm exporting Rs. 1,000 crore of products that require the utmost precision and technological sophistication. A firm that European firms fear.

And equally important - the very international fora that our ideologues shout are instruments of exploitation hold against European firms, and in favour of this Indian firm.

There is more. Moser-Baer has acquired Capco Luxembourg, a firm that owns 49 per cent of a Netherlands-based CD-R distributor. And it has set up Glyphics Media Inc. in the United States-for markets in North and South America. And here we are being made to shiver at the thought that foreign firms are about to swallow us!

Heard of Tandon Electronics? Its exports of electronic hardware are close to Rs. 4,000 crore!

At a moment's notice, my friends Amit Mitra of FICCI and Tarun Das of CII send me particulars of firm after firm, in sector after sector, that has broken new ground. A sample:

  • Fifteen of the world's major automobile manufacturers are now obtaining components from Indian firms.
  • Just last year, exports of auto-components were $375 million. This year they are close to $1.5 billion. Estimates indicate they will reach $15 billion within six to seven years.
  • Hero Honda is now the largest manufacturer of motorcycles in the world-with an output of 17 lakh motorcycles a year.
  • One lakh Indica cars of the Tatas are to be marketed in Europe by Rover, one of the United Kingdom's most prestigious auto-manufacturers under its - that is, Rover's - brand name.
  • Bharat Forge has the world's largest single-location forging facility - of 1.2 lakh tonnes per annum. Its client list includes Toyota, Honda, Volvo, Cummins, Daimler Chrysler. It has been chosen as a supplier of small forging parts for Toyota's global transmission parts' sourcing hub in Bangalore.
  • Asian Paints has production facilities in 22 countries spread across five continents. It has recently acquired Berger International, which gives it access to 11 countries, and SCIB Chemical SAE in Egypt. Asian Paints is the market leader in 11 of the 22 countries in which it is present, including India.
  • Hindustan Inks has the world's largest single stream, fully integrated ink plant, of 1 lakh tonnes per annum capacity, at Vapi, Gujarat. It has a manufacturing plant and a 100 per cent subsidiary in the US. It has another 100 per cent subsidiary in Austria.
  • For two years running, General Motors has awarded Sundaram Clayton its 'Best Supplier Award'; the volumes it sources out of India are growing every year.
  • Ford has presented the 'Gold World Excellence Award' to Cooper Tyres.
  • Essel Propack is the world's largest laminated tube manufacturer. It has a manufacturing presence in 11 countries including China, a global manufacturing share of 25 per cent, and caters to all of P&G's laminated tube requirements in the US, and 40 per cent of Unilever's.
  • Aston Martin, one of the world's most expensive car brands, has contracted prototyping its latest luxury sports car to an India-based designer. This would be the cheapest car to roll out of Aston Martin's stable.
  • Maruti has been the preferred supplier of small cars under the Suzuki brand for Europe. Suzuki has now decided to make India its manufacturing, export and research hub outside Japan.
  • Hyundai Motors India is about to become the parent Hyundai Motors Corporation's global small car hub. In 2003, HMC will source 25,000 Santros from HMI's plant in India. By 2010 HMI is targeted to supply half a million cars to HMC.

It was only in 1999 that HMI got its first outsourcing contract and already, in 2003, 20 per cent of its sales will be what it supplies as an outsourcing hub. It is exporting cars to Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Columbia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

  • Ford India got its first outsourcing contract in 2000. Within 3 years outsourcing accounts for 35 per cent of its sales. Ford India supplies to Mexico, Brazil and China. The parent Ford is sourcing close to $40 million worth of components from India, and plans to increase these in the coming years.

Ford India is already the sole manufacturing and supply base for Ikon cars and components. These are being exported to Mexico, China and Africa.

  • Toyota Kirloskar Motors chose India over competitive destinations like Philippines and China for setting up a new project to source transmissions as this option proved more economical.
  • Europe's leading tractor maker, Renault, has chosen International Tractors (ITL) as its sole global sourcing hub for 40 to 85 horsepower tractors.
  • Tyco Electronics India bagged its first outsourcing contract in 1998-99. So successful has it been that components and products others have contracted from it already account for 50 per cent of its total sales. It supplies to the parent, Tyco Europe.
  • TISCO is today the lowest cost producer of hot-rolled steel in the world.
  • TVS Motor Company has been awarded the coveted Deming Prize for Total Quality Management. Many of the largest of organizations, even American ones-like GE-have not managed that recognition yet!

India's pharmaceutical industry has come to be feared as much as its infotech industry. It is already worth $ 6.5 billion and it has been growing at 8-10 per cent a year. It's the fourth largest pharmaceutical industry in terms of volumes and 13th in value. Its exports have crossed $2 billion, and have increased by 30 per cent in the past five years. India is among the top five manufacturers of bulk drugs.

Even more telling is another figure. We are always being frightened, ''Multinational drug companies are about to takeover.'' In 1971 the share of these MNCs in the Indian market was 75 per cent. Today it's 35 per cent!

There's another feature we should bear in mind: India's strengths are becoming evident across the technology spectrum:

  • We are among the three countries in the world that have built supercomputers on their own, the US and Japan being the other two: two months ago, the fourth generation PARAM supercomputer was inaugurated in Bangalore.
  • We are among six countries in the world that launch satellites. We launch some of our own satellites of course; we have launched satellites for others too, among them such countries as Germany and Belgium. We have the largest set of remote sensing satellites. Our INSAT system is also among the world's largest domestic satellite communication systems.

At the other end:

  • India is one of the world's largest diamond cutting and polishing centres. CLSA estimates nine of every 10 stones sold in the world pass through India.
  • Trade of Indian medicinal plants has crossed Rs. 4,000 crore.

Here is proof positive that liberalization has indeed worked. ''By opening the economy before giving it a chance to become competitive, we have thrown our industry to the wolves,'' it used to be said. Quite the contrary. The success in exports, in fields such as IT in which competition is fierce, in which technological change is fast as lightning, success in auto-components, in pharmaceuticals shows that our industry has fought back, it has become competitive.

Remember all that shouting about Chinese batteries a year ago? ''Markets are closing down, thousands are being thrown out of their meagre businesses, and factory after factory has shut down.'' That was the shouting just a few months ago.

Where are those batteries from China? Yes, trade with China has grown-by 104% in the past year. But according to figures of the Chinese Government, in the first five months of 2003, India has amassed a surplus in its trade with China, a surplus of close to half a billion dollars.

And China is just an instance. Exports as a whole, and in the face of an unrelenting recession in the West, have grown by 19 per cent in the year. In a word, what committees upon committees with their piles of recommendations would not have achieved, being actually exposed to actual competition has.

Our foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high-$82 billion. We have announced that we will not be taking aid from a string of countries.

  • We are giving aid to 10 or 11 countries
  • We are pre-paying our debt.
  • We have just ''loaned'' $300 million to the IMF!

How distant the days when we used to wait anxiously for the announcement about what the Aid India Club meeting in Paris had decided to give us.

But there is the other side-equally telling. Why is it that so few among us know even the elementary facts about these successes? Why is it that so much of public, specifically political, discourse, when it is not whining is just wailing?


PART II

India's new world, of unlimited opportunities
Dated August 19, 2003

The problems that have bedeviled Japanese banks are well known - the quicksand of ''directed lending'', NPAs, and the rest - as is the way these problems have been at the heart of Japan's inability to pull itself out of the trough for over a decade. The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, the giant LTCB, followed the same trajectory as other banks, except that it has suddenly, in just two years, shot out of the pack.

LTCB was established in 1952. It was one of the principal financiers of Japan's phenomenal industrialization after World War II. As the 1990s rolled on, its troubles became deeper and deeper. It went bankrupt. To prevent the collapse from bringing down other parts of the banking sector, the Government had no alternative but to nationalize the bank. That was in 1998.

The bank continued to hemorrhage. Soon, in June 2000, it had to be sold to a consortium of international investors. That was a thunderclap for Japan - this was the largest organization that had to be sold to foreigners. The bank was renamed the Shinsei Bank.

In just two years, it has turned around, even as others are still in the morass of old problems. It turns out that Indian professionals - a thousand of them from Nucleus Software Exports, Mphasis, Polaris, i-Flex Solutions and Wipro - have played a crucial role in transforming the bank: they are the ones who have completely re-engineered the bank's processes, they are the ones who have reorganized the bank's operations around a completely new, modern business model.

And they have done it all in record time, and with record economy: the new, transformed retail bank has been launched within one year instead of the anticipated three; implementation costs have been 90 per cent less than estimated; a range of new financial products has been launched that are better than what competitors are giving; hardware too has been drastically downsized. When I was in Tokyo a few weeks ago to open Indian IT fair, the success of these professionals in rehabilitating the Shinsei Bank was the talk of the banking and IT community in Japan.

What is it that Indians could bring to this task that, say, Chinese software firms could not? The Indians could not just write software for different functions and transactions that the staff of the bank had to perform - the Chinese too could have done this: China also has a very large software industry that today caters to its domestic IT market, a market which is many times that in India.

The Indians could bring to bear on the task expertise in a host of other domains - for instance, knowledge of financial markets, of modern commercial banking, of accountancy - and thereby provide not just software but complete solutions, from software to hardware to completely new business models.

Similarly, high-end Indian garment industry can avail of not just cheaper labour. In addition it can tap into our fashion designers. Is it any surprise then that Wal-Mart sources $1 billion worth of goods - that is, half of its apparel - from India? That GAP sources $500-600 million from India? That Hilfiger sources $100 million?

The point is the successes we have encountered above are not fortuitous. India has a score of strengths that others do not.

Cost is one of them. Nor is it a marginal advantage. Indeed, the difference between the cost at which we can provide services and many commodities of comparable quality and what those cost in the developed world is so vast that, should those firms and economies shut themselves out from our supplies, they are the ones who will be severely disadvantaged, they are the ones who will be making themselves un-competitive.

  • Indian IT firms provide world-class services at one-tenth what the same services would cost in the United States.
  • An MBA costs about $5,000 in India. In the US, an MBA costs around $120,000.
  • Developing a new automobile model in the US costs about $1 billion. Indica and Scorpio have been designed, developed and produced totally in India. They have been acclaimed abroad, and found to be up to international standards. The cost of designing them? Less than half what the design would cost in the US.
  • In an important address - you will find it in FICCI's publication, Unleashing India's True Potential: CEO's Vision of the Future - M.S. Banga, Chairman, Hindustan Lever, and reports results of inquiries that the company made. In spite of high power costs, high interest rates, it found that the capital costs of setting up plants in India to produce an item like toothpaste for Levers worldwide were just 35 per cent of what its sister companies in the US and Europe would have to spend. And the conversion costs were just 15 per cent. In tea bags they were just a quarter of what they would be in the US.

Sourcing already accounts for about half of Hindustan Lever's exports of Rs. 1,500 crore a year. But Banga surmised, by being just the hub from which Levers' units worldwide would source their requirements of such goods, Hindustan Lever could build up a business of $1 billion a year - that is Rs. 5,000 thousand crore a year. Moreover, as it would be marketing directly to these companies, it would save on the costs of reaching, winning, retaining the individual customer.

  • Surgery: Arvind Netralaya performs a cataract operation, including the cost of the lens, for $12; that very operation costs about $1,500 in the US. A bypass surgery in India costs around Rs. 40,000; in the US it can cost anything upwards of Rs. 6 lakhs. The cost of open-heart surgery in the UK or the US can be anywhere between Rs. 15 lakhs and Rs. 35 lakhs as against Rs. 1.5 lakh to Rs.5 lakhs in the best of hospitals in India. The cost differentials in more complicated surgeries - liver and kidney transplants, etc - are even higher.

Brains are another strength - far, far more important than material resources in several sunrise activities. Most would have been surprised to read recent accounts in magazines such as Business World of India being looked upon as a research hub by company after choosy company. FICCI's list includes:

  • Over 70 MNCs, including Delphi, Eli Lilly, General Electric, Hewlett Packard, Heinz and DaimlerChrysler, have set up R&D facilities in India in the past five years. Together with laboratories set up before 1997, 100 of the Fortune 500 have set up R&D facilities in India. By contrast, only 33 of the Business Week 1000 companies have R&D centres in China.
  • The scale of these operations also tells the tale. Just four years ago, Intel had a mere 10 persons working in India; today it has over 1,000. GE's John F Welch Technology Center in Bangalore is the company's largest outside the US. With an investment of $60 million, it employs 1,600 researchers. GE's R&D centre in China by contrast employs only 100.

The Indian centre devotes 20 per cent of its resources to fundamental research having a five to 10 year horizon in areas like nanotechnology, hydrogen energy, photonics and advanced propulsion. With 17 clinical trials (10 of them global), the Eli Lilly research facility at Gurgaon is its largest in Asia and the third largest in the world.

  • GE Medical in Bangalore has developed a high resolution-imaging machine for angiography to meet GE's entire global requirement. It has also developed a portable ultrasound scanner that is exported around the world from Bangalore.
  • Two-thirds of GE Plastics' 300-member research team in India is doing fundamental research on molecules. GE Plastics has contributed to the development of a family of polycarbonates of engineering plastics that are being used in auto headlamps and CDs. It has also developed heat resistant monomers for applications in aircraft bodies and high-end medical equipment.
  • GE Motors India has developed an almost noiseless motor for GE's most sophisticated washing machine lines in the US; it is the sole sourcing point for a million of these motors every year.
  • Monsanto has been in India for over 50 years. After examining China and India, it set up its first non-US research facility in Bangalore in 1998. This facility is responsible for Monsanto's R&D for Asia. The company is researching ''promoters'' - accelerators that improve crop productivity.
  • Whirlpool's Pune Research Lab develops refrigerators and air conditioners for Asia (including China) and Australia. Forty per cent of this facility's resources are devoted to its core research on global projects.
  • The DaimlerChrysler Research Centre in Bangalore is engaged in fundamental and applied research in avionics, simulation and software development.
  • HP Labs India has built a prototype that can scan handwritten mail through a small handheld device instead of a scanner. It has also built the prototype of a computer for unsophisticated users.

You can extend the list many times over by just following our business newspapers and magazines for a week. Moreover, while youthful professionals and entrepreneurs have been adding these sinews, the most far-reaching structural change has taken place:

  • The proportion living below the poverty line has fallen from 36 per cent to 27 per cent.
  • The balance of power between state and society in the economic sphere has been overturned: the dismantling of the license-quota raj, the transfer of power to regulators in one sector after another.

Indeed, not a week passes and there is yet another advance in economic management. One reason these changes do not get adequate notice is that, many of the structures having been set up, the improvements are now in the details. Those who are acquainted with economic policy and administration know that each of these improvements will have far-reaching consequences as the years go by. But as the improvements are in the details, most of us miss their significance.

As a result of such steps, many of the handicaps that hobbled our entrepreneurs have been eased in the past few years. Initiatives in different, seemingly distant fields have reached fruition. And the effect is not additive, it is multiplicative:

  • The turnaround time in our ports used to be eight to 10 days; it is now four-and-a-half days.
  • As recently as 1999, our telecom infrastructure could provide a bandwidth of only 155 Mbps; today it is able to provide terabit capacity, that is, 75,000 times what could be provided just four years ago. Within a year or so, as the fibre optic network being laid by various enterprises gets in place, it will not matter whether your office is in San Jose, California or in any of 300 cities in India.
  • Till the other day we used to be in awe of the rate of expansion of mobile phones in China - a million a month. In the past two months these have increased in India by almost 1.5 million a month.
  • Long distance telephone tariffs have fallen by two-thirds in five years.
  • Tariffs for data transmission have fallen by 80 per cent in three years.
  • The work done by the far-sighted people who set up what seemed at that time such an esoteric institution, one oriented to the rich elite, the National Institute of Design has borne fruit. Today graduates of that fine institution help design cell phones, CAT-scan and MRI machines ...

Other handicaps too have been eased. Interest rates have come down drastically, foreign exchange restrictions for business purposes are as good as non-existent...

On the other side is the fact that the developed world will increasingly require services and personnel from a country such as India. We are the ones who have to be swift enough to prepare for and grab the opportunities:

  • Various studies conclude (you will find them summarized in the All India Management Association's India's New Opportunity - 2020) that the workforce of developed countries will fall short by 32 to 39 million by 2020. In the US alone the shortfall is expected to be between 8.2 and 14.3 million.
  • The proportion of the aged to persons in working age is shooting up precipitously in developed countries from Germany to Japan.

Such developments provide excellent opportunities for India - for services that have to be provided in situ such as nursing and care for the elderly, for services such as surgery that can be provided to residents of those countries upon their coming here. In fact, there are opportunities in a host of new services of an even higher order, and ones that exist not in the future but right now:

  • Higher, specially medical and engineering education: educating an MBA to world standards costs $9000 in India; in the US that degree of education costs $30,000.
  • Editing, composing, formatting text, from books to newspapers: a sub-editor costs an American paper $25,000; in India an excellent substitute can be employed for $5,200. The editor of an Indian paper told the proprietor of a leading British paper the other day he could edit the latter's paper for merely the amount that the latter's publication spent on renting the space occupied by sub-editors in the publication.
  • Printing and binding books: Hong Kong and Singapore, which had taken a leap in this regard, have become high-cost centres.
  • India has exactly the same order of cost-cum-competence advantage in professions like law, accountancy, design, engineering, tax consultancy, financial services of all kinds.
  • In software itself, though there have been the most conspicuous successes, the field is limited only by our imagination - in that IT fair in Tokyo that I mentioned, I saw fine text-to-voice software that has been developed by a small software unit in Lucknow. It was receiving excellent reception in Japan. It can be used to quickly produce audio versions of books upon books for the visually impaired.

Thus, on the one side the opportunities are unlimited; on the other we have incomparable advantages for grasping them. But as has been said, ''When opportunity knocks, some complain about the noise.''

Software engineers or cyber coolies? runs the headline of a newspaper feature. In the US a software engineer earns $21 an hour, in India even the leading companies pay him only $2, runs the text. Is this not exploitation? it asks.

Now a salary of Rs. 100 an hour is excellent for someone living and working in India. Why throw away the advantage? Look at it the other way. China has accumulated its huge pile of foreign exchange reserves - over $280 billion - not by high-technology exports. It has accumulated them by flooding the world with low-technology items - leather, leather products, garments, toys ... And it has used the advantage of lower cost - and perfectly disciplined labour - to the hilt.

China's achievement we gape at: ''How have they become the manufacturing hub of the world?'' we ask. But our advantage - in some senses the very same advantage China has put to such good use - we want to throw away.

Keep these foreign accounting firms out, proclaim our accountants at a high-profile function. They have been involved in frauds abroad. On that reasoning, shouldn't we bar our own accounting firms also? After all, frauds in our banks, in our stock markets, the way so many of our firms that have run up NPAs are then able to extract bail-out packages from financial institutions, could such things have happened if our accounting firms had been doing their job?

And there is the other point: we want their accountants and lawyers to be kept out, but they must open their doors to our IT professionals! As the title of one of Jairam Ramesh's monographs ran, Yankee Go Home - But Take Me with You!

Why not look upon the opportunities positively? Why not institute courses in our law colleges on Germany's legal system, in the accounting systems of the US and thereby capture the markets there? Why not multiply the number of nurses we train, and have them learn Japanese? Why not enable private firms to open world-class universities in India, and thereby become educators to the world?


Part III

This is India's moment, can we grasp it?
Dated August 17, 2003

On the one hand, we have unbounded opportunities and incomparable advantages to seize them. On the other, there is the fate that will surely befall us if we falter. Unemployment will reach such proportions that social unrest will become unmanageable. Similarly, if the rates of growth of India and China continue to differ by the margins of the past 15 years, within the next 15 years the Chinese economy will be six times that of India. And the consequences will be worse than we can imagine.

Economic strength is itself power. To take one instance, because China has been able to attract so many more to invest than we have, China today is able to mobilize so many more-American firms, for instance-as lobbyists to advance its interests.

Moreover, economic strength gives China the wherewithal to go in for comprehensive modernization of its armed forces. Indeed, that there is so much talk of China's economic transformation obscures what China is already doing, what its economic modernization already enables it to do in the military sphere.

Will a China six times stronger than India not administer another slap at us? Indeed, will it have to administer a slap? Will an India dwarfed to that extent not learn to pay heed to China's interests subliminally?

Now it is nobody's case that China is free of problems. Quite the contrary. The achievements-the incredible infrastructure built in Shanghai, for instance-themselves remind us of problems it may be storing up: this infrastructure has been built by getting the country's banks to lend money to the special purpose vehicles that were created for building the projects. But everything has to be paid for in economics: what is the rate of return of these projects today, and how does it compare with what is needed to repay the investments?

There is moreover a fundamental issue. The 21st century is going to be the century of knowledge-of its continuous unraveling and of its continuous application. One of the central lessons of the 20th century is that where the state is pervasive, creativity does not flourish. The Chinese have indeed transformed their state. But it remains pervasive. How will they ensure creativity-of the kind, say, youngsters in our IT firms have displayed?

So we have many things working for us. In many ways, this is India's moment, even vis a vis China. For the first time, observers have begun to voice questions in public about China-its statistics; the fact, for instance, as a German investor said recently at a conference I was deputed to attend, that, ''If you want your factory to come up quickly, go to China; if you want to make money, go to India.'' On the other side, everyone's noticing Indians make a mark in every sphere: writers, scientists, doctors, IT, cricket, beauty pageants, chess...

So it is the moment for India. It is a moment. But, it is only a moment. What should we do to ensure we grasp it?

First, we should begin to notice what is happening around us. We have become what an American author calls ''Negaholics''-addicted to the negative, as an alcoholic is to drink. Ever so many of us are unaware of even the elementary examples that have been listed above.

Nor is that the result merely of inattention. We look for, we latch on to the negative; even if some achievement breaks on to our mental screen it does not percolate into our awareness, we do not see that it is part of a pattern, that it is not an isolated fluke. Indeed, our instinct is not to believe evidence of that accomplishment.

Remember how eager many commentators were to find fault with NSS data that established a steep decline in proportions living below the poverty line? These are symptoms of a habit. Remember the exercise that books on creative thinking recommend? Is there much blue around you? You would not have noticed much. Now make an effort to look only for blue things around you. You will notice so many that, though they were lying around, had not registered.

It is especially important that those who are in public life-who hold public office, who participate in public discourse-break out of this addiction to the negative. Because of my work, I have had occasion to travel abroad several times in the past two-three years. Each time I have been struck by the contrast between the way India is looked upon abroad, and the way we look upon it here. There is an equally telling symptom here at home-there is much greater confidence in the Indian industrial class than there is in the rhetoric of politicians who ostensibly are shouting on behalf of and to save that industry!

The result is our discourse continues to be mired in fear, so many of us just keep repeating slogans of 30 years ago. We should listen to the new India.

Next we should be alert to what the critics of reform are doing where they are in power. In New Delhi, the CPI(M) shouts against even the slightest attempt to reform-for instance, privatize - a public sector unit, they bring woe upon anyone who may say that repeated revival attempts having failed, such and such firm has to be shut down.

But in West Bengal the state government has already shut down two state-owned units, it is disinvesting 10 more. It's just that the state government does not talk of ''disinvestment''; it says it is just turning the firm over to a joint venture partner!

Remember Ajit Jogi's hysterics over Balco? Remember his threat ''Should anyone from Sterlite enter Chattisgarh, we will break his legs''? Since then his refrain is ''Sterlite is scripting the success-story of Chattisgarh''! More important, he is today the leader in public sector reform! Including privatization! The Indian Express reports he has already closed thirty-seven public sector units.

Remember all that shouting, ''Why are you selling profit-making companies?'' The Housing Board-HUDAC-Jogi has just closed down has been a profitable concern, reports The Indian Express. Remember all that shouting ''But the land of Balco is itself worth Rs. 1,000 crores''? Reporting about that Housing Board, the Express correspondent writes from Raipur, ''The assets ... also include some prime properties and a land bank of approximately 600 acres of land. In Raipur itself, HUDAC owns 300 acres of prime land near Tatibandha-an upcoming commercial area. Bhilai and Durg towns are also key urban towns where HUDAC had purchased land ... Other assets, according to the HUDAC balance sheet, include hundreds of unsold HIG, MIG, LIG and EWS houses, shops in urban complexes and other properties...''

A simple rule of self-denial among political parties would help: ''Do not block another party from doing what your own party is doing where it is in power.'' As parties are unlikely to deny themselves even this much, journalists and others should bring the rule into being in effect: keep an eye on what the party is doing where it is in power, recall what it was doing when it was in power and, each time the party tries to stop a rival from prosecuting a reform, broadcast those facts, grill its leaders on them.

There is a more intractable problem-a central dissociation between democracy as we know it in India and what is needed for rapid growth.

All change involves dislocation. And this is where the strengths of yesterday become the handicaps of today. BSNL has one of the world's most extensive networks of copper-wire. But people are switching to wireless telephony. Every time there is a proposal for new technology, our first thought is, ''But what will happen to the thousands of crores that have been sunk into that network?''

Nor is the drag confined to governments. As BSNL has been purchasing copper wire worth Rs. 2,000 to 4,000 crore every year, 30 or more companies have come up that can survive only if BSNL continues to purchase copper wire! Their owners and the workers employed in them too would rather that the switchover to new technologies is slower.

That is how over the decades the Civil Aviation Policy becomes the policy for Air India rather than for India. That is how our finances get sucked into quicksand-that is how we continue to ''protect'' existing producers of wheat and rice with ever higher minimum support prices even as government godowns overflow with stocks, and even though we know that these support prices are in fact preventing the crop diversification that other programs of government are trying to promote; that is how a state like Maharashtra brings its finances to the brink by continuing subsidies to sugar growers; that is how over the years we squander Rs. 10,000 or 15,000 crores keeping obsolete mills of the National Textile Corporation (NTC) on artificial respirators rather than using the money to modernize the textile industry; that is how we continue to guarantee procurement of tobacco, of all things, even as we spend crores admonishing people to abjure it; that is how, ostensibly to protect existing tenants, we continue rent control laws, thereby discourage investment in housing and thus ensure both housing shortage and urban decay.

We block voice-over-internet for long, we set the police upon youngsters who have begun using the technology; for years we won't allow personnel of IT firms to avail of the Closed User Group facility-lest the revenues of BSNL get affected ... It is as if we were to block the introduction of the automobile to protect carpenters who are making tongas. Without doubt, one of the reasons West Germany and Japan forged ahead of the United Kingdom after World War II was that the entire industrial stock of those two countries had been bombed out of existence while that of the latter had survived.

In the end, all such efforts fail. One cannot block technology any more than one can block time: in the end Bangladesh has had to close down the largest jute mill in the world, in the end we are having to close down NTC mills ... But over the years we ensure our country's progress is slowed down, and our governmental finances are brought to the brink.

The problem becomes all the more acute in a democracy, all the more so in what we have made of democracy. The electorate has been so fractured by caste and the rest that it does not respond to national issues. To attain office and retain it, therefore, parties have to aggregate votes, section by section. Each section liable to be dislocated by change-the tobacco farmer no less than the textile mill owner and the powerloom operator-is able to suborn parties and politicians to block that change.

Of course, in due time a constituency will arise of those who have benefited from the change-the IT professionals, the ones who will prosper if only we were to allow our entrepreneurs to set up institutions of higher learning ... But they are in the womb of the future. And the ones who will be dislocated are ones who will defeat the party today. As the horizon of political parties seldom extends beyond the forthcoming election, even a bit of aggressive shouting can ensure that reform is deferred.

There is another factor that confounds everyone into submission. All politicians are nervous-witness our nerves before every reshuffle! Politicians faced with elections are more so. And no one quite knows what issues are on the people's mind. So the moment a step is mooted, everyone can, and does, proclaim, ''Not just now, elections are round the corner. People will turn against us.''

Was disinvestment an issue in any of the elections during the past five years? If free power could have won elections, how come the Akalis in Punjab, the DMK in Tamil Nadu were swept away? I well remember a meeting in a state on the eve of elections there, and what was being said ''on the sidelines', ''Please get (the chief minister) to abolish (a local tax) ... If only it is removed, we will sweep the urban areas.'' It was abolished. The urban areas swept away the alliance.

There isn't much that can be done about the politicians' nervousness, except to go on pointing out reforms are not the issue they are made out to be: internal bickering has brought defeat to parties not issues like disinvestment or tariffs.

But the problem-the dislocations that change will cause-is real and we have to attend to it. Four things can help.

We should multiply outlays on activities that will engage large numbers, and are things that we should be doing in any case. The Planning Commission has prepared three first-rate reports, for instance-on biofuels, on bamboo cultivation and products, and on medicinal plants. Each of these can engage millions. As can organic farming, diversification into vegetables and fruit and floriculture. As can water harvesting.

When activities like these flourish, incomes will multiply, nutrition will improve, fewer will flock to urban slums. Indeed, through them the country would register gains even in foreign exchange-outlays on biofuels would save on imported crude; organic farming, medicinal plants would bring foreign exchange.

Similarly, projects that entail huge earthworks-the Prime Minister's Quadrilateral and gram sadak projects, the linking of rivers-can absorb millions who may be dislocated and at the same time unleash the country's productive potential. They are the real social security that will cushion our people.

But the main solutions lie, as usual, not in the economic realm. They lie in political arrangements, in discourse. We must reduce the frequency of elections: schedule elections, as the vice-president and the deputy prime minister have proposed, to state assemblies and to the Lok Sabha simultaneously; fixed terms for legislatures even as individual ministers can be voted away for dereliction.

Even before such changes are put into effect, and even after they have been instituted, we have to make everyone see that change cannot be blocked. The more we succeed within India in delaying it, the greater the lead that others will get over us. Schemes to rehabilitate and reposition workers or farmers who may be dislocated must, of course, be devised and executed. But the project or technology must not be blocked.

Soon enough that project will have to be executed in any case; soon that technology will come to be adopted. Time will have been lost. Resources that could have been used for modernization of that enterprise, that industry, for the prosperity of that very region would have been wasted in keeping that obsolete technology or enterprise ''alive''.

And we must with evidence induce everyone to see that more often than not the resources needed to take care of and re-equip those who will be dislocated are embedded in the obsolete enterprises themselves. Look at the land NTC's mills have in Mumbai. If only the government would be allowed to sell it, more than enough would be available to retrain and re-equip every single worker in those mills, as well as to modernize the mills that are to survive.

Not the details of economic policy-that is not where the impediments lie. The way we look at things, our discourse, the drag of interests that are vested in the way things are-these are what we need to change.

By: Shri. Arun Shourie


The Indian Liberal Group, Chennai, had organized a meeting on 13 July 2007, where Arun Shourie and Cho Ramaswamy participated and talked about the Congress Presidential nominee Mrs. Pratibha Patil.

To listen:
Arun Shourie (English, 32.16 min)

To download: Arun Shourie | Cho Ramaswamy

Courtesy:http://bseshadri.blogspot.com/

Quota is not the way: Arun Shourie

Quota is not the way: Arun Shourie

TimePublished on Sun, Jun 25, 2006

Karan Thapar: Hello and Welcome to Devil’s Advocate. My guest today is one of the sharpest critics of India’s reservation policy. In a book published this month Falling Over Backward, he exposes its intellectual hollowness and its moral two-facedness. But is he against reservation specifically for the Scheduled Castes? And if he answers this as yes, then how does he think India should respond to the centuries of discrimination they have suffered? Those are the two key questions that I would put today to Arun Shourie.

Mr Shourie, let me start with a simple question to establish your position. When you say you are against reservation per say, are you also including reservation for the Scheduled Caste?

Arun Shourie: Yes, I think so. Because reservations are not meant to compensate for historic wrongs. They are meant for helping people at the moment.

Karan Thapar: Well, that’s what I want to put to you. The Scheduled Castes have been treated as untouchables for centuries. In fact, even their shadow was considered to be polluting. Their dignity has been trampled upon. Their individuality and humanity has been questioned. Why do you believe that reservation is not an appropriate way of giving them confidence and status?

Arun Shourie: Firstly, these are clichés without particular examination of historical records. Because a passage occurs in something called Manu’s doctrine or Manu’s compilation, I mean I have not met a person who realises or who acknowledges the fact that this compilation was done over 700 years.

Karan Thapar: Let's leave Manu Smriti out.

Arun Shourie: No.

Karan Thapar: When you are saying these are clichés, are you saying that in fact the untouchables have not been treated in the way that history acknowledges?

Arun Shourie: No. They have been in parts of India. Let's say in some districts of the South. And the real remedy to that has been in modernisation. In overcrowded trains... Indians make five billion railway journeys every year. Five times of our population. In overcrowded buses, are you first verifying what is the caste of the person standing next to you?

Karan Thapar: But what happens when you get off the bus? It’s an argument in your book.

Arun Shourie: No. No.





Karan Thapar: Equality may be forced upon you in a bus, because you have no choice. But when you get off the bus, inequality reigns supreme. It is that inequality that I am talking about.

Arun Shourie: It doesn’t. That’s not the argument in my book at all.

Karan Thapar: I am not saying it is the argument in your book. I am countering your position that reservations are not justified for Scheduled Castes. I am asking you why you believe that centuries of discrimination should not be countered by reservations?

Arun Shourie: You asked me that and I gave you the answer that reservations were and are not meant in the Constituent Assembly as a compensation for historic wrong.

Karan Thapar: They can be used for that?

Arun Shourie: But… My friend, let me answer. Because there are better ways to lift people. Poor must be helped, they must be lifted. That’s the duty of society, but reservation is not the way and that’s why I argued.

Karan Thapar: Let's come to the better ways in a moment's time, I very much want to talk about them. But for most people listening to this interview, it will come as supreme shock that you believe reservations for the Scheduled Castes, who have suffered centuries of discrimination, are unjustified. Let me put to you why people disagree. Even today, Valmiki graduates are unable to get proper jobs and have to scavenge because they are considered untouchables. Even today, the Mushahars of Bihar are forced to eat rats and mice because they are too poor to access proper meal. Are you saying to me that reservations for such people are wrong?

Arun Shourie: Yes. Because the way to help them is to give them jobs and to give them access to education so that they don’t eat the damned mice. And the very fact that after 50 years of reservations, they are still eating mice is a conclusive argument against the compassion that you are showing.

Karan Thapar: Except for the fact that they don’t get jobs because they are untouchables.

Arun Shourie: Absolutely bunk. It is the other way round.

Karan Thapar: Why then are there Valmiki graduates scavenging for a living?

Arun Shourie: But there are Brahmin graduates who are doing it because of inadequacy of jobs.

Karan Thapar: But there is a difference. In one case, there is discrimination and in the other it is the inadequacy of jobs.

Arun Shourie: No. No. You just don’t let me speak. In China, people are scavenging and eating rats. Not because of caste, but because of 110 million of floating population who have lost their jobs.

Karan Thapar: Chinese eat snails, they eat eels, they eat snakes. There is a different culture and cuisine.

Arun Shourie: No. Just one second. I am talking of the 110 million Chinese who have been dislocated by modernisation. You read any Chinese text and you will find that. The point there is that I am all for the stopping of eating mice and elimination of poverty and giving people jobs, but it is wrong to presume…

Karan Thapar: Aren’t you missing the point here? There is difference.

Arun Shourie: No, I am not missing the point. You are not letting me make the point here. But when they are being discriminated against, the persons who are doing that most, who are beating them, who are responsible for the massacres as reported by Mandal himself are the so-called OBCs, who own land.

Karan Thapar: But that’s not the question I asked you.

Arun Shourie: But that’s the question.

Karan Thapar: No, that is not the question. The question is this. There is a difference in dislocation because of modernisation that affects people of all classes, of all castes. I am talking about discrimination due to untouchability, due to a wall of prejudice, which has affected people for centuries. Surely, today modern India has a moral obligation to atone and to recompense for the way it has treated the Scheduled Castes. You are denying that?

Arun Shourie: Karan, I completely would put aside this moral outrage that many of you put on.

Karan Thapar: It’s not put on, it is a reality for the people who are affected.

Arun Shourie: Just a second. Yes, but the so-called modern people do put on this compassion. The fact of the matter is that great progress has been made by our social reformers. That is the real way for dealing with this. Swami Dayanand, Swami Shraddhanand, Sri Narayan Guru in the South…

Karan Thapar: I am afraid it hasn’t changed the situation at the ground.

Arun Shourie: You are absolutely…How do you know the situation? Will you please just let me speak?





Karan Thapar: Can I just answer that?

Arun Shourie: No. First let me speak. Let me first answer your question when you assert that the situation has not changed, that is what I call a cliché. You have to listen.

Karan Thapar: Can I justify that?

Arun Shourie: No. Just one second, let me complete it. I will give you the documentary evidence. You see what Sri Narayan Guru reported in Kerala at the turn of the century. You see what Gandhiji found in the 1920s and you compare that with things today.

Karan Thapar: Compare it with 2006. Name one village out of India’s 6,00,000 villages where the Dalits are permitted to stay in the centre of the village. Not only are they banished to the outskirts, but in most cases, they are required to live in the south side so that the wind that blows over them doesn’t pollute the village. That is the extent of discrimination they still suffer.

Arun Shourie: And the wind in all of South India comes from the south my friend. I don’t know where you get this nonsense from?

Karan Thapar: Chandrabhan Prasad, perhaps one of the few Dalit intellectual scholars, who can easily confirm the facts to you.

Arun Shourie: Well, maybe. We have all got impressions about India. India is a large country. Almost every statement about India must be true, but the south business is quite silly because if you come to Goa my friend, you see the wind coming form the south. You come to Kerala, you see the wind coming from the south.

Karan Thapar: Ok. Let's approach this matter differently. Let's not talk about it in terms of moral obligation or recompense and atonement. Let me put it like this. Do you believe that reservations are intrinsically wrong because they lower standards, because they sacrifice merit as a way of giving people access for the wrong reasons?

Arun Shourie: Yes, they are for all these reasons and many more. For instance, especially when they are caste-based, then they reinforce caste as they have done in South as they are now doing in the North.

Karan Thapar: That’s disputable. You can only fight caste discrimination in terms of caste. Leave the caste basis aside. Your concern is that it affects merit.

Arun Shourie: But why it is caste-based? All reservations in India are caste-based. How can you just put it aside?

Karan Thapar: Because you are correcting caste prejudice. If the Dalits have been discriminated against as untouchables, you have to be given reservation on that very basis to make up for it.

Arun Shourie: That was the argument my friend. That is how things were rationalised in the end when the Constitution specifically forbade caste-based reservations. Then there has been discrimination on the basis of residence. There has been discrimination in India, it has been alleged, on the basis of language as in every other society. On the colour of one’s skin.

Karan Thapar: Quite right.

Arun Shourie: Just one second. So why not have reservations on the basis of the colour of one’s skin?

Karan Thapar: Well let's not talk about hypotheticals. I am trying to understand your concern about reservations.

Arun Shourie: I am not talking about hypotheticals. You said that there is discrimination on the basis of caste.

Karan Thapar: It’s a fact.

Arun Shourie: So I said there is discrimination on the basis of the colour of one’s skin. Why not have reservations for that? You are not answering it.

Karan Thapar: Because I am saying to you that the level of discrimination that has been practised on the basis of caste and because of untouchability is infinitely and incomparably greater. The comparison doesn’t arise.

Arun Shourie: How do you say that, my friend? Where is the basis?

Karan Thapar: Let's come back to the question that I began with. The real reason, if you are not accepting the moral obligation, that you find reservations wrong because they undermine merit, that they sacrifice standards?

Arun Shourie: Yes. That is one of the reasons.

Karan Thapar: But can I then point out to you that special concessions on the grounds that we are talking about have been granted to Indians since at least the 1850s, upper castes were beneficiaries. Let me give you an example. When the first college was set up in Madras in the late 1850s, British records show that the pass marks had to be reduced form 40 per cent to 33 per cent and a whole new concept of third division was introduced to help the sons of Tamil Brahmins. If it can be done for them in the 1850s, why can’t the same concession be given to the Dalits today?

Arun Shourie: Firstly, we are in 2006. The demand for proficiency is much greater. You look at the range of jobs at that time and the skills required for those jobs and…

Karan Thapar: But the problem is the same?

Arun Shourie: No. Firstly if that was the case, it was wrong. Second, if I have to learn typing and you give me a concession on that as in the case of N M Thomas vs. State of Kerala, then it is one thing. But if the job that is required is a highly skilled job in a medical institution and you lower the standards, the consequences are much greater. It’s not typing that you are lowering the standards for.

Karan Thapar: But talking about lowering standards to give them admissions and entrance, we are not talking about lowering standards of graduation. What we are talking about is just creating an opening field.

Arun Shourie: My friend, you have just not studied the Constitution in which it has now been provided that standards will be lowered even for promotions and standards have been lowered for post-graduate courses for reservations.

Karan Thapar: No, I am not questioning the extent…

Arun Shourie: You are. You just said this and then you run away.

Karan Thapar: No, I am not. I am not questioning the extent to which reservations have been taken. I am questioning the position you began with which is that reservations at the very outset for Dalits and Scheduled Castes is wrong. I am putting to you that similar concessions were given to Tamil Brahmins. Let me add. As the Indian University’s Commission says they were even given in 1935.

Arun Shourie: To hell with Tamil Brahmins, man. I am not defending. Dekho Tum baat hi nahin karne detein. Tamil Brahmins be damned. I wouldn’t care two hoots of what the British did. My whole argument is that the British sowed many of these things like separate electorates to divide Indian society.

Karan Thapar: All right. Let me give you a modern example. Yogendra Yadav did a study this month (in June) of 315 key positions in journalistic organisations and he chose 37 national journalistic organisations -- both television and print -- and he discovered that not one of the top 315 positions is manned by a Dalit. That is an example surely of the manner in which discrimination keeps out people of talent only on caste.

Arun Shourie: Absolute bunk. I cannot believe that Karan Thapar is not going to employ a proficient person whether it is for camera or for assisting him just because of caste. Karan Thapar is not like that.

Karan Thapar: Then how do you explain 315 top organisations and 37 media houses, including the papers you have worked for?

Arun Shourie: Because it takes time for that kind of competence to be acquired. Journalism is one of the freest professions as sports are, as entertainment industry is.

Karan Thapar: So, you are saying to the Dalits wait a century? Wait two centuries? Do you think time is on their side? You don’t think they need a helping hand?

Arun Shourie: Of course they do. But you don’t let me tell you what the helping hand has to be. Not reservations.

Karan Thapar: Why?

Arun Shourie: Because I have answered it 10 times and you keep going back to the same question. Repeating the very words. Just look at your own recording Karan, you are just repeating. You are taking up time.

Karan Thapar: You have answered it in terms of the moral obligation. Let me point out to you the efficacy between ’47 and ’97. In those 50 years alone, the number of Dalits who as a result of reservations went to schools and colleges grew from 1.74 million to 27.92 million. During the same period, the number of Dalit graduates jumped from 50,000 to over 5.5 million. That’s an example of how reservations have helped and you are denying this to them.

Arun Shourie: You have just picked up a few statistics.

Karan Thapar: Very meaningful ones.

Arun Shourie: Just one second. For the total number of persons going to school, what is the statistics from 1947 to 2006?

Karan Thapar: What do you mean the total number?

Arun Shourie: Irrespective of Dalits. The total number of school-going population in India from 1947 and now. Tell me.

Karan Thapar: I don’t know the answer, but the point that I am making is that the percentage of both has increased. I am saying the percentage of Dalits has increased because of reservations. Otherwise the system would have kept them out.

Arun Shourie: How do you say the last sentence?

Karan Thapar: I will illustrate it by taking government employment.

Arun Shourie: No. But firstly, you did not know what was the total growth.

Karan Thapar: Do you know it?

Arun Shourie: No.

Karan Thapar: You don’t either. You are simply trying to question whether the two have increased equivalently. I am saying that in fact the reason why the Dalits have increased. It's because of reservations and not because of general improvement in society.

Arun Shourie: That is just an assertion of yours.

Karan Thapar: It is a fairly valid one that most people would accept.

Arun Shourie: How do you say this? Then we have two contradictory assertions.

Karan Thapar: So you neither accept the logic in terms of morality or in terms of efficacy?

Arun Shourie: Yes.

Karan Thapar: On both grounds, you think reservations are wrong?

Arun Shourie: Absolutely.

Karan Thapar: Arun Shourie, since you are implacably opposed to reservations for the Scheduled Castes, what is your preferred way of tackling the discrimination they have suffered for centuries?

Arun Shourie: Firstly, I am not against reservations only for the Scheduled Castes, but for everybody. Second point is yes, if they have suffered that kind of discrimination and we have got good records of this kind of thing happening in the South, for instance in many parts of Tamil Nadu, then the best way is social reform and these great reformers who have made an enormous difference to India in the last 200 years as testified to by the Christian missionaries themselves.

Karan Thapar: Is there a second way beyond social reforms?

Arun Shourie: Yes, there is. Second is economic growth and modernisation.

Karan Thapar: Third?

Arun Shourie: Third is to find out what is the real reason for the poor performance of the child. For instance, he cannot retain what he learns in class because of poor nutrition, give him four free meals a day.

Karan Thapar: Individual attention?

Arun Shourie: Yes, absolutely.

Karan Thapar: Is there a fourth?

Arun Shourie: Yes. There are many things. He doesn’t have a place to study, make free dormitories. He needs free textbooks, he needs training and education.

Karan Thapar: That’s all part of individual attention. But is there yet another measure you would like to implement to help the Dalit? Because let me tell you why I am asking you all the things you have talked about -- social reform, economic growth, individual attention, they are very slow. They are unenforceable, they are difficult to monitor, they are certainly not transparent and in most cases, they are voluntary. The reason why people prefer reservations is because they are transparent, they are enforceable, and they are monitorable.

Arun Shourie: And for 50 years you have not monitored them? Even the government.

Karan Thapar: But that’s not the failure of reservations? That is the failure of the administration.

Arun Shourie: No. No. You don’t understand. Reservations are going to be implemented by whom? By the Americans in India?

Karan Thapar: Reservations have been implemented badly. That’s not an argument against reservations per se?

Arun Shourie: That is the usual argument of Five-Year Plans. Plan was good, but was not implemented properly.

Karan Thapar: But in this case, it is the truth?

Arun Shourie: It is not the truth. It is an assertion that you keep making. The fact of the matter is that these free lunch programmes, midday meals have helped a great deal in reducing dropout rates, in retention of what is learnt. We should do that. That is what requires painstaking work and the very fact that things are not being monitored…

I will give you an example if you please permit me. Recently in the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Social Welfare, there was a report available in May, in which the Secretary of Social Welfare was asked: "You have a backward classes of financial corporation, how do you distribute the money between he states?" He said: "Madam, we distribute it according to the proportion of OBC population in different states." She said: "How do you know the number?" He said: "We don’t know the number." She said: "What is the total number of OBCs in India?" He said: "We don’t know." "What is the total number of Scheduled Caste people?" He said: "We don’t know." If we don't know the number, we don’t know the distribution, we are not monitoring who is getting what.

Karan Thapar: It is a little facile to knock down reservations on the ground that the administrators who are responsible for administrating them are fools. That’s what you are proving. You are proving the administration, not the policy of reservations, is wrong.

Arun Shourie: I am saying more. Many commentators are just assertives. I will not listen to…

Karan Thapar: The assertion could be on fact?

Arun Shourie: What is the fact?

Karan Thapar: I can argue that your refusal to accept this is based on prejudice.

Arun Shourie: No. The caste people…

Karan Thapar: I being the asserter, you could be the prejudiced.

Arun Shourie: Could be. The Scheduled Caste people are saying that the benefits of reservations are being hogged by a Creamy Layer within Scheduled Caste.

Karan Thapar: But at least they are getting it. The Creamy Layer didn’t have it 50 years ago.

Arun Shourie: It is impossible to argue with that.

Karan Thapar: Why? It is a fact.

Arun Shourie: What is the Creamy Layer?

Karan Thapar: Once the Creamy Layer has benefited, you can remove them, but let them benefit before you remove them.

Arun Shourie: But you can benefit the people by having an economic criterion for identifying the individual. Why not?

Karan Thapar: You know that each time milk boils, it forms a Creamy Layer. You just remove it. Each boiling brings a fresh layer to the top.

Arun Shourie: Milk could be made to boil many time over, provided you identify the state policy by the unit of the individual and you identify the beneficiary individual by economic criteria. You would then not be fortifying precisely the types of regressive institutions within Indian society like caste, which you want to get rid off.

Karan Thapar: Except that the people who are untouchables were not created untouchables because of their individual character but because of the group. That’s why the group is being focused upon.

Arun Shourie: It reinforces the kind of group. This was Panditji’s view. I believe that this has been vindicated by time that we have reinforced that group identity to the great evil of society, to the ill results of society.

Karan Thapar: This will unfortunately have to be my last question. That many Dalits listening to you will say that ‘he may be a liberal in many matters, but he is a hard-hearted, callous man who simply doesn’t understand what it’s like to be oppressed under centuries of discrimination.’

Arun Shourie: They said that to me when I wrote about Bhindrawala. He is a Hindu, Arya Samaji, does not…

Karan Thapar: The two situations don’t equate.

Arun Shourie: They do. When I wrote about the Shariat and the consequences of Shah Bano, everybody said he is communal, he is Hindu. And now? So wait for time.

Karan Thapar: So the verdict of your peers or the verdict of the majority of society is water off a duck's back as far as Arun Shourie is concerned.

Arun Shourie: I don’t know what the majority of the society. Karan Thapar doesn’t speak for them either.

Karan Thapar: Arun Shourie, a pleasure talking to you.

Arun Shourie: Thank you.

Arun Shourie on the Mitrokhin Archives OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Part-I

Standard Operating Procedure
The weekly organ of the CPI(M), People's Democracy, September 2005, declaims, ''The Mitrokhin balloon of lies has been well burst recently. The statement of the secretary of the Bengal unit of the CPI(M), Anil Biswas on September 21 may well perhaps be the last nail on the coffin of the 'archival misdemeanour'. Anil Biswas told the media at the Muzaffar Ahmad Bhavan that 'after having procured the so-called Mitrokhin archives and poring over it, we find no reference of the kind alleged or otherwise, to the late Promode Dasgupta'.''

There are just two short chapters in this book about India. On the very second page of the very first of these, we read, ''As KGB operations in India expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, the Centre (that is, the KGB headquarters in Moscow ) seems to have discovered the extent of IB's previous penetration of the CPI. According to a KGB report, an investigation into Promode Das Gupta, who became secretary of the Bengal Communist Party in 1959, concluded that he had been recruited by the IB in 1947 . Further significant IB penetrations were discovered in the Kerala and Madras parties...''

Did the ''poring over'' not reach even the second page? But this is standard procedure for Marxists — lie outright!

In the full confidence that no one will look up the original material.

The second, adopted this time round by the Congress too, is to just dismiss revelations. Extracts from The Mitrokhin Archive had but to appear in the press, and they, and their favoured commentators pronounced, ''No evidence...,'' ''Fiction...,'' ''An author in search of lies.'' And simultaneously, ''There is nothing new.... These things have been well known for long!'' Well known for long, but require new proof!

The third device also has been on display this time round: paste motives on all concerned. A favourite of Marxists, it has been deployed even by ''intelligence experts'' this time. One of them writes that the book has three aims. The first, he says, is ''To discredit the present Russian leadership.'' Presumably this is accomplished by indirection: as Putin is known to have been in the KGB, as it is well known that he has appointed his former colleagues from the KGB to vital posts across Russia, pointing to what the KGB used to be doing, tarnishes ''the present Russian leadership''. Second, our expert says, the purpose of the Mitrokhin account is ''to drive a wedge between the present leaderships of Russia and India .'' And, third, the British secret service has always been hostile to leaders of the Labour Party in the UK , this has been a plot to discredit the Labour Government and leaders of Britain.

Assume all this to be true, does it amount to a reason for India not to examine what the disclosures spell for our national security and governance? The fourth device is to smear whoever has brought out facts that are inconvenient. ''A former low-grade clerk of the KGB archives,'' they write about Mitrokhin, he was not the head of KGB archives. Assume that to be true: low-grade clerks are as useful sources of information as heads of departments! Mitrokhin was an incompetent officer, they say — if he had been any good at field work, he would not have been assigned to a backroom tending old records. But the point is whether, having been relegated to backrooms, he had access to thoe tell-tale records. Just one who ''stole'' those ''clandestinely obtained'' documents, they say. But does that suggest that the records he transcribed were genuine and valuable or does that establish that they were fakes?!

As it isn't just Vasili Mitrokhin who was involved in this project, the British professor, Christopher Andrew who collaborated in writing and editing the volumes also comes in for the standard treatment. The professor, we are told, ''was alleged to have been embedded in the intelligence agencies.'' He becomes ''the ever-obliging Christopher Andrew.'' The CPI(M) mouthpiece, People's Democracy, is even more elaborate: ''No wonder, these scions (those running the 'corporate media' here in India) have now picked up the Soviet defector's ramblings, which have been put together in a fashion in a book by an English author who is not only not known for his scholarship but also just not known in the academe as a practicing historian.'' That phrase is literally standard issue.

When ''Why?,'' does not work, ask, ''Why now?'' That is the standard device since Lenin's time! And this time too we have had it in full display: Mitrokhin defected in 1992, why is this book being released now, in 2005? demands one of these tele-Communists. In fact, the six cases full of notes that were brought over were examined threadbare for years, and the first volume was printed in 1999! But again, standard.

In truth, there never is a right time to talk the truth about them! Communist journals in India used to be full of glowing accounts about the industrial excellence of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, about the achievements of Ceausescu and his Romania, about the unequalled might of the Soviet Union; about how unemployment had been abolished, how ills that plagued capitalist societies — divorce, crime — were non-existent in Communist countries. If before 1989 you questioned the claims, you were denounced, ''Do you think one-third of humanity is wrong, and you alone are right?'' And after 1989, when the entire Soviet bloc collapsed?

True to form, this time also we read in the CPI(M)'s mouthpiece, People's Democracy, ''The principal reason why this cheap thriller (the phrase for the Mitrokhin record) is being played out in the corporate media now more than ever is not difficult to guess. The recent resurgence of the communists, socialists, and the Left across the globe has certainly made the imperialists press the panic button.... In India, the presence and growth of the CPI(M) has long since been a worry for the ruling classes and their friends and patrons out in the West. The corporate media has, as a willing handmaiden, been periodically albeit regularly feeding out stories maligning the Party and its leadership.''

Facts about Mitrokhin's records:
To gauge the worth of these denunciations, recall that Vasili Mitrokhin defected in 1992. Between 1992 and 1999, his notes were subjected to minute and most careful examination by various levels of the British Government. They scrutinized the information, they examined who to engage as co-author, they weighed how the material ought to be published. Questions such as these were considered by senior civil servants, intelligence agencies, by an interdepartmental committee, by Ministers, by two Prime Ministers. The way the material was handled was subsequently debated in the House of Commons and was examined threadbare by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament. The Committee was tasked in October 1999 to examine whether it had been handled well. The Parliamentary Committee submitted a detailed report in June 2000. This report was debated extensively.

The first volume of the present work was published in 1999. No one in India made the kinds of allegations that are being hurled now. While we are being fed insinuations to belittle Mitrokhin; while we are being fed the line, for instance, that the entire project has been a conspiracy of British intelligence agencies to discredit British Labour Party leaders, this is what Jack Straw, then Home Secretary and currently the Foreign Secretary of the Labour Government - to tarnish whom we are being told this plot has been engineered — said about Mitrokhin. He told the House of Commons on 21 October, 1999,

''....I entirely endorse what the right hon. Gentleman says about Mr. Mitrokhin's courage. It required huge courage to do what he did. I do not doubt that a great many other people working in the KGB during that long period were pretty disgusted with the work that they were asked to engage in, but very few of them had the courage and tenacity to work, as Mr. Mitrokhin did, to record the huge amount of what was passing across his desk and then to make himself known to intelligence agents in Moscow and have himself and his family brought out at considerable risk. I pay tribute to his courage and acknowledge the benefits that the whole of the West has received as a result of his disclosures''

Similarly, the Parliamentary Committee observed, ''The Committee, during the course of the inquiry, had the opportunity to meet Vasili Mitrokhin. The Committee believes that he is a man of remarkable commitment and courage, who risked imprisonment or death in his determination that the truth should be told about the real nature of the KGB and their activities, which he believed were betraying the interests of his own country and people. He succeeded in this and we wish to record our admiration for his achievement....'' But in India, ''a former low-grade clerk,'' one who ''stole documents,'' one who was so incompetent that he had to be consigned to a backroom dusting archives....

Similarly, while in India the account has been dismissed as ''vague'', ''complete fabrication,'' ''fiction'', ''a spy thriller,'' Britain's Parliamentary Committee had this to say about the value of the material that Mitrokhin had brought over, and on which the Mitrokhin-Andrew volumes are based, ''We are aware that the Western intelligence communities are extremely grateful for Mr Mitrokhin's material, which has shown the degree to which the KGB influenced and penetrated official organizations. Historians also find The Mitrokhin Archive of tremendous value, as it gives a real insight into the KGB's work and the persecution of dissidents.''

But in India , to use Lenin's phrase, ''a shroud of angry words to cover inconvenient facts''! The one question we should be asking, is not being asked: Indian and British intelligence agencies have had close relations; was the material offered to us, as it was offered to other agencies? What did we do about it?

Instead, all sorts of red-herrings are being thrown in the way. Why was this unknown professor, why was this person who was ''alleged to have been embedded in intelligence agencies,'' why was he of all persons chosen as co-author? It just so happens that this question too was examined by the UK Parliamentary Committee. It concluded that in Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University, just the right man had been chosen for the project. Andrews had previously worked on the Gordievsky books. He had been security cleared and had signed the Official Secrets Act, the Committee noted. ''The Committee regards Professor Andrews as a distinguished academic who has specialized in the espionage field,'' the report stated. ''He was a good choice to undertake this work.'' But in India....



Part-II
A society and state in denial In his justly famous memoir, Encounters with Lenin, (Oxford University press, 1968) Nikolay Vladislavovich Volsky, who wrote under the pen-name Valentinov, narrates what is for Communists the hadis in such matters. He recounts what Lenin said to him: ''Marxism is a monolith conception of the world, it does not toler ate dilution and vulgarisation by means of various insertions and additions. Plekhanov once said to me about a critic of Marxism (I've forgotten his name) 'First let's stick the convict's badge on him, and then after that we'll examine this case.' And I think we must stick the convict's badge, on anyone and everyone who tries to undermine Marxism, even if we don't go on to examine his case. That's how every sound revolutionary should react.''

As that is the operating procedure for the much lesser offence — that of mere ''dilution'' of the doctrine — you can imagine how much greater must be the zeal with which the ''convict's badge'' is stuck on one guilty of the much greater crime — the crime of revealing the truth about them.

In a word, we should see that the put-on derision with which Communists and the Congress spokesmen have been trying to bury Mitrokhin's records is just standard procedure, and not let it deflect us from the revelations. For there can be no doubt at all that, as far as India is concerned — our governance, our national security — Mitrokhin's records point to the gravest danger. Remember that the two brief chapters in this volume are but the distillation of trunk-loads of scrupulous notes taken down over twelve years. Even this briefest of brief accounts speaks of penetration by foreign agencies of departments of our Government, including intelligence agencies; of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's coterie; it speaks of the foreign agency's intervention in what we regard as our hallmark, our ''free and fair'' elections; it speaks of the confidence with which the agency maneuvered to build up preferred successors to Prime Ministers; it speaks of funding of Left parties, of trade unions, of the Congress itself; it speaks of how one of the prides of that period — Indo-Soviet trade — became such a handy channel for secret funds; it speaks of infiltration of our other hallmark, our ''free and fair'' media — it recounts the ease with which the KGB and the CIA were able to plant stories; it speaks of the ease with which, and the paltry sums for which the KGB was able to organize ''spontaneous demonstrations'' by Muslims....

Consider just a single paragraph from the chapter: ''Oleg Kalugin, who became head of FCD Directorate K (Counterintelligence) in 1973, remembers India as 'a model of KGB infiltration of a Third World Government': We had scores of sources throughout the Indian Government — in intelligence, counterintelligence, the Defence and Foreign Ministries, and the police.' In 1978, Directorate K, whose responsibilities included the penetration of foreign intelligence and security agencies, was running, through Line KR in the Indian residencies, over thirty agents — ten of whom were Indian intelligence officers. Kalugin recalls one occasion on which Andropov personally turned down an offer from an Indian minister to provide information in return for $ 50,000 on the grounds that the KGB was already well supplied with material from the Indian Foreign and Defence Ministries: 'It seemed like the entire country was for sale; the KGB — and the CIA — had deeply penetrated the Indian Government. After a while neither side entrusted sensitive information to the Indians, realising that their enemy would know all about it the next day.''

Even if we have become so immune to shame by now that we are not led to hang our heads on reading a passage such as this, at least we should consider what that kind of information implies for our national security. Moreover, as the KGB had such ingress into our governmental structures, agencies of other countries too would have had no greater difficulty in suborning persons and influencing policies and decisions. And can that surprise us? When every corporate house is able to plant stories, what difficulty would a foreign government face? And remember, that passage is about the state of affairs thirty years ago. Since then, there has been a precipitate deterioration in both the quality and integrity of persons in public life as well as in the civil service.

For none of the things that Mitrokhin records is the KGB is to blame. That agency was just doing its job for its country. The question is, what were we doing for our country? The question is, what are we to now do to protect our interest? Recall what the British Parliamentary Committee reported about the worth of Mitrokhin's disclosures, and how invaluable these had been to agencies of other countries to neutralise dangers those countries faced — ''Western intelligence communities are extremely grateful for Mr. Mitrokhin's material...,'' ''a case of exceptional counter-intelligence significance, not only illuminating past KGB activity against Western countries but also promising to nullify many of Russia's current assets''.... ''the most detailed and extensive pool of CI (counter-intelligence) ever received by the FBI''.... ''the biggest CI bonanza of the postwar period'' — contrast these acknowledgments, contrast the way agencies of other countries put the material to work, contrast all that with the resolute shutting of eyes in India.

Several lessons leap out from this episode. Notice first what the Communists, their megaphones and their current dependents would have been blaring had even one-thousandth of such disclosures come out about some organization or individual affiliated to the RSS. Two points arise from that contrast. First, is such penetration a threat to our national security if it relates to the RSS and not a threat when it relates to the Communists or the Congress? Second, where do the disclosures leave the high moral ground that the Left appropriates?

It is entirely true that just because someone is named by a foreign intelligence agency or agent, that does not establish him to have been a spy. But surely the right response would be to inquire, at least to find out whether British agencies had offered the information to us and we had failed to follow it up. Nor is this a one-off. Professor Patrick Moynihan was one of the most respected of American academics. He was appointed Ambassador to India during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's time. As Mrs. Gandhi's speeches about the ''foreign hand'' — that always meant the CIA — became incessant, Moynihan commenced an inquiry into what Americans had been doing. In his memoir of the period he wrote that he came across two occasions on which the CIA had provided funds to counter Communist candidates. He wrote, ''Both times the money was given to the Congress Party which had asked for it. Once it was given to Mrs. Gandhi herself, who was then a party official.'' His book was published in the US as well as in India . If what he had said was untrue, what could be a clearer occasion for a defamation case? But absolutely nothing of the kind was done. Just the standard operating procedure: denounce, smear, bury. When the Government so resolutely refuses to make any inquiries, whether the account is of Moynihan or Mitrokhin, what should one conclude?

In the case of the Communists, disclosures about their having received money are the least of the matter — and it does seem to me that the Mitrokhin figures are gross understatements, as if some few zeros have got left out. The figures of Indo-Soviet trade, the quantum of Indian purchases of Soviet arms, and what was said in those days of the sudden wealth of the private parties through whom the Soviets insisted these transactions be made, would suggest transfers of much, much larger amounts. But in their case, money is the least of the matter. Their entire outlook, their ''line'' has been foreign, it has been derived from, to use Mao's phrase, ''the dung-heap of textbooks written abroad.'' And, as has been documented time and again, from instructions received from abroad.

As a result, working for the interest of heir ''international movement'', specifically for the ''fortresses'' of that ''movement'' — the USSR, China — is in their very genes. They traduced Gandhiji and the freedom movement from 1939 for not taking advantage of Britain's difficulties — the war in Europe is just an ''Imperialist war'', they shouted; Gandhi is guilty of collaborating with the Imperialists by not launching a movement to liberate India when Britain was caught defending itself against Hitler. Hitler was, of course, on the side of history then as he had signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin.

Then they switched suddenly — the ''Imperialist war'' became ''People's war'', not because India 's interests had changed but because Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union. They now denounced Gandhi for launching the Quit India Movement! And there was no doubt about the reason: the Soviet Union is ''The Only Fatherland'' for us, they proudly announced in their resolutions, and, in accordance with this new ''assessment'', they entered into a secret understanding with the British Government in India to sabotage the Quit India Movement. In 1947, apart from the Muslim League, they were the only party that advocated the vivisection of India. When India became independent, they declared that India was in fact still under the tutelage of capitalist, Imperial powers, and so its Government must be overthrown.

In 1962, their thesis was that India is the aggressor, not China — which, by definition, could never launch aggression as it was a ''workers' State''. In 1975, they — they, we now see, at the goading of their KGB minders - were all for the Emergency. When China exploded its atomic bomb, they proclaimed it to be a great triumph — a fitting answer to the Imperialists, a decisive step that breaks the monopoly of Imperialist powers. When India went in for atomic weapons, they denounced it — a blow at world peace!

The Mitrokhin disclosures are particularly disturbing for them as they remind us once more, among other ''well known'' facts, of how they and their fellow-travelers, unable to work their Revolution, worked at securing the same goal by infiltration — of the Congress; a sort of ''Revolution-by-stealth''. This was the famous ''Kumarmangalam thesis'' that, as Mitrokhin reports, got such enthusiastic assistance from the KGB. But surely that is not just a reminder of what is past. The Communists have never been closer to attaining that goal as they are today — what with a supine Congress so completely at their mercy.

Nor is it just that the Congress is so completely at their mercy. As Swapan Dasgupta pointed out the other day, the danger is twice compounded — the Congress is completely dependent on the Communists, and the Communists are completely compromised. The Communists have been busy denouncing Mitrokhin's revelations. But as Dasgupta points out, there are several other caches that are coming to light. He draws attention to the fact that the private diaries of a former Soviet Ambassador to India, I. A. Benediktov can now be accessed on the Internet — at the website of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington, DC ( http://wilsoncentre.org) In these diaries, Benediktov records plaintive pleas of Bhupesh Gupta, Secretary, National Council of CPI, for funds. He records Gupta's plea that, with Ajoy Ghosh through whom the monies used to be received and disbursed, gone, Namboodripad should be allowed to be brought in to handle funds from the Soviets.

A little later, during China's invasion of India in 1962, Benediktov records Namboodripad's fevered appeals to the Soviets that they abandon their support for India, and the sycophantic gratitude Namboodripad expresses for an editorial that Pravda has carried that suggests a shift away from India. Namboodripad asks Benediktov to inform the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ''that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this, there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to help this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help. You can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B Gupta.'' In a word, the Congress is completely in the hands of the Communists, and the Communists can be ''motivated'' by so many — those who gave them assistance and guidance, as well as those who may reveal what they got, and with how much gratitude they received it.

So, first of all we must see through their invective. As the Government is in their grip; as, given what Mitrokhin records about infiltration into Mrs. Indira Gandhi's circle, of its own accord the Government itself will not want to pursue the matter, inside Parliament and outside, citizens must put pressure on the Government to institute a full and public inquiry. It must be made to request the British Government for access to Mitrokhin's records, and it must be made to make public what those records reveal about India. But we do not have to go on waiting for the Government to do something in the matter. Papers of several senior Soviet officials are now in various archives. We should form teams of scholars on our own and scrutinize that heap of material for entries that pertain to India.

These are important steps, and they must be taken. But even they are but tiny ancillaries to the main debility we must overcome. The reaction in India, that is the non-reaction to The Mitrokhin Archive is but a symptom — of a state and society in denial. On every matter — what Pakistan was doing in Punjab; what it has been doing in Kashmir as well as its current stratagem to acquire it ''peacefully''; infiltration from Bangladesh; jihadi curricula; the threat Naxalites pose and their links in Bihar, in Andhra; the threat ULFA poses and its links in Assam; the militarization of Tibet, the modernization of Chinese defence forces and their deadly implications for India; the opportunity that the breakdown of governance in vast tracts like Bihar spells for the country's enemies — on each and every matter, our society and state just do not want to face the facts.

The media must see how it assists in this shutting of eyes. By the current ''your reaction journalism'' for one. Mitrokhin's volume is published. It goes to someone from the BJP, ''Sir, this new book by this Russian alleges..., what is your reaction? In brief.'' And then to a Communist, ''Sir, this new book by this Russian alleges..., what is your reaction?'' Both sides covered. Balanced story on air. End of matter. This is the condition that we have to reverse, and disclosures of the Mitrokhin kind are yet another occasion when we can commence to do so. On each of these questions, at each of these turns, induce readers, compel governments to face the facts, and thereby take steps that would save the country.

(Concluded)

Shilpa Shetty trumps Arunachal again

Arun Shourie: Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Every time China advances a claim, watch how our government — and media — react in feeble, confused, and contradictory ways, writes Arun Shourie


November 21, 2007: We were all at the weekly meeting of the BJP members of Parliament. L.K. Advani was presiding. Two of our colleagues represent Arunachal in the Lok Sabha — Tapir Gao and Kiren Rijiju. They drew attention to the fact that Chinese incursions into Arunachal were not just continuing — these were becoming more frequent and the Chinese soldiers were coming in deeper into our territory. They pointed to the statement of a senior official heading our force that is deployed on the border: the official had felt compelled to disclose in a public statement that there had been 146 incursions in just 2007. The MPs — who know the area well, who tour extensively across the state, to whom local inhabitants regularly and naturally bring information — said that the Chinese were now preventing locals from going up to regions where they had been taking their animals for grazing; that they were being supplied goods from Chinese shops...

They drew even sharper attention to an incident that had occurred just three weeks earlier. For as long as anyone could remember, there had been a statue of the Buddha — well inside Indian territory. Local inhabitants used to go up to it — pray, make their offerings. The local commander of the Chinese troops had told Indian soldiers that the statue must be removed. Our soldiers had pointed out that the statue was well within Indian territory, and so there was no question of removing it. The Chinese had come, and blown off the statue...

I raised my hand for permission to speak. It so happened that I was half-way through a book, Why Geography Matters, by the well-known geographer, Harm de Blij. Setting the stage, Blij points to the clues that one can get from maps, and why it is important to pay attention to them — especially when governments publish them. He recalls ‘a telling experience’ he had in 1990. A colleague of his, working then at the University of Baghdad, had sent him an official map that had been published by the Government of Iraq. The map showed Kuwait as the 13th province of Iraq. At a meeting in Washington, Blij had drawn the attention of the then chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the US House of Representatives to the map and its implications. The gentleman had told Blij not to worry, the US Ambassador, he said, was on top of things... A few days had not passed, and Iraq had marched its armies into Kuwait... The first Gulf War...

But it was the passage that followed that was of urgent interest to us, and I sought Advani’s permission to read it. The passage is as follows — please do read it carefully:

‘Cartographic aggression takes several forms. Some overt, as in the case of Iraq, others more subtle. In 1993 I received a book titled Physical Geography of China, written by Zhao Sonqiao, published in 1986 in Beijing. On the frontispiece is a map of China. But that map, to the trained eye, looks a bit strange. Why? Because in the south, it takes from India virtually all of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, plus a piece of the state of Assam. Now this book is not a political geography of China, nor is the matter of appropriated Indian territory ever discussed in it. China’s border is simply assumed to lie deep inside India, and the mountains and valleys thus claimed are discussed as though they are routinely a part of China. Make no mistake: such a map could not, in the 1980s at least, have been published without official approval. It should put not just India but the whole international community on notice of a latent trouble spot.’

BJP members of Parliament are acutely sensitive to national security issues. Here were two colleagues from the state testifying to what the Chinese were doing in Arunachal, and now here was a book that was warning about what was afoot — a book published far away, a book written by an author who had no interest in either running down China or upholding India’s position on anything. The effect was palpable. Advani said that the two MPs and I should attend the BJP press conference that afternoon, and draw the attention of the media to the facts. Advaniji said that, in addition to explaining the background, I should read out the passage too.

When Parliament is in session, the press conference is held every afternoon. The large room was packed with journalists. After Sushma Swaraj and Vijay Kumar Malhotra had dealt with events of the day, Tapir Gao and Kiren Rijiju narrated the facts. I set out the context — and read the foregoing passage.

I had hardly concluded that the usual clutch — pro-Congress, pro-Left — was up in arms. ‘When was the book published?’ one demanded. I couldn’t get the relevance of the question: what has the date of publication got to do with the warning that the author had penned, even more so with the facts that the MPs have set out? ‘No, no. As the book must have been available even during the NDA regime, what did your government do about the matter?’ I hadn’t looked up the date of publication. I did now. The edition I had in hand had been published in 2007! It records that the book was first published in 2005! The journalist subsided. In any case, I pointed out, trying to soften the deflation-by-date, the vital thing is not what the book says — the passage from the book just illustrates that, while others are concerned, we continue to sleep. The thing of vital consequence is what is happening on the ground, and this is what my colleagues here — who represent the area in Parliament — have just narrated.

‘But what did the NDA do about the incursions?’ another member of that clutch demanded. First, the head of the force at the border has spoken about the incursions that have taken place this year, in 2007, I pointed out. What could the NDA government have done about them? But assume that incursions were taking place then, and that the NDA government did nothing. Does that in any way become reason for not doing anything today? Please do have some mercy on our country, I said. Here is China claiming our territory; here it is, having begun that well-rehearsed series of steps which precede a grab. Are we going to divert ourselves from that reality by the usual ‘tu-tu, mein-mein, NDA vs UPA?’

‘No, Mr Shourie,’ — it was the pro-Left journalist — ‘but you have to acknowledge that there is no agreed international border between India and China. So...’ That is the Chinese position as articulated by your paper often, I said. It has not been the position of any Indian Government...

By now enough diversion had been created. The press conference was soon over. My Arunachal colleagues were, of course, disheartened — ‘If this is how much the national press cares...’ I was incensed. For years I have seen such clutches divert attention from life and death issues and been unable to do anything about it. Here was another painful instance.

Not only was the question at hand a matter of life and death for our country. It was one on which we had the most recent historical experience to keep us alert. When Acharya Kripalani, Ram Manohar Lohia, K.M. Munshi and others had first drawn attention to Chinese maps that showed vast swathes of Indian territory to be part of China, Panditji had replied that he had taken up the matter with the Chinese and they had said that these were old, colonial, faulty maps, and, as they had just gained independence, they had not had time to correct them. Later, these very maps were used to argue that the areas had always been part of China. Mao had then declared, Tibet is the palm of China, and the Himalayan kingdoms are the fingers of that palm... Did the journalists not remember any of this?

An anchor from a news channel phoned. I saw your press conference, he said. We have been following this story for many months. Can you please come to our studio?... No, I said, I really am very upset at what happened... But I give you my word, he said, we think this is an important issue, and we are going to follow it in the coming months also. I will send an OB-van to your house.

The van came. The late night news. The earpiece in my ear... All set. Delay — quite understandable: some new eruption in Nandigram... Eventually, the anchor and I are talking.

‘But are you sure about the facts or is the BJP indulging in its usual fear-politics?’ the anchor asks. But why don’t you ascertain them from the two MPs who represent the area? I respond. Better still, why don’t you send your own correspondents and photographers to the area? I inquire. We will, we will, I assure you. I was just making sure...

In any case, look at what the ambassador of China has himself said, I remarked. Remember, just days before Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, was to come to India, the ambassador declared, right here on Indian soil, that Arunachal is a part of China...

‘But maybe he was saying it for rhetorical effect,’ said the anchor.

Rhetorical effect? I skipped a heartbeat. Is the Chinese Ambassador also running after TRP ratings like the TV channels? Would an ambassador say such things just for effect? And that too the ambassador of China, of all countries? You mean an ambassador, you mean the ambassador of China of all countries would claim the territory of the country to which he is accredited, that he would lay claim to an entire state of that country for rhetorical effect? I asked. And remember, I pointed out, he repeated the claim in Chandigarh later. And look at the government of China — it has not distanced itself from the claim advanced by its ambassador. On the contrary, its ‘think-tanks’ have held ‘seminars’ in the wake of the ambassador’s statement. In this the ‘scholars’ and ‘diplomats’ and ‘strategic thinkers’ have declared to the man that Arunachal is ‘Chinese territory under India’s forcible occupation’; that it is ‘China’s Tawang region’; that it is ‘Southern Tibet’ which must be brought under the control of the Tibet Autonomous Region. And you call this rhetorical? That is just lunatic...

The anchor was off to the next item. ‘Be that as it may... Another controversy... Thank you, Mr Shourie. Always a pleasure talking to you. Moving now to a slightly less controversial story...’ ‘SHILPA SHETTY,’ he said, his voice rising, ‘has not been in the news since the famous Richard Gere kiss, but we have her back today. Here she is, SHILPA SHETTY...’

The sound on my earpiece cut. Shilpa Shetty had once again trumped poor Arunachal.

Both sets of exchanges — at the press conference as well as over the TV news channel — had been typical. In part, the problem is extreme, brazen partisanship — and this takes two forms. One is the premise of many: India can never really be in the right: you just have to see the play Musharraf’s devious formulae have got in many of our magazines — the presumption is that we are in the wrong in Kashmir, and so we are the ones who must bend, and go on bending till Pakistan expresses satisfaction. This premise is compounded in the case of many others by commitment: you can rely on several of our colleagues to see merit in China’s stance on everything. The second variant is domestic predilection: the BJP is evil incarnate; because the BJP has raised the issue, the issue itself must be trashed. That is how the mortal danger from Bangladeshi infiltrators has been shouted out. That is how the dual-faced, anti-national politics of many in Kashmir has been shouted out. That is how appeasement of narrow sections for votes is routinely shouted out. That is how what is happening in Arunachal is being shouted out.

And then there is what has become the nature of the media: the obsession with the sound bite on the one side and with the next ‘breaking news’ on the other. Issues like Kashmir, the nuclear deal, the way China is translating its economic strength into military might — these require more than a sound bite. The media has no time for that.

Similarly, to deal with China, to counter Pakistan’s proxy war, the country must sustain a policy for 20-30 years. And for that, you have to keep readers and viewers focused on that issue for decades at a time. But the media is fixated only on what it can project as ‘breaking news’ in this shift — what was ‘breaking news’ in the last shift is ‘old hat’ by this one.

Even more than partisanship, and the obsessions of the current media with the next ‘breaking news’, the problem is superciliousness — this has become the reigning ideology today. What we see every day in papers — that ‘Shilpa Shetty over Arunachal’ business — was brought home to me directly one day. We happened to meet while flying to Mumbai — the owner of one of the country’s foremost newspapers and I. I accosted him about what his paper was carrying on Kashmir — every allegation, every smear that any and every secessionist thug was spitting out at our country and our forces was being carried on the front pages of his paper as fact. Aren’t you reading the nonsense that your paper is printing on Kashmir? I asked. And I gave examples from the preceding few days. The entrepreneur listened. And then exclaimed: ‘Arun bhai, yehi to faraq hai aap mein aur hum mein. Aap abhi bhi hamara paper padhte ho!’ — ‘That is precisely the difference between you and us, Arun bhai. You still read our paper!’

That such a person no longer bothers to read his paper was just a pose. His real message was, ‘Kashmir, did you say? I am above such trifles...’

This weak-kneed government is a problem, of course: its nominal leaders have lifted helplessness to new heights. But the even graver problem now is that the one instrument by which it could be shaken up, the media, has become a problem of its own.

Make no mistake: China watches all this. It watches the feeble, confused, contradictory ways in which our government, and even more our society, reacts each time it advances a claim. And it pursues its policy:

Claim;

Repeat the claim;

Go on repeating the claim;

Grab;

Hold;

Let time pass.

And they will reconcile themselves to the new situation. Has the policy not succeeded in regard to Tibet? No Indian Prime Minister will dare mention the word ‘Tibet’ or ‘Taiwan’ — lest doing so offends China. But China will go on claiming what it wants — for reasons that we must understand!

But why think of Tibet and Taiwan? Has the six-step policy not succeeded in regard to Aksai Chin? In spite of the unanimous resolution that the Parliament passed at the time under Panditji, is there an Indian leader who will today demand that China hand back Aksai Chin? And do you think that when they deliberate over what they are to do in regard to Arunachal, the Chinese do not remember the success they have achieved in Aksai Chin?

The writer is a BJP MP in Rajya Sabha
“The Left distorts” (Interview with Arun Shourie)
Author: Swapan Dasgupta
Publication: India Today
Date: November 23, 1998

Controversy and Arun Shourie are inseparable. He, has taken on
governments, politicians and corporate houses, championed
contentious causes and assumed the role of India's permanent
gadfly. After questioning the mythology centred on Babasaheb
Ambedkar and offending Dalit activists, Shourie has now targeted
Left historians. Eminent Historians: Their Technology, Their
Line, Their Fraud (ASA, Rs 350), released last week, is a
characteristically robust attack on India's history
establishment. He has accused it of shoddy scholarship, wilful
distortion and even milking the exchequer He spoke to Deputy
Editor Swapan Dasgupta on his latest battle. Extracts:

Q: Let me start with a question you accuse communists of
constantly asking. Why now?
A: It is what the Gita calls a war unasked for. We should never
shirk work that has been brought upon us. Some magazines
published reports that the BJP Government had changed the
resolution of the Indian Council for Historical Research (ICHR)
by converting "rational" into "national". It was a concoction by
some CPI(M) members and I learnt from the ICHR staff that the
letter circulated to the newspapers was typed in the ICHR office.
A staff member told one of these so-called historians that it was
not true. He replied. "Who cares? Let it go." That was the
origin. And every newspaper just swallowed it. I contacted the
editors but none of them retracted the story. Even the story
carried by INDIA TODAY was about the eminent historians not
having accepted one penny as if there was a genuine other side to
it.

Q: So you believe that in this controversy there is no other
side?
A: Not yet. Not in the three limited matters which I have touched
upon in the book. Which are: the technology by which they acquire
these institutions and the uses to which they put it to; the
pickpocketing that they do; the complete and systematic
perversion of facts. I don't think there is another side.

Q: It's curious that it took a non-historian to question some of
these assumptions. Why hasn't this challenge come from within the
discipline of history?
A: There are too many establishments in India, the Indian
journalists service, the Indian intellectual service, the Indian
historians service. They capture institutions. There is a great
timidity in India in all intellectual circles. You want a
promotion in the history department, increase in research funds,
funds for travel, promotion, everything depends upon certificates
>from these persons. If you want to challenge the accepted
notions, you not only need a person who is outside the discipline
but one who is deaf to the reproaches of these persons.

Q: Your interventions in history have aroused claims and
counterclaims that you are waging a proxy. political war?
A: These are allegations. Have they found anything wrong with my
facts? When they quote a source, I look it up and I find it is
the opposite. Then they say that he did not look up the correct
one. Whatever they write is politics. So why are they so
surprised that an honest man may also write?

Q: Part of the problem in your view has been caused by shoddy
scholarship and shoddier journalism.
A: Yes. That, as well as slavish scholarship and journalism. One
and a half paras from Stalin's Short History of the CPSU(B). Just
look up any one the books of R.S. Sharma, Satish Chandra, Romila
Thapar or D. N. Jha. It is the slavish mentality, providing
examples that substantiate those one and half paras on
periodisation. Even the Soviet historians have liberated
themselves from those categories. We got stuck in the categories
of the 1920s and 1930s.

Q: But you haven't stopped at mere intellectual slavishness. You
have actually accused these "eminent historians” of milking the
state.
A: Yes. It is a pitiable milking by current standards-all for
just Rs 12,000 or Rs 6.5 lakh. But it is a gross misuse of
authority and position. If the NBT or NCERT send a proposal that
R.C. Majumdar's edited Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan series on the
history of India should be translated into Indian languages,
these people would pass a resolution saying that it was not worth
translating into any Indian language. And lo and behold-they will
recommend their own works or that of EMS (Namboodiripad), the
great historian.

The deputy director of ICHR gives a project to Dr Paramatma
Saran, one of the great medievalists in India. He translates and
sends it to ICHR. After his death, the deputy director takes that
manuscript and gets a PhD for himself from Rajasthan University
without changing anything and publishes the book dedicated to
Nurul Hasan and thanking Irfan Habib who wrote a laudatory
foreword to it. In his office there is a picture of him
presenting his book to the then President Shankar Dayal Sharma,
another great scholar. So it's not just milking the state.

Some people in ICHR have told me that well known sociologist A.R.
Desai had been given a project to compile the history of the
trade union movement in India in 15 volumes. He completed the
task before he died. Then it mysteriously disappeared. The
current ICHR chairman has succeeded in tracing these manuscripts
inspite of non-cooperation. By doing so, he has deprived 15
people of their mock PhDs.

Q: None of these details have been seriously contested. But your
detractors sail they will not give you the pleasure of a de
defamation suit because you are beneath contempt?
A: Why aren't they replying through the newspapers. They are
always issuing statements, these six eminent historians, 10
leading intellectuals. They put on lofty airs because they have
no answers.

Q: How should people, governments and public spirited individuals
approach the question of teaching history in schools?
A: I feel that each time their books are recommended, mine should
be too. The students should see what great perversity they are
being made to swallow. There is no sufficient professional
scrutiny, no professional discourse on what has been published.
The same thing gets repeated. Nobody goes back to the sources.
Also, it is a bad idea for governments to get into the business
of preparing textbooks just as it is a bad idea to have
institutions like ICHR. It only leads to the patronage of
intellectuals. This is the bad legacy of Indian socialism.

Q: Will the book be of assistance to the BJP governments which
have also been accused of doctoring history?
A: Firstly I do not know what changes have been brought about by
them. I have asked them (Left historians) to show me those
textbooks which they think have been changed. But they haven't.
It can't be that you set one standard and any departure from that
stand is communal. The cure is that if someone perverts the next
set of history text books then they should also be subjected to
professional scrutiny

Q: Has the spirit of inquiry completely gone out of Indian
intellectuals?
A: Yes, I think so. By and large our work is very derivative in
most subjects. I find this in the case of many subjects. In
history it is slavishness to the verbiage of the 1920s and 1930s.
There is a lack of creativity even in activist movements in
India. When an issue became prominent in the West, five years
later you'll see it prominent in India like feminism, human
rights, big dams, child labour and child prostitution. We are so
blind that someone has to yank our eyelids open for us. I am
considered disreputable if I depart from the standards of
political correctness set by the establishment.

Q: Why does it fall on you to yank open the eyelids, whether it
is on Ambedkar, Ayodhya or ICHR?
A: First. I'm deaf, and secondly, I'm shameless. I am not looking
for a job and find it quite easy to survive without a job. Of
course, they will say he is not a historian, that it is part of a
political agenda. It starts with allegations and smear and will
not stop till they say facts are not as important as social
revolution. It doesn't affect me. I hope readers will see through
it.

The vital difference



Arun Shourie: Monday, December 31, 2007

In the Indic traditions — as opposed to the Middle Eastern traditions — reality is multilayered. Hence no description of it is final: tolerance follows as an article of faith.

So, the first lesson to bear in mind is that every tradition has in it the potential to become extremist. In this sense, our traditions are indeed similar to the Middle Eastern traditions. This similarity should be a warning to governments and parties that keep traducing Hindus, for instance, and pandering to Muslims and the rest just because the latter are aggressive. Everyone learns.

And yet there is a basic, foundational difference — one that points us to what is of inestimable value in Indic traditions; to the priceless pearl that we should preserve, the one that these heedless secularists and the rapacious aggressives do not realise they are pushing Hindus, Buddhists and others to discard. This basic difference is as follows.

When a tradition has the following elements, as each of the three Middle Eastern traditions has, as do the secular traditions of the West — Nazism, Marxism-Leninism — it will invariably be exclusivist, intolerant and aggressive, and it will invariably deploy all means — from propaganda to money to violence:

Reality is simple;

It has been revealed to one man;

He has put it in one Book;

That Book is inerrant as well as exhaustive: so that whatever is in it is true, that it is true for all time; and that whatever is not in it or is contrary to what is in it, is false or useless or worse;

But the Book is difficult to understand; hence, you need a guide, an intermediary, a monitor: in a word, the Church, the ulema, or the Party;

The Book covers, the intermediary must cover every aspect of life: there is no distinction between the private and the public sphere, between the Secular and the Religious, between the State and the Church. These doctrines are totalitarian — in both senses: they insist on governing the totality of life — the Roman Catholic Church’s minatory insistence against contraception, for instance, and the reams and reams of fatwas that deal with even more intimate matters; they are also totalitarian in the sense that what they prescribe on any aspect just must be obeyed;

The test of piety is adherence to that Book and to the prescriptions of that intermediary — in every sphere of life;

It is the duty of that intermediary, indeed of every believer to ensure that all come to accept and adhere to The Message — there is only one Message;

As the Message is the ‘Truth, the whole Truth and nothing but the Truth,’ as there is no truth beside it, those who do not accept the Message are cussed; worse, they are thwarting the Will of Allah, or its equivalent — the march of History in Marxism-Leninism;

Hence, it is the duty of every believer, and even more so of that intermediary to use all means to make them accept the Message, and if, even after being offered the opportunity to accept it, they refuse, to vanquish them all together.

When these elements are present, the tradition will have one singular objective: dominance. It will become an ideology of power, a dogma that rationalises everything in the pursuit of hegemony. The dogma will necessarily gravitate to, among other things, violence.

Contrast those elements with propositions that are central to the Indic traditions:

Reality is multilayered complexity: both in the sense that there are layers within layers of it, and in the sense of each element mingling into others: the Buddhist master Thich Nhat Hanh refers to the latter as ‘inter-being’;

It has not been revealed exclusively to one person: several have glimpsed it;

They have put down approximate descriptions of that reality as well as hints of how to glimpse it in some books: these are travel guides;

Perceiving that Truth is an overwhelming, incomparable experience; it is the one joy that lasts. This life gives each of us a unique opportunity to bathe in that effulgence. If we don’t, the loss will be ours — but that is about it: the Truth is not affected; the guides are not falsified;

It is not just the Book or some singular great figure who can teach us; everything, every event, every relationship can be a teacher guiding us to glimpse the Truth — indeed, our object should be to make everything teach us. The essential points are three: different ways will suit different persons; second, the individual is the one who has to strive — as ‘an island unto himself’; third, the striving, the search is an inner-directed one. It has nothing to do with the state or power or dominance over nature or man;

In pursuing this inner-directed search, indeed in leading one’s life, the test is not adherence to any of these travel guides, nor obedience to any intermediary, but darshan — the traveller’s own experience: do not mistake the finger pointing to the moon — that is, my teaching — for the moon, the reality, the Buddha counsels.

Every single element in these traditions guides and pulls the believer in the direction that is the exact opposite of the Middle Eastern traditions. Reality is multilayered, hence no description of it is final: tolerance follows as an article of faith. The search is to be an inner-directed one: where, then, is there a case for converting some dar ul harb into some dar ul Islam? The touchstone is not that I am adhering to what some book says or what some person, howsoever worthy, prescribed. The touchstone is my own experience. The consequence of even this single article is immense and radical. The Gita is set in a battlefield. At the end, Arjuna declares that all his doubts are settled. He goes into gory battle. Yet Gandhiji derived non-violence from it. The orthodox berated him. Where do you get the authority to advance such a notion, they demanded. Gandhiji’s answer? From here, his heart. What is written in this book, he says in Anashakti Yoga, is the result of thirty years’ unremitting effort to live the Gita in my life. When Mansur speaks to his experience, he is executed. Within Islam, the Sufis were a beleaguered sect . . .

Putting belief into practice

It is entirely possible, of course, to be earnest about one’s religious beliefs, practices, rituals and not turn to violence or to converting others through allurements or violence. Indeed, we can go further and say that in all traditions, the majority of people in their practice, in their day-to-day life are like each other: each of them has a hard enough time getting through her or his daily struggles to spare time and effort to forcing or even inducing others or even persuading others to his particular way. But when the religion insists that the object is to convert, to ‘harvest souls’ for Jesus, when it declares that all of dar ul harb must be converted into the dar ul Islam; when the religion is a doctrine of dominance, being earnest about one’s religion comes to include as an essential element that the believer assist in spreading that religion, and that he use all means to do so. If a believer does not do so, he is deficient in his belief.

That is why in the hadis, we find the Prophet repeatedly enumerating the boons that accrue to the martyr and his relatives from jihad, from killing and being killed in the cause of Islam. The pre-eminent rewards, of course, accrue to the one who joins in the fighting himself, the Prophet declares in scores of hadis. But even the one who does not do so directly, will be rewarded for every bit of assistance that he gives for the establishment, defence and spread of Islam, the Prophet declares. When a man keeps a horse for the purpose of jihad, ‘tying it with a long tether on a meadow or in a garden... whatever it eats from the area of the meadow or the garden where it is tied will be counted as good deeds for his benefit, and if it should break its rope and jump over one or two hillocks then all its dung and its footmarks will be written as good deeds for him; and if it passes by a river and drinks water from it even though he had no intention of watering it, even then he will get the rewards for its drinking.’ And again, even more generally, ‘If somebody keeps a horse in Allah’s Cause motivated by his belief in His Promise, then he will be rewarded on the Day of Resurrection for what the horse has eaten or drunk and for its dung and urine.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari, 52.44, 49, 105; similarly, Muwatta’ Imam Malik, 951, Mishkat al-Masabih, Book XVIII, Volume II, p. 822. The hadis compilations as well as books on shariah are filled with scores and scores of such exhortations and promises.]

By contrast ‘the one who died but did not fight in the way of Allah,’ the Prophet declares, ‘nor did he express any desire (or determination) for jihad, died the death of a hypocrite.’ [Sahih Muslim, 4696.] Again, the Prophet declares, ‘He who dies without having fought or having felt fighting (against the infidels) to be his duty will die guilty of a kind of hypocrisy.’ And yet again, ‘He who does not join the warlike expedition (jihad), or equip a warrior, or look well after a warrior’s family when he is away, will be smitten by Allah with a sudden calamity.’ Hence, commands the Prophet, ‘Use your property, your persons and your tongues in striving against the polytheists.’ [Sunan Abu Dawud, 2496-98.]

Such commands follow ineluctably from the propositions that I listed above. We shut this fact out by two blindfolds. We judge a faith by looking at ‘people like us’ — most of the ones we know are ‘persons like us’, they do not live by such commands, but it is precisely because they are ‘like us’ that they are in our social circle. Unfortunately, the outcome is determined, not by the millions who lead ordinary lives, lives like ours, but by microscopic minorities: to say, ‘But the majority of Muslims did not want Partition’ may be true but is little consolation — that did not save the country from being partitioned. Similarly, to say ‘But millions are living peacefully today, they have not the slightest intention of setting off for jihad’ is true but equally little consolation: the ones who take the propositions seriously and thereby heed the hadis, are the ones who are determining the direction that events are taking.

And the direction that Islam itself is taking. Once they enter the stage, the extremists come to set the standard of fidelity and piety within a community. The tradition metamorphoses in no time: look at the change that has swept Islam in Southeast Asia in just fifteen years.

Second, we often lull ourselves with the thought, ‘But so what if someone wears the scarf or burqa? If they want to send their children to madrasas, what business is it of ours?’ But there is a technology to all this. The ones steering a community make a point of starting with a completely innocuous demand, by inducing believers to adhere to a practice that does not inconvenience non-believers in any way. The headscarf, for instance, or the new piety-statement in lands as far apart as Egypt and Pakistan, the zebibah — the dark, calloused bump that registers on the forehead when it is repeatedly struck or rubbed on the ground during prayers. [For our own neighbourhood, observe the visitors from Pakistan; for Egypt, see, for instance, Michael Slackman, ‘Mark of piety as plain as a bump on the head,’ IHT, December 13, 2007.] Non-believers are not inconvenienced by such signs, and yet the practices go far. They become a device for making the adherent realise that she is not the same as the others, and to make her or him announce that she is not one of the others. Simultaneously, the marks drill into others that the adherents have come to look upon themselves as separate. When the non-believers in turn start treating them as separate, that they are doing so becomes a grievance. And thus another argument is acquired for transiting from separateness to separatism.

Hence, all who are apprehensive of a Hindu reaction should:

Get to know the non-Indic traditions;

Shed denial — from denial of what the basic texts of the non-Indic traditions say to denial of the demographic aggression in the Northeast;

Most important of all, work to ensure a completely fair and an absolutely firm state; and an even-handed discourse.

For their part, the Hindus cannot recline back, confident that the reaction will take care of the current pressures. They too have much to do. In particular, they must

Awaken to the fact that the danger does not come just from violence and money; it comes as much from the purposive use of the electoral system;

And so, they must organise themselves for this challenge as much as for others;

For this, they must vault over internal divisions, in particular the curse of caste;

Be alert not just to assault by others, but also to perversions from within: the commercialisation of the tradition; its becoming a commerce with deities — ‘Please get me this contract, and I will . . .’; its becoming ostentatious religiosity; persons setting themselves up as the guardians of the tradition, and then using the perch for self-aggrandisement . . .

Get to know the tradition; and live it.

What more is needed to stoke reaction?



Arun Shourie: Saturday, December 29, 2007



The Task Force on Border Management, one of the four that were set up in the wake of the Kargil War, reported with alarm about the way madrassas had mushroomed along India’s borders. On the basis of information it received from intelligence agencies, it expressed grave concern at the amount of money these madrassas were receiving from foreign sources. It reported that large numbers were being ‘educated’ in these institutions in subjects that did not equip them at all for jobs — other than to become preachers and teachers producing the same type of incendiary unemployables. It expressed the gravest concern at the way the madrassas were reinforcing separateness in those attending them — through the curriculum, through the medium of instruction, through the entire orientation of learning: the latter, the Task Force pointed out, was entirely turned towards Arabia, towards the ‘golden ages’ of Islamic rule. It pointed to the consequences that were certain to flow from ‘the Talibanisation’ of the madrassas. [In spite of what the Task Forces themselves advised, namely that their reports be made public, the reports have been kept secret. Accordingly, I have summarised the observations of the Task Forces in some detail in Will the Iron Fence Save a Tree Hollowed by Termites? Defence imperatives beyond the military, ASA, Delhi, 2005.]

And what does the Sachar Committee recommend? ‘Recognition of the degrees from madrassas for eligibility in competitive examinations such as the civil services, banks, defence services and other such examinations’! It recommends that government use public funds to encourage formation of Muslim NGOs and their activities. It recommends that government provide financial and other support to occupations and areas in which Muslims predominate. It recommends that Muslims be in selection committees, interview panels and boards for public services.

It recommends that a higher proportion of Muslims be inducted in offices that deal with the public — ‘the teaching community, health workers, police personnel, bank employees and so on.’ It recommends ‘provision of ‘equivalence’ to madrassa certificates/degrees for subsequent admissions into institutions of higher level of education.’ It recommends that banks be required to collect and maintain information about their transactions — deposits, advances — separately for Muslims, and that they be required to submit this to the Reserve Bank of India! It recommends that advances be made to Muslims as part of the obligation imposed on banks to give advances to Priority Sectors. It recommends that government give banks incentives to open branches in Muslim concentration areas. It recommends that, instead of being required to report merely ‘Amount Outstanding’, banks be told to report ‘Sanctions or Disbursements to Minorities’. It recommends that financial institutions be required to set up separate funds for training Muslim entrepreneurs, that they be required to set up special micro-credit schemes for Muslims. It recommends that all districts more than a quarter of whose population is Muslim be brought into the prime minister’s 15-point programme.

‘There should be transparency in information about minorities in all activities,’ the Committee declares. ‘It should be made mandatory to publish/furnish information in a prescribed format once in three months and also to post the same on the website of the departments and state governments...’ It recommends that for each programme of government, data be maintained separately about the extent to which Muslims and other minorities are benefiting from it. But it is not enough to keep data separately. Separate schemes must be instituted. It recommends that special and separate Centrally Sponsored Schemes and Central Plan Schemes be launched for ‘minorities with an equitable provision for Muslims.’ It recommends special measures for the promotion and spread of Urdu. It recommends the adoption of ‘alternate admission criteria’ in universities and autonomous colleges: assessment of merit should not be assigned more than 60 per cent out of the total — the remaining 40 per cent should be assigned in accordance with the income of the household, the backwardness of the district, and the backwardness of the caste and occupation of the family. It recommends that grants by the University Grants Commission be linked to ‘the diversity of the student population.’ It recommends that pre-entry qualification for admission to ITIs be scaled down, that ‘eligibility for such programmes should also be extended to the madrassa educated children.’ It recommends that ‘high quality government schools should be set up in all areas of Muslim concentration.’ It recommends that resources and government land be made available for ‘common public spaces’ for adults of — its euphemism — ‘Socio-Religious Categories’ to ‘interact’.

It recommends that incentives to builders, private sector employers, educational institutions be linked to ‘diversity’ of the populations in their sites and enterprises. For this purpose it wants a ‘diversity index’ to be developed for each such activity.

It recommends changes in the way constituencies are delimited. It recommends that where Muslims are elected or selected in numbers less than adequate, ‘a carefully conceived ‘nomination’ procedure’ be worked out ‘to increase the participation of minorities at the grass roots.’

It notes that there already are the Human Rights Commission and the Minorities Commission ‘to look into complaints by the minorities with respect to state action.’ But these are not adequate as the Muslims still feel that they are not getting a fair share. The solution? Here is its recommendation, and a typical passage:

‘It is imperative that if the minorities have certain perceptions of being aggrieved,’ notice the touchstone — ‘if the minorities have certain perceptions of being aggrieved’ — ‘all efforts should be made by the state to find a mechanism by which these complaints could be attended to expeditiously. This mechanism should operate in a manner which gives full satisfaction to the minorities’, notice again the touchstone — not any external criterion, but ‘full satisfaction to the minorities’ — ‘that any denial of equal opportunities or bias or discrimination in dealing with them, either by a public functionary or any private individual, will immediately be attended to and redress given. Such a mechanism should be accessible to all individuals and institutions desirous to complain that they have received less favourable treatment from any employer or any person on the basis of his/her SRC [Socio-Religious Category] background and gender.’

The responsibility is entirely that of the other. The other must function to the full satisfaction of the Muslims. As long as the Muslims ‘have certain perceptions of being aggrieved,’ the other is at fault...

So that everyone is put on notice, so that everyone who is the other is forever put to straining himself to satisfy the Muslims, the Committee recommends that a National Data Bank be created and it be mandatory for all departments and agencies to supply information to it to document how their activities are impacting Muslims and other minorities. On top of all this, government should set up an Assessment and Monitoring Authority to evaluate the benefits that are accruing to the minorities from each programme and activity...

This is the programme that every secularist who is in government is demanding that the government implement forthwith. And every secularist outside — the ever-so-secular CPI(M), for instance — is scolding the government for not implementing swiftly enough. What splendid evolution! Not long ago, unless you saw a Muslim as a human being, and not as a Muslim, you were not secular. Now, if you see a Muslim as a human being and not as a Muslim, you are not secular!

Consequences

The first consequence is as inevitable as it is obvious: such pandering whets the appetite. Seeing that governments and parties are competing to pander to them, Muslims see that they are doing so only because their community is acting cohesively, as a vote bank. So, they act even more as a bank of votes.

For the same reason, a competition is ignited within the community: to prove that he is more devoted to the community than his rival, every would-be leader of the community demands more and more from governments and parties. When the concession he demanded has been made, he declares, ‘It is not being implemented’. And he has a ready diagnosis: because implementation, he declares, is in the hands of non-Muslims. Hence, unless Muslims officers are appointed in the financial institutions meant for Muslims... With demand following demand, with secularist upon secularist straining himself to urge the demands, the leader sets about looking for grievances that he can fan. When he can’t find them, he invents them...

Governments make the fatal mistake, or — as happened in the case of the British when they announced separate electorates for Muslims — they play the master-stroke: they proffer an advantage to the community which that community, Muslims in this case, can secure only by being separate — whether this be separate electorates in the case of Lord Minto or separate financial institutions in the case of Manmohan Singh.

The community in its turn begins to assess every proposal, every measure, howsoever secular it may be, against one touchstone alone: ‘What can we extract from this measure for Muslims as Muslims?’How current the description rings that Cantwell Smith gave in his book, Modern Islam in India, published in the 1940s, of the effect that the British stratagem of instituting separate electorates for Muslims had had on the Muslim mind. The separate electorates led Muslims, as they had been designed to lead them, he observed, ‘to vote communally, think communally, listen only to communal election speeches, judge the delegates communally, look for constitutional and other reforms only in terms of more relative communal power, and express their grievances communally.’ [Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, Second Revised Edition, 1946, reprint, Usha Publications, New Delhi, 1979, p. 216]. Exactly the same consequence will follow from implementing the Sachar proposals — and the reason for that is simple: the essential point about the proposals is the same — that is, the Muslims can obtain them by being separate from the rest of the country.

The reaction cannot but set in. ‘As Muslims are being given all this because they have distanced themselves from the rest of us, why should we cling to them?’ the Hindus are bound to ask. ‘On the contrary, we should learn from them. Governments and political parties are pandering to Muslims because the latter have become a bank of votes. We should knit ourselves into a solid bloc also.’

Do you think they need a Pravin Togadia to tell them this? The genuflections of governments and parties write the lesson on the blackboard. And the abuse hurled by secularists drills it in: by the excellent work that Narendra Modi has done for development, he had already made himself the pre-eminent leader of Gujarat; by the abuse they have hurled at him, the secularists, in particular the media, have enlarged his canvas to the country.

Arun Shourie Interview: Rediff.com

'There is not one instance, not one single, solitary instance in which Ambedkar participated in any activity connected with that struggle to free the country'

Arun Shourie's book 'Woshipping False Gods' The recent furore following the desecration of Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar's statue in Bombay has largely been interpreted as the resurgence of the dalit movement in India. A phenomenon which first saw its genesis in the philosophy and personality of Dr B R Ambedkar 50 years ago.

In his latest book, Worshipping False Gods, Arun Shourie challenges Dr Ambedkar's contribution to Indian Independence. The book has already run into controversy and several dalit organisations in Maharashtra want it banned.

Ambedkar's public life begins in a sense from a public meeting held at the Damodar Hall in Bombay on March 9, 1924. The struggle for freeing the country from the British was by then in full swing. Swami Vivekananda's work, Sri Aurobindo's work, the Lokmanya's work had already stirred the country. Lokmanya Tilak had passed away in 1920. The leadership of the National Movement had fallen on Gandhiji. He had already led the country in the Champaran satyagraha, the Khilafat movement, in the satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act, against the killings in Jallianwala Bagh and the merciless repression in Punjab. This National Movement culminated in the country's Independence in 1947.

In a word, a quarter century of Ambedkar's public career overlapped with this struggle of the country to free itself from British rule. There is not one instance, not one single, solitary instance in which Ambedkar participated in any activity connected with that struggle to free the country. Quite the contrary--at every possible turn he opposed the campaigns of the National Movement, at every setback to the Movement he was among those cheering the failure.

Thus, while the years culminated in the country's Independence, in Ambedkar's case they culminated in his becoming a member of the Viceroy's Council, that is -- to use the current terms -- a Minister in the British Cabinet in India.

The writings of Ambedkar following the same pattern. The Maharashtra government has by now published 14 volumes of the speeches and writings of Ambedkar. These cover 9,996 pages. Volumes up to the 12th contain his speeches and writing up to 1946. These extend to 7,371 pages. You would be hard put to find one article, one speech, one passage in which Ambedkar can be seen even by inference to be arguing for India's Independence. Quite the contrary.

Pause for a minute and read the following:

All me to say that the British have a moral responsibility towards the scheduled castes. They may have moral responsibilities towards all minorities. But it can never transcend the moral responsibility which rests on them in respect of the untouchables. It is a pity how few Britishers are aware of it and how fewer are prepared to discharge it. British rule in India owes its very existence to the help rendered by the untouchables. Many Britishers think that India was conquered by the Clives, Hastings, Coots and so on. Nothing can be a greater mistake. India was conquered by an army of Indians and the Indians who formed the army were all untouchables. British rule in India would have been impossible if the untouchables had not helped the British to conquer India. Take the Battle of Plassey which laid the beginning of British rule or the battle of Kirkee which completed the conquest of India. In both these fateful battles the soldiers who fought for the British were all untouchables...

Who is pleading thus to whom? It is B R Ambedkar writing on 14 May 1946 to a member of the (British) Cabinet Mission, A V Alexander.

Nor was this a one-of slip, an arrangement crafted just for the occasion. Indeed, so long as the British were ruling over India, far from trying to hide such views, Ambedkar would lose no opportunity to advertise them, and to advertise what he had been doing to ensure that they came to prevail in practice. Among the faithful his book What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables is among the most admired and emulated of his writings. It was published in 1945, that is just two years or so before India became Independent.

As we shall see when we turn to Ambedkar's views on how harijans may be raised, it is an out and out regurgitation of the things that the British rulers and the missionaries wanted to be said, of the allegations and worse that they had been hurling at our civilisation and people. The book has been published officially by the education department of the government of Maharashtra, and is sold at a subsidised price! It constitutes Volume IX of the set Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches. It reproduces the speech Ambedkar made at the Round Table Conference -- a speech which served the designs of the British rulers to the dot, and for which, as we shall soon see, they were ever so grateful to Ambedkar for it became one of the principal devices for thwarting Gandhiji.

In the speech Ambedkar addresses the prime minister and says, "Prime minister, permit me to make one thing clear. The depressed classes are not anxious, they are not clamorous, they have not started any movement for claiming that there shall be an immediate transfer of power from the British to the Indian people.... Their position, to put it plainly, is that we are not anxious for transfer of power from the British to the Indian people.... Their position, to put it plainly, is that we are not anxious for transfer of political power...." But if the British were no longer strong enough to resist the forces which were clamouring for such transfer, Ambedkar declared, then his demand was that they make certain arrangements-- arrangements which we shall encounter repeatedly in his speeches and writings, the essential point about which was to tie down the new government of Independent India.

'Nationalist leaders were neither surprised that Ambedkar was on the platforms with Jinnah, nor had they any doubts about the inspiration behind these celebrations'

Ambedkar and his patrons were dealt a humiliating blow by the elections of 1937. There were a total of 1,585 seats in the 11 assemblies in 'British India'. Of these 777 were 'tied'-- in the sense that they were to be filled by communal or special representation from Chambers of Commerce, plantations, labour etc. Of the 808 'general' seats, the Congress, which Ambedkar, Jinnah and others denounced from the house tops, won 456. It secured absolute majorities in 5 assemblies -- those of Madras, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa. And was the largest single party in 4 others-- Bombay, Bengal, Assam and the NWFP.

From the point of view of Ambedkar and the British -- who had been holding him up to counter the Congress claim that it represented the harijans as much as any other section of Indian society -- worse was the fact that the Congress did extremely well in the seats which had been reserved for harijans. Thirty seats were reserved for harijans in Madras Presidency, the Congress contested 26 and won 26. In Bihar there were 24 reserved seats -- in 9 of these Congress candidates were returned unopposed; of the remaining 15 reserved seats, it contested 14, and won 14.

In Bombay of the 15 reserved seats, it secured 1 unopposed, contested 8 and won 5. In the United Provinces there were 20 reserved seats; two of its candidates were returned unopposed; it contested 17 seats and won 16. In Bengal of the 30 reserved seats, it contested 17 and won 6. In the Central Provinces of the 19 reserved seats, it contested 9 and won 5.

The lesson was there for all to see. Reporting to the Viceroy on the result in the Bombay Presidency, the Governor, Lord Brabourne wrote, "Dr Ambedkar's boast of winning, not only 15 seats which are reserved for the harijans, but also a good many more -- looks like being completely falsified, as I feared it would be."

The electorate, including the harijans, may have punctured his claims but there was always the possibility of reviving one's fortunes through politicking and maneuvers. Efforts of all these elements were focused on the objective of installing non-Congress ministries in Bombay and wherever else this was a possibility. Brabourne reported to the viceroy that Jamnadas Mehta, the finance minister "who is chief minister in all but name", was telling him that the ministry in Bombay would survive motions on the budget and may even get through the motion of no-confidence:

"His calculations are based on the fact that he expects to get the support of the bulk of the Muhammadans, the whole of Ambedkar's Scheduled Castes Party, and of half a dozen or so of those individuals who stood as Congressmen merely to get elected," he reported. But added, "I gather that he is in touch with Ambedkar, who is carrying on negotiations for him, but, as you will find from the next succeeding paragraph, it rather looks to me as if Ambedkar is playing a thoroughly double game, in which case Jamnadas Mehta's hopes are likely to be rudely shattered."

The governor went on to report that he had also had a long conversation with Jinnah, and that Jinnah had told him that, in the event of the ministry being defeated, the Muslim League would be prepared to form a ministry provided they could secure a majority of even two or three in the assembly. "He (that is, Jinnah) went on to say that Ambedkar and his party were prepared to back him in this," Brabourne reported, "and that he expected to get the support of ten or a dozen of the so-called Congress MLAs mentioned above.

He made it quite clear to me that they would not support the present ministry. The governor was sceptical about the claims and assurances of all of them. He wrote, "It is, of course, quite impossible to rely on anything that Jinnah tells me, and the only thing for me to do is to listen and keep silent. I obviously cannot tell Jamnadas Mehta what Jinnah told me, or vice versa, as both of them are hopelessly indiscreet. The only thing that is clear is that a vast amount of intrigue is going on behind the scenes, but, in the long run, I cannot see anything coming out of it at all, as none of these people trust each other round the corner. Were to hazard a guess, it would still be that the present ministry will be defeated on the budget proposals and the alternative will then lie between Congress or Section 93"-- the equivalent of our present-day governor's rule.

Congress ministries were formed. And in 1939 they resigned in view of the British government's refusal to state what it intended to do about Indian Independence after the War. Jinnah announced that the Muslim League would celebrate the resignations as 'Deliverance Day.' Guess who was at his side in these 'celebrations' addressing meetings from the same platforms? Ambedkar, of course.

Nationalist leaders were neither surprised that Ambedkar was on the platforms with Jinnah, nor had they any doubts about the inspiration behind these celebrations. Addressing the Congress Legislature Party in Bombay on 27 December, 1937, Sardar Patel noted, "We cannot forget how Sir Samuel Hoare set the Muslims against the Hindus when the unity conference was held at Allahabad. The British statesmen in order to win the sympathy of the world, now go on repeating that they are willing to give freedom to India, were India united.

The 'Day of Deliverance' was evidently calculated to make the world and particularly the British public believe that India was not united and that Hindus and Muslims were against each other. But when several sections of Muslims were found to oppose the 'Day of Deliverance', the proposed anti-Hindu demonstrations were converted into a Jinnah-Ambedkar-Byramji protest against the Congress ministries and the Congress high command..."

That rout in the election remained a thorn in the heart of Ambedkar for long. A large part of What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables which Ambedkar published in 1945 is a tortuous effort to explain that actually the Congress had not done well in the election, that in fact, while groups such as his which had opposed Congress had been mauled even in reserved constituencies, they had triumphed, and the Congress, in spite of the seats having gone to it, had actually been dealt a drubbing!

Though this is his central thesis, Ambedkar gives reasons upon reasons to explain why he and his kind have lost and why the Congress has won! One of the reasons he says is that the people in general believe that the Congress is fighting for the freedom of the country. This fight for freedom, Ambedkar says, "has been carried on mostly by Hindus." It is only once that the Mussalmans took part in it and that was during the short-lived Khilafat agitation. They soon got out of it, he says. The other communities, particularly the untouchables, never took part in it.

A few stray individuals may have joined it -- and they did so, Ambedkar declares, for personal gain. But the community as such has stood out. This is particularly noticeable in the last campaign of the "Fight For Freedom", which followed the 'Quit India Resolution' passed by the Congress in August 1942, Ambedkar says. And this too has not been just an oversight, in Ambedkar's reckoning it was a considered boycott. The Untouchables have stayed out of the Freedom Movement for good and strong reasons, he says again and again.

'Even though he had been heaping scorn at them for a quarter of a century, the Congress leaders put all that aside and invited him to join the government'

Independence came. For all the venom he had poured at Gandhiji and the Congress, Ambedkar was back in the Cabinet, this time Pandit Nehru's Cabinet of Independent India. How did he get there?

Ambedkar's own explanation was typical of the man: he had done nothing to seek a position in the new government, Ambedkar told Parliament later, it was the new prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru who had urged him to join the new government; the offer had come to him as a surprise, he said, he had been full of doubts, but in the end he had yielded to the call of duty and to the plea that he make his talents available to the new government -- that is how things had gone according to Ambedkar. Recall the pleas to Atlee, and set them against Ambedkar's reconstruction of the sequence in the speech he made in the Lok Sabha. It was 10 October 1951 and Ambedkar was explaining his resignation from the Cabinet of Panditji:

It is now 4 years, 1 month and 26 days since I was called by the prime minister to accept the office of the law minister in the Cabinet. The offer came as a great surprise to me. I was in the opposite camp and had already been condemned as unworthy of association when the interim government was formed in August 1946. I was left to speculate as to what could have happened to bring about this change in the attitude of the prime minister. I had my doubts. I did not know how I could carry on with those who had never been my friends. I had doubts as to whether I could, as a law member, maintain the standard of legal knowledge and acumen which had been maintained by those who had preceded me as law ministers of the government of India. But I kept my doubts at rest and accepted the offer of the prime minister on the ground that I should not deny my co-operation when it was asked for in the building up of our nation...

In a word, the reluctant expert who eventually yields to the implorings of others so as to help the poor country that needs his talents. Far from a word of gratitude for the fact that, even though he had been heaping scorn at them for a quarter of a century, even though he had been a most ardent member of the British government which had thrown them and kept them in jails for years, the Congress leaders had put all that aside and invited him to join the government, far from there being any word of gratitude, there was not a word even of appreciation, even of a mere acknowledgment at least for their sagacity, if not their magnanimity, in putting so much of the past -- of the past that was so recent, of the past that had been so bitter -- behind them. The new leaders had implored him to join the government as they had no alternative, so indispensable were the man's talents -- that was the implicit refrain.

The diary of Indrani Devi, the widow of Jagjivan Ram, records the exact opposite. In the entry entitled, Ambedkar ki sifaarish, she records,

And on this side Ambedkar had started coming over to our house. One day he (Ambedkar) told him to put in a word with Gandhiji to have him (Ambedkar) included in the Cabinet. Before talking to Gandhiji he (Jagjivan Ram) talked to Sardar Patel. Sardar Patel said, do what you think is appropriate. He (Jagjivan Ram) got into quite a quandary -- that Ambedkar had always opposed Gandhiji and the Congress, how could he now recommend his case to Gandhiji? Even so, given his large-heartedness, he pleaded with Gandhiji on behalf of Ambedkar, and told him that as he has surrendered in front of you please request Nehruji so that he may be taken into the first Cabinet.

In any event, either as a result of his lobbying or because Pandit Nehru requested him, Ambedkar joined the government. He broke with Nehru four years later and denounced the Congress and Nehru. He entered into an electoral alliance with the Socialists to oppose the Congress in the 1952 elections. His party was wiped out. There were a total of 489 seats in the Lok Sabha. Of these the Congress secured 364, that is almost three-quarters. Ambedkar's party got no seat in the Parliament, only one set in the Bombay assembly, and one in that of Hyderabad.

But presumably the inference to be drawn from this defeat too is the same. "It was a colossal failure, and Ambedkar fell like a rocket," writes his admiring biographer, Dhananjay Keer, about the election result. "It proved once again that there is no gratitude in politics. The nation which had conferred so much glory on him seemed now unwilling to show him gratitude..."

But I anticipate. For the moment we need bear in mind just a few facts.

'Ambedkar was one of the few politicians who supported the Muslim League demand for Pakistan'

Throughout the twenty-five years of his public life before the British left India, Ambedkar took positions which were ever so convenient for the British, throughout these twenty-five years he hurled pejoratives at the Congress, in particular Gandhiji. At every turn he put forward formulae and demands which enabled the British to counter the national movement for freedom. The British were fully aware of the use he was to them, and they were anxious to give him a hand so that he could become even more the exclusive leader of the scheduled castes.

We shall have occasion soon to see what happened at the Round Table Conference in 1931, and what happened in its wake: Gandhiji had to stake his very life to thwart the maneuver the British made -- in consultation with Ambedkar, and to his great acclaim -- to split Hindu society asunder. Gandhiji survived, but he was kept in jail, as were the other Congress leaders. Ambedkar, of course, was again on his way to England to attend yet another Round Table Conference. And as on the previous occasion, what he said and did was to the full satisfaction of the British rulers.

On 28 December 1932, the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, was recounting the proceedings for the Viceroy. He wrote, "Ambedkar had behaved very well at the (Round Table) Conference, and I am most anxious to strengthen his hands in every possible way. Coming from a family whose members have almost always been in the (British) Army, he feels intensely that there are no Depressed Class units left. Could you not induce the Commander-in-Chief to give them at least a Company? Ambedkar tells me that the Depressed Class battalion did much better in the Afghan War than most of the other Indian battalions. In any case, I feel sure that at this juncture it would be a really valuable political act to make a move of this kind."

Next, Ambedkar argued long and vehemently that India must not be given Independence in the foreseeable future. We have already seen some of his urgings in this regard. Consider an example from another sphere. As is well known, apart from the Communists, Ambedkar was one of the few politicians who supported the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. One side of his argument was that Muslims cannot stay in a multi-religious society; the other side of his argument was that no one can stay with the Hindus either, by which he always meant "upper-caste exploiters".

That in brief was the thesis of his book, Thoughts on Pakistan. In private he was telling the British something quite different. He had been yearning to be included in the Viceroy's administration, and in mid-1940 it was presumed that, in view of what he had been saying and doing, his induction was just a matter of days.

But those were uncertain times and the calculations of the British were changing from day to day: they were at war with Hitler; they knew that opinion within the Congress was divided, some important elements were of the view that Britain should be supported even though they were not prepared to spell out what they would do about India after the war; so they had to keep in mind the possibility of strengthening this section within the Congress. They also knew that inducting a person like Ambedkar would offend the Congress as a whole no end.

At the last minute, therefore, the Viceroy had called Ambedkar and the other aspirant, M S Aney, and told them that he would have to put off the expansion of his Council for the time being. Not only that, in view of what he might have to do to win co-operation of the Congress, the Viceroy had had to tell Ambedkar that he could not bind himself or his successor about the future. Recounting his meeting with Ambedkar the Viceroy told the Secretary of State on 19 November 1940, in a communication marked "Private and Personal," "I was at pains to protect my successor and myself so far as he was concerned by making it clear that while if circumstances led me to invite him to work with me again, it would give me personal pleasure to have him as a colleague, I or my successor must be regarded as wholly uncommitted in the matter, and under no obligation of any sort."

The conversation had then turned to the demand for Pakistan. The Viceroy noted, "He (Ambedkar) was quite clear that Muslims proposed to hold to their demands for 50:50 and so gradually lay the foundation of Pakistan, and he was perfectly content himself, he said, with that state of things, and in favour of the Pakistan idea quite frankly because it meant the British would have to stay in India. He saw not the least prospect of our overcoming difficulties here by guarantees of any sort and (like most minorities) he has, I suspect, little interest in constitutional progress...."

Eventually, of course, the British had decided that they would just have to leave. Ambedkar then pleaded with them that they tie the new government by a Treaty. Then that they get his organisation a place in the new set up. Then he went and pleaded with Jagjivan Ram, the sort of man on whom he had poured scorn for decades.

But today that very Ambedkar is a Bharat Ratna!

'Ambedkar collaborated with the British to undermine Gandhiji'

All the facts which have been recounted above were well known fifty years ago. With the passing of the generation that fought for Independence, with the total abandonment of looking up the record, most of all with the rise of casteist politics, they have been erased from public awareness. And that erasure has led to the predictable result: schizophrenia.

To start with, those trading in Ambedkar's name and their apologists have sought to downplay the struggle for Independence: the freedom it brought is not "real", they insist. Exactly as that other group did which teamed up with the British at that crucial hour, 1942 -- the Communists. Indeed, as we shall see in the concluding part of the book, to justify Ambedkar's conduct his followers insist that British Rule was better.

Next, they have sought to exaggerate the hardship that Ambedkar had to put up with, to almost rub out the fact, for instance, that at every step -- for instance in his education -- he received fulsome help from persons belonging to the higher castes; by exaggerating the hardships the apologists seek to explain away Ambedkar's collaborating with the British, his hankering for office: these hardships were the sort that are commonplace in India -- one has only to recall the circumstances in which Swami Vivekananda matured, one has only to recall the starvation which stared him in the face, the calumny and humiliations he had to fight back; but in the case of one and each of our leaders the hardships became the crucible which steeled their resolve to rid our country of British rule; it is only in Ambedkar's case that his followers and apologists think that those hardships justify his collaborating with the British against the national movement.

And, of course, these persons have made a practice of denouncing and calumnising Mahatma Gandhi: Gandhiji was the great leader, even more so he was the great symbol of that struggle for Freedom; as Ambedkar collaborated with the British to undermine him, as for 25 years he heaped on the Mahatma calumnies which the British found so valuable, his apologists abuse and denigrate and belittle the Mahatma. In doing this they work out their own poisons -- poisons which, as we shall see, are the inescapable legacy of leaders who have not cast out the thorn of hatred before they come to wield influence.

Today the abuse he hurled at Gandhiji provides the precedent: the apologist's case, as Kanshi Ram said recently while explaining the venom his associate Mayawati had spewed at the Mahatma, is, "We are followers of Babasaheb, we only keep repeating what he used to say." They are at the same time serving their convenience: they have made Ambedkar's style, so to say, as also the facility with which he allied with those who were out to keep the country subjugated, the rationalisation for their own politics.

But the facts lurk in the closet. Lest they spill out and tarnish the icon they need for their politics, lest their politics be shown up for what it is -- a trade in the name of the dispossessed -- these followers of Ambedkar enforce their brand of history through verbal terrorism, and actual assault.

And intimidation works. Editors and others conclude, "Better leave bad enough alone."

Excerpted from Worshipping False Gods by Arun Shourie, ASA Publishers, 1997, Rs 450, with the author's permission. Those interested in obtaining a copy of the book can contact the distributor at Bilblia Impex Pvt Ltd, 2/18, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110001or bibimpex@giasdl01.vsnl.net.in

The 'main hun na' school of budgeting

Arun Shourie: Saturday, March 29, 2008

Arun Shourie puts the Budget to the aam aadmi test and argues why the UPA fails miserably

In the Budget for 1990/91, the VP Singh Government announced a loan waiver of Rs. 10,000 crore. The Government was soon out. I am not on the precedent, but on the accounting! The waiver had been included in the Budget.

Soon, a new Government was in office. Delivering the Budget speech on 24 July, 1991, the then Finance Minister was as stern as he was scornful about the loan waiver, and about the way it had been budgeted.

‘There is one large component of non-plan expenditure that is a burden on the exchequer,’ he told Parliament. ‘I refer to the Government’s obligation under the Rural Debt Relief Scheme. Unfortunately, there was a gross under-estimation of the total fiscal liability under this scheme which was introduced last year. In addition to the sum of Rs. 1500 crores provided in the revised estimates for last year, we have to provide Rs. 1500 crores in the current year. But this is not all. We may need a similar provision in the next year.’

Guess, who was so punctilious then. The words constitute paragraph 39, of the Budget Speech delivered that day by the then Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh.

And now? No provision at all for the Rs. 60,000 crore that the loan waiver is supposed to cost. ‘Main hun na’… ‘Credit me with some intelligence...’ ‘Funds will be found...’ ‘Modalities are being worked out…’

After much bewildered talk, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister did hit upon one source for financing the waiver: we may sell Public Sector equity, they suggested. On behalf of the CPI(M), Brinda Karat shot that down with one sentence. Chidambram then told Parliament – and this is after two weeks of confusion -- that he was confident that he would be able to carve Rs. 40,000 crore out of buoyant revenues this year, and that he was equally confident that it would not be difficult for whichever Government is in office next year to find the remaining Rs. 20,000 crore.

Take him at his word for a minute. If it is possible to be so confident on 14 and 17 March when he said as much to the two Houses of Parliament, why it could not have been said while announcing the waiver a fortnight earlier?

Here is Parliament being asked to approve a scheme of Rs. 60,000 crore with no inkling of where the money will come from, and, hence, with no idea of what its impact will be – on prices, on interest rates… Even of whom the waiver will benefit. Is this ‘accountability’? ‘Transparency’?

And this is just a typical omission.

The Sixth Pay Commission is to report soon. Given that election loom, the Government will certainly implement the pay hikes. The Fifth Pay Commission had increased emoluments by 35 per cent. There will be cascading effect for state governments, for municipalities, indeed for each and every institution even vaguely linked to the State machinery. There is no provision at all for this certain outlay in Chidambram’s Budget. When it is prudent to include Rs. 5,000 crore in the Railway Budget as the likely outflow on account of the Sixth Pay Commission increases, why is prudent not to make a provision for the same contingency in the General Budget?

Similarly, subsidies on petroleum products, on food and fertilizers are mentioned, but not included! The latter two alone are estimated to be over Rs. 63,000 crore. The Fiscal deficit is put at 1,33,287 crore in this Budget. Once you include the four items that have been left out – the loan waiver, the subsidies on petroleum, food and fertilizers -- plus the impact of the 6th Pay Commission, it is liable to be double the figure that has been indicated. Fiscal responsibility?

A reform they were to institute

‘Seven years ago, I placed before Parliament the first paper on subsidies,’ Chidambram said in the Budget for 2004/05. They need to be sharply targeted at the poor and the really needy. So? He has, he said, initiated a new study on them!

By the next Budget, he had taken further action: he had placed the study before Parliament. Subsidies are necessary, ‘However, we must now take up the task of restructuring the subsidy regime in a cautious manner and after a thorough discussion.’

Nothing was done even by the 2007/08 Budget. ‘The issue of subsidies is proving to be a divisive one,’ Chidambram said, ‘but I would urge Honourable Members that it is imperative that we make progress on this front if we are serious about targeting subsidies at the poor and the truly needy.’ It isn’t that he had done nothing: ‘My Ministry has held extensive discussions with stakeholders on three major subsidies, namely, food, fertilizer and petroleum. We have also sought the views of the general public. Working groups/committees have gone into the question of fertilizer and petroleum subsidies, the latest being the Dr. C. Rangarajan Committee. I would urge Members to help the Government evolve a consensus on the issue of subsidies.’ Another consultant to Government.

The Prime Minister, of course, alternates his emphasis: reforms one day; reforms with a human face the next! And yet, at least on occasion, he has spoken clearly. The Gross Budgetary Support for the 11th Plan is going to be double of what it was during the 10th Plan, he told the Planning Commission last November. ‘These are large increases by any reckoning,’ he continued. ‘This will only be possible if we have strong growth, if tax revenues remain buoyant as they have been in recent years and if non-Plan expenditure is checked and checked effectively. We need to address the problem of mounting subsidies in food, fertilizers and now, in petroleum which is a recent phenomenon. Over Rs. 1 lakh crores are going to be spent this year alone on these three items. I would like my cabinet colleagues and the Planning Commission to reflect what these mean for our development options and what development options these subsidies are shutting out. Do they mean fewer schools, fewer hospitals, fewer scholarships, slower public investment in agriculture and poorer infrastructure? It is important that we restructure subsidies so that only the really needy and the poor benefit from them and all leakages are plugged.’

The warnings having been given, the task is done – what more are consultants to do, after all? There is no mention of the subject in Chidambram’s Budget speech this year.

But there is mention of one of these subsidies – that on fertilizers – in the document distributed with the Budget, Implementation of Budget 2007-2008. In the Budget for 2007/08, Chidambram had emphasized the need to distribute fertilizer subsidies by some alternate way – so that they reach the farmer directly rather than being eaten up by fertilizer companies. So, what is going to be done? ‘The fertilizer industry has agreed to work with the Department of Fertilizers,’ he told Parliament, ‘to conduct a study and find a solution.’ And what will happen once the study has been done? By now, you should be able to guess: ‘Based on the report, Government intends to implement a pilot programme in at least one district in each State in 2007-08.’

That was the last Budget. And what are we told now about what has been done on this matter? ‘The modalities for providing an alternative method of delivering the fertilizer subsidy directly to the farmer are being worked out. The proposal was examined by a Group of Ministers (GOM) and the Report is being finalized.’

In the meanwhile, all the ills continue: the industry does not get reimbursed in time; the farmer does not get the full benefit; the application of fertilizers remains distorted and our land is harmed.

Exactly the position in regard to the other subsidy, of Rs. 32,600 crore – that on food: the 61st Round of the NSS reveals that one half of the poorest quintile do not have either a BPL card or one for the Antyodaya Anna Yojana. On the other hand, more than a sixth of the richest quintile have BPL cards!

The Italians have the right expression for it

‘The Eleventh Plan target for additional power generation capacity is 78,577 MW,’ Chidambram told Parliament while speaking on this new Budget, adding, ‘which is more than the total capacity added in the previous three Plans.’ In the 10th Plan the target was 41,000 MW. Additional capacity that got commissioned was just about 21,000 MW. But why be niggardly in setting targets? John Galbriath had a word for Indian Planning: ‘therapeutic targetry’! But the sentence that scores for gall is the next one: ‘By end March 2008, we will achieve Commercial Operation Date (COD) on about 10,000 MW, marking the best first year in any Plan period.’

Just pause for a moment, and read that sentence again: ‘By end March 2008, we will achieve Commercial Operation Date (COD) on about 10,000 MW, marking the best first year in any Plan period.’ The trick in it is the benchmark that has been used, ‘Commercial Operation Date (COD)’ – a plant that has been completed is said to have attained ‘Commercial Operation Date’ once it has been in operation at full load for at least 72 hours. Ten power plants contributing 3020 MW were included when totaling up the achievements of the last year of the 10th Plan on the ground that they had been ‘commissioned’. They have been counted again among the achievements of the first year of the 11th Plan – on the ground that in regard to them ‘Commercial Operation Date’ has been achieved! The plants are the same ten. Nor is it just that: among these ten, is Ratnagiri CCPP (Dabhol) II, a plant that was completed in the Ninth Plan; among them is the atomic power plant at Kaiga – which is virtually shut for want of fuel; among them is Karbilangpi, a plant of the Sixth Plan! Nor indeed do the remaining ten plants – accounting for 3090 MW of the 10,000 MW for which Chidambram takes credit – testify to either reforms or execution in the power sector having improved. Each one of them has been under construction for years – among them is another Dabhol plant, Ratnagiri CCPP III, which too was completed in the Ninth Plan; among them are two plants at Purlia which were sanctioned in the Eighth Plan!

Claims and promises in regard to the Ultra Mega Power Projects in Chidambram’s successive budgets have been even more farcical, even more brazenly misleading. It is our intention to award five projects before December 31, 2006, he told Parliament in the Budget for 2006/07. By the 2007/08 Budget, this became, ‘Seven more UMPPs are under process and we are confident that at least two will be awarded by July, 2007.’ In this Budget, he says that the fourth UMPP ‘will be awarded shortly,’ and that five more can be brought to the bidding stage provided the states extend the requisite support. After listing four Ultra Mega Projects, his document of ‘accountability and transparency’, Implementation of Budget 2007-2008, reports ‘Five other suitable sites have been identified by the Central Electricity Authority’ – it proceeds to list five sites in five states. The fact as of 20 February, 2008 is that not one site has been finalized, not one. In regard to each of them, letters are going to and from central and state governments: I can supply the list at short notice.

And yet you can’t quite say that the Government has lied – notice the words it has used, ‘Five other suitable sites have been identified by the Central Electricity Authority.’ That doesn’t mean they have been settled, and, if you concluded as much, well, that is your problem.

The Italians have the right expression for this kind of reporting: suppressio veri suggestio falsi – to suppress the truth is to suggest the false!

A symptom

And yet the Budget is but a symptom of the ways of the Government:

Just go on announcing schemes;

Grab existing schemes, group them, give them a new name, and proclaim them as historic new initiatives;

Announce huge grants and outlays, forget them;

Advance false claims: those ‘Action Completed’s;

Shove problems to the future – as in the loan waiver; shove blame on the past – even when doing so flatly contradicts what you have yourself stated in Parliament, as the Prime Minister’s ‘the unpaid distress bills of the NDA’ is flatly contradicted by what is set out in the Economic Survey 2003/04 that Chidambram himself tabled;

Mislead – as in the calculation of the deficit;

Double-count – as in regard to power;

Proclaim the desirable –‘we must aim at outcomes, not just outlays,’ the necessity for reforms as in the Economic Survey – and make people believe that, because you have proclaimed the desirable, you are straining to attain it.

And do all this with full faith – that no one will actually read the documents you pile on them; that, even of they do, they will soon forget; that the media are the easiest to bamboozle…Mismanagement

The Budget is a symptom also of gross mismanagement of the economy. Apart from the fact that reforms have been at a complete standstill ever since this ‘dream-team’ of ‘reformers’ took office, their management has brought the country back into the vicious cycle of high interest rates, declining growth, and inflation. Till 2004 April, foodgrain stocks had been scrupulously kept 40 to 50 per cent higher than norms set by experts – so that fixers always knew that, were they to raise prices, Government could, and would, counter them by releasing stocks from its godowns. Ever since, stocks have been allowed to fall below the norms – with the result that traders today know that the Government just does not have the wherewithal to stabilize prices.

The result has been worsened by erratic policies. Exports of non-basmati rice were banned; soon the ban was lifted. Government did nothing as wheat output fell short; then it floated a tender to import wheat; then it cancelled the tender, then…

As prices kept rising, it hurtled to swat a fly with an axe – the axe of monetary policy: higher interest rates, tightened money supply… Prices continue to rise, and naturally so. Investment is discouraged, and naturally so. Growth rate of manufactures has already begun falling, predictably so…

The dream-team…

(Concluded)

For all stories visit www.indianexpress.com/arunshourie

The new remedies

Arun Shourie: Friday, March 28, 2008

Arun Shourie puts the Budget to the aam aadmi test and argues why the UPA fails miserably

What the CAG’s Performance Audit has revealed about the ‘flagships’ – the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and the Rajiv Gandhi Drinking Water Mission – is the pattern. NC Saxena draws attention to an account of another ‘flagship’ programme held up by Chidambram in this new Budget, the ICDS – the Integrated Child Development Services. After citing what the PM, FM, etc. have been saying about ensuring outcomes and not being lulled by outlays, Saxena asks, and ‘How is outcome delivered in the states?’, and answers, ‘By falsifying records!’ He cites the tour observations of a person in a position to know, and unlikely to state things that would embarrass the Government:

‘We discovered that all data of children at the centre for the past five months, weight, vaccinations, health records etc, were filled in with pencils. On probing further, I found it was done so that in case of an official inspection, the figures could be erased and “correct” data inserted to make the centre’s performance look good!’

The writer? The Congress MP, Sachin Pilot. Recalling such accounts, Saxena observes, ‘The practice is so widely prevalent in all the states, presumably with the connivance of senior officers, that the data reaching GOI [according to a recent study by the National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development] shows only 8% as the overall percentage of malnourished children in case of 0-3 years (with only one percent children severely malnourished), as against 46% reported by NFHS-3. What is equally astonishing is the fact that records show a steep decline in the percentage of malnourished children from 29% to 8%, which is totally at variance with the findings of the various NFHS surveys. By sending bogus reports the field officials are thus able to escape from any sense of accountability for reducing malnutrition.’

This then is the pattern. And what does Chidambram propose to do about the matter? He sets it out in his new Budget:

‘I think we do not pay enough attention to outcomes as we do to outlays; or to physical targets as we do to financial targets; or to quality as we do to quantity. Government therefore proposes to put in place a Central Plan Schemes Monitoring System (CPSMS) that will be implemented as a Plan scheme of the Planning Commission. A comprehensive Decision Support System and Management Information System will also be established. The intended outcome is to generate and monitor scheme-wise and State-wise releases for about 1,000 Central Plan and centrally sponsored schemes in 2008-09.’

Pray, what is the reason to believe that this new central scheme of the Planning Commission will work better than the 1000 central schemes of the Planning Commission that it is to monitor? Then follow the currently fashionable words, ‘Government also intends to strengthen evaluation. Some ministries have started concurrent evaluation. This needs to be supplemented by independent evaluations conducted by research institutions. The Planning Commission will authorise such evaluations of the major schemes and complete the task by the time of the mid-term review of the Eleventh Plan.’

Pray, why will the new evaluations authorised by the Planning Commission be more independent than the innumerable ones that it has authorised in the past? Why will they be more independent than the countless evaluations that have been done independently of the Commission in the past?

The piece de resistance

In each of its five Budgets, this Government has had one triumphant item – agricultural credit. In each Budget, Chidambram has proclaimed higher and higher targets, and in each he has announced that the target has been exceeded. In the new Budget, he says that, as against Rs. 100,000 crore that were disbursed when this Government assumed office, Rs. 280,000 crore shall be disbursed as rural credit in 2008/09.

Surely, that very fact should have alerted the Government that either the credit is not reaching those who need it most, or that their problems are not going to get solved by credit alone. As suicides have mounted, as the agrarian crisis has barged more and more into its face, the Government has done what it always does – it has appointed committee after committee: the Swaminathan Commission; the Radhakrishna ‘Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness’; the A. Vaidyanathan ‘Task Force on Cooperative Banking’; the RBI’s ‘Working Group on Distressed Farmers’ headed by Sardara Singh Johl; the RBI’s ‘Technical Group to Review Legislations on Money Lending’ headed by SC Gupta.

Second, it has rained package after package:

2% remission in interest rate – 1,700 crore were provided for this in the 2006/07 Budget;

The Backward Regions Grant Fund: in the 2006/07 Budget, Chidambram announced that he would disburse Rs. 5,000 crore; this year he pledges to disburse Rs. 5,800 crore;

In July, 2006, Government announced the PM’s special package for distressed farmers of 31 districts in four states. In the 2007/08 Budget, Chidambram announced that Rs. 16,979 crore would be spent under this special package. The usual panoply of institutions have been set up to implement and monitor the package: state-level committees consisting of representatives of central and state government, district level committees and Panchayati Raj institutions, and ‘appropriate institutional structure and special purpose cooperatives/community based organizations at the local level for delivery of the package and optimum utilization of resources in a time-bound manner.’

And yet distress continues unabated. Yet suicides go on increasing. Who is swallowing up these packages? What is happening to the packages?

The Report of the Radhakrishna Committee – The Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness – gives a part of the answer. It sets out the result of its inquiries into the fate of the PM’s special package in its Report:

Commenting on the disbursement of fresh loans, the Committee observes, ‘The gap in the off take of fresh credit in three states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra) indicates that the credit needs of the farmers were not assessed accurately. The credit flow targets do not appear to have been based on a proper assessment of the credit absorption capacity at the farm/household level. In order to ensure that the basic objectives of providing farm credit are not distorted, disbursements should have been made only after proper project appraisal. This also calls for greater coordination among banks and block level officials at the ground level in identifying the genuine credit needs of the people.’

In regard to ‘Irrigation’, it finds, ‘Utilization rates varied across states and between irrigation schemes. In the case of major irrigation schemes, delay occurred because for some of them like Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) sanction has to be obtained from the Planning Commission and for many others from the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Tribal Affairs. This is a time-consuming process.’

Pause a moment. That sentence itself gives us a glimpse of the well-practiced trick: the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme is an existing programme. All that has been done is that it has now been shoved into the new envelope, ‘The PM’s special package for distressed farmers in 31 districts’! But to continue with the findings of the Radhakrishna Committee:

‘The progress is poor under minor irrigation in the case of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka due to the existence of grey blocks…’

‘Watershed Development, Rainwater Harvesting and Check Dams: Progress has been extremely poor in all the states. Even Maharashtra, which had in place a shelf of sanctioned projects, could utilize only 12 per cent of its financial allocation of Rs.54 crore in the year.’

And then a comic instance:

‘Kerala falls under high rainfall area and no watershed projects are being implemented in the state under any of the Government/NABARD programmes. As such, the concept of watershed development is relatively new to the state; all the partner institutions involved in the implementation of the project are required to be sensitized vigorously.’

And then, a glimpse of the same old trick – of giving an existing programme a new name, but this time with another comic consequence:

‘In the case of Andhra Pradesh, the state government was already availing of loan from the Watershed Development Fund at the time the package was announced. The switchover from loan mode to grant mode took some time due to the procedures involved in the conversion.’

And then the thoughtlessness: ‘The process of watershed development requires five to six years,’ the Committee notes, but the authorities that be have decreed a cut-off of three years!

‘Rainwater harvesting and construction of check dams are a non-starter in most districts.’

And it turns out that in some cases at least there is good reason for this!

‘Some states which are implementing rain water schemes and enjoying cent per cent subsidy are reluctant to switch over to the scheme from the Ministry of Agriculture under the Prime Minister’s package. With regard to check dams, NABARD is yet to receive proposals from any of the states….’

And so on, to one dismal conclusion after another: ‘There is no coordination between different agencies implementing the schemes. Further, no information is available on the impact of the scheme on the people. In addition to financial targets in the Prime Minister’s package, physical targets need to be set and monitored…’

Lesson? Another massive special package! Exactly, but exactly the sort of package that the Radhakrishna Committee, the RBI’s Working Group, Vaidyanathan himself, each and every one of them had said should not be given: a ‘historic’ loan waiver amounting to Rs. 60,000 crore.

The loan waiver

First, as expert after expert has pointed out no one knows from where this figure of Rs. 60,000 crore has dropped. Second, the waiver is of loans that are overdue to commercial banks, rural banks and cooperatives. Each of the expert bodies has emphasized that the farmers in real need are the ones who do not have access to institutional credit – they borrow from moneylenders and the like. Two columns – one for Andhra which has witnessed a spate of suicides, and one for India as a whole -- from the detailed tables furnished by the Radhakrishna Committee tell the tale:

Accordingly, to get relief to the ones who really need it, the Radhakrishna Committee suggested, not a loan waiver but a ‘one-time measure of providing long-term loans by banks to enable them to repay their debts to moneylenders,’ and thereby free them from the latters’ clutches. The RBI’s Working Group as well as experts like Vaidyanathan added another reason: arguing against giving any general loan waiver, they pointed out that it would reward those who had not paid, that it would implicitly penalize those who had, that it would reinforce the culture of not living up to one’s contractual obligations.

But compassion is compassion! Hence, 60,000 crore it shall be.

NC Saxena and Vaidyanathan – both advisors to the Government – prick the claims. Saxena points out that the farmers who get credit from institutions are actually those who are well-enough connected to have access to these banks and cooperatives. A number of these, Saxena points out, double up as moneylenders! They borrow from the banks at 6.5 per cent, and lend to the small farmer in distress at rates ranging from 50 to 100 per cent. So, who is the waiver actually going to help? Vaidyanathan adds a further fatal detail. Writing in The Hindu, he points out that ‘The magnitude of outstanding debt of rural households, going by National Sample Survey data, is less than outstanding debt reported by the institutions in the cooperatives and substantially so in regional rural banks. Since both are intended to lend mostly in rural areas, this difference suggests that they also carry a sizeable portfolio of non-household, non-rural loans… There is good reason to believe that a generalized waiver of all overdues will benefit non-rural borrowers to a considerable extent; that the large majority of rural households, including those in the below 2 hectares category will not benefit; and that the magnitude of the benefit will be considerably less than Rs. 60,000 crore. Benefits in rural areas will accrue to a rather small fraction of households and the magnitude of beneficiaries is likely to be considerably less than the cited figure.’

But who is listening? It is celebration time, time to seize the moment: posters, rallies to hail the Almighty for her beneficence… And hope that she is looking…

(To be concluded)

For all stories visit www.indianexpress.com/arunshourie

On their own yardstick


Arun Shourie: Thursday, March 27, 2008

Arun Shourie puts the Budget to the aam aadmi test and argues why the UPA fails miserably


One problem is that while the Government committed itself in that new scripture – The National Common Minimum Programme – to doubling the proportion of GDP that is devoted to social sectors like health and education, in fact, as NC Saxena, member of the UPA’s National Advisory Board, points out, the proportion continues to hover around half the pledged targets.

But that is the lesser problem. The even more debilitating one has been much in the admonitions of the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister. In his Budget speech for 2005/06, Chidambram drew pointed attention to this: ‘At the same time,’ he told the Treasury Benches that were cheering his announcements of higher outlays, ‘I must caution that outlays do not necessarily mean outcomes. The people of the country are concerned with outcomes. The Prime Minister has repeatedly emphasized the need to improve the quality of implementation and enhance the efficiency and accountability of the delivery mechanism.’

So what did he propose to do? ‘During the course of the year, together with the Planning Commission, we shall put in place a mechanism to measure the development outcomes of all major programmes,’ he told Parliament. ‘We shall also ensure that programmes and schemes are not allowed to continue indefinitely from one Plan period to the next without an independent and in-depth evaluation.’ Given that activists were said to have the ear of the Highup, Chidambram added, ‘Civil society should also engage Government in a healthy debate on the efficiency of the delivery mechanism.’

Two years went by, little happened. Chidambram returned to the theme in his Budget of 2007/08. ‘There is no dearth of schemes,’ he told Parliament, ‘there is no dearth of funds. What needs to be done is to deliver the intended outcomes.’

The Prime Minister has been proclaiming the desideratum just as frequently and even more emphatically. ‘We have generated adequate resources in the last three years for use in social sector without sacrificing fiscal prudence,’ he told the ‘Roundtable on India’ organised by The Economist in March 2007. ‘However, we cannot spend our way to prosperity and having tangible outcomes is, therefore, as important as increasing outlays. This is the single biggest concern of our government today and we have to address this issue if we need greater returns on our social investments.’ And a few months later, in November, 2007, he told the full meeting of the Planning Commission, the Gross Budgetary Support provided for in the 11th Plan is almost double what it was in the 10th Plan. More than that ‘the architecture for inclusive growth’ has been laid out, the ‘basic elements’ of that architecture ‘are now fully in place.’ ‘This is a matter of satisfaction and indeed of pride,’ he said. ‘For the next few years, the emphasis must be on ensuring that these programmes deliver what they promise. We must work purposefully to realise the socio-economic transformation the Plan seeks to achieve.’

And what is happening on the ground? After all, these worthies are not consultants to Government. They are the ones directing it. The answer can be gleaned by picking up any one of what Chidambram calls ‘the flagship schemes’ of this Government.

If this is the flagship…

‘The object is to guarantee 100 days of employment in a year to one able-bodied person in every poor household,’ Chidambram told the cheering MPs during his Budget speech for 2004/05 as he explained the Government’s commitment to the poor. So, what was he going to do? Pending legislation, the Food for Work Programme is being extended to 150 districts.

And where is the money to come from? Chidambram’s solution was one that has become the hallmark of this Government: ‘Allocations under different schemes will be pulled together to support the Food for Work Programme,’ he declared. There are substantial funds totaling over Rs. 6,000 crore under SGRY, SGSY, SJSRY, REGP and PMRY.’ A typical stratagem: if there is one big programme, split it into five and announce five path-breaking, closer-to-the people initiatives; if there are five programmes, club them, and announce one historic initiative! In either event, rename them – giving them one of the two permissible names.

In the 2005/06 Budget, while announcing that he was increasing the allocation for this programme to Rs. 11,000 crore, Chidambram correctly noted that there were two components to the allocation – a cash component and a food component.

By the 2006/07, the commitment had got altered, a word got slipped in: while the original commitment was to ‘guarantee 100 days of employment in a year to one able-bodied person in every poor household,’ the commitment now became to guarantee 100 days of employment in a year to one able-bodied person in every rural household. As for allocation, Chidambram said, ‘In the current year, under a clutch of schemes including the Food For Work programme, a sum of Rs. 11,700 crore is expected to be spent on rural employment.’ A few sentences later, the figure was given as 11,300 crore. And there was to be in addition, Rs. 3,000 crore under the Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojna (SGRY).

In the Budget for 2007/08, the scheme was expanded from 200 districts to 330, and the allocation was increased to Rs. 12,000 crore, plus another Rs. 2,800 crore for (SGRY) for rural employment in districts not covered by NREGS.

In this new Budget, Chidambram proclaims, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme ‘has proved a historic measure of empowerment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and, especially, women’; that the allocation for it will be raised to Rs. 16,000 crore, and that it will be rolled out to all 596 rural districts of India.

In a note that he has sent to all the Highups, NC Saxena punctures the balloon. First, he points out, since this Government took office, the allocation for rural employment has actually fallen! While Chidambram has been parading financial outlays, he has forgotten to mention what has been happening to that other component of outlays on this programme, the food component: this, Saxena shows, was sixty eight lakh tonnes in 2005/06; it fell to twenty four lakh tonnes in 2006/07; and this year, it was just a little more than seven lakh tonnes till Novemebr, 2007, and may not reach even fifteen lakh tonnes by end-March 2008. Converting these figures into cash, Saxena points out, the outlay by the central Government on wage employment schemes has come down from Rs. 18,406 crore in 2005/06 to Rs. 15,000 crore.

The second point he makes is almost cruel! Recall the other part of the announcement: the programme will be extended to all 596 rural districts of India. But one-fourth of the districts are short of labour, Saxena points out! ‘Reckless expansion will only promote migration and fudging of documents,’ he writes.

That must have been obvious, even to Chidambram. So, what happened? Rahul Gandhi, with his insights into India, is said to have ‘suggested’ that the programme be extended to all districts. The revelation having descended, Chidambram at once did the needful, as they say in Government! ‘They are perfect practitioners of dialectics,’ that distinguished civil servant, the late Ashok Mitra told me about the type, ‘Strong to the weak; weak to the strong’!

And then there is the fatal point, one to which …. has already drawn attention in The Indian Express: larger outlays or smaller, on the ground the programme is riddled with leakages, fraud and the rest. In the draft report on the Performance Audit of the NRGES that has been sent to Government in December 2007, the CAG states, among other things, that under the programme

Only 3.2 per cent of the registered households have been given 100 days or more of employment;

The average employment that has been provided to each household is just 18 days;

While projects are to be taken up in low-wage areas, such areas have not even been identified in 53 of the test districts;

Works have been taken up without the kind of planning and scrutiny that the guidelines require – on occasion just on the ‘recommendation’ of VIPs;

While no more than 40 percent is to be spent on materials, in case after case much higher proportions – on occasion up to 80 per cent – are being spent on materials;

Materials are being purchased without the mandatory tenders being called;

Contrary to guidelines, work has been assigned to, and payments are being made to contractors and the like;

Registers of materials received, and utilized of work assigned and executed are not being maintained;

Workers are being paid wages that are far, far less than the minimum prescribed;

Muster rolls as well as registers of materials and payments are being fudged wholesale – the report is full of shameful examples;

When wages are not paid in time, workers are to be paid a compensation; this is not being paid – ‘because it has not been claimed,’ say those in-charge…

And so on. NC Saxena draws attention to these findings also about this ‘flagship’, saying only, ‘As regards its implementation, I think the CAG has said whatever needs to be said.’

Another flagship

Another ‘flagship’ that Chidambram mentions in his Budget is the provision of drinking water. This too has all the hallmarks of this Government.

‘I turn now to one of my big dreams,’ Chidambram declared in his Budget for 2004/05. He described how ‘Water is the lifeline of civilization,’ and lamented that the water bodies of yore had fallen into disrepair, and said that, ‘I therefore propose to launch a massive scheme to repair, renovate and restore all the water bodies that are directly linked to agriculture.’

So, what shall be done? ‘In the current year, we shall begin with pilot projects in at least five districts, and we shall select at least one district in each of the five regions of the country. The estimated cost is Rs.100 crore.’ The big dream has become a little dreamlet. Even so, from where shall the funds for even this dreamlet come? ‘Funds for the five pilot projects will be drawn from existing programmes such as SGRY, PMGJSY, DPAP, DDP and IWDP. Once the pilot projects are completed and validated, Government will launch the National Water Resources Development Project and complete it over a period of 7 to 10 years.’ And then there is the LIC, and those much derided institutions, the World bank, and others. Funds will not be a constraint.

The much bigger dream, of course, has been the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission. In this year’s Budget, Chidambram lists it again as one of the ‘flagship programmes’ of the UPA. He increases the allocation for it from 6,500 crore to 7,300 crore. And he carves out Rs. 200 crore out of this for providing drinking water for schools.

Excellent. Who can deny the importance of water? Who cannot agree that it is a shame that even 60 years after Independence we are not able to provide drinking water to all our people?

The first thing we have to remember is that this is almost an ancient programme. It used to be known as the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme – ARWSP.

Second, its implementation remains woeful, living up to Rajiv Gandhi’s statement that only 15% of outlays reach the poor in whose name they are defrayed. As Ganesh Pandey and Ravish Tiwari have reported in The Indian Express, the CAG has conducted a Performance Audit of this flagship also, and sent his findings to the Government in December, 2007:

While guidelines require that states prepare Annual Plans for works that are to be taken up, of 26 states, 8 had not prepared the required Plans at all. Of the remaining 18, 9, while saying they had prepared them, did not submit them to the central Government; 10 had put together something at the state-level but these had no district or lower level details; Plans drawn up by 10 turned out to be ‘sketchy’; 9 had no shelf of schemes and likely size of allocations.

While the guidelines require that 35 per cent of the outlay be on schemes that benefit SC/STs, the CAG’s Audit finds that in state after state, no separate targets or schemes have been formulated for the Scheduled Caste population; that the allocation, instead of being 35 per cent of the total, is much, much lower.

An enormous portion of the funds have been diverted – for paying salaries, for defraying office expenses, for paying outstanding bills, for other schemes.

Works said to have been completed do not exist; works have been ‘completed’ in non-existent villages; in other cases they have been taken up in villages that are already ‘fully covered’; works have been abandoned – in typical cases, pipes have been laid only part of the distance, pools have been dug where there is no water.

Guidelines provide that the quality of water must be assessed: it is not assessed at all – water treatment plants have just not been installed as required.

One half the Rural Protected Water Supply projects and a fifth of the tubewells shown as ‘completed’, found to be ‘non-functional’ or abandoned.

In state after state, the expenditure figures turn out to be manifestly inflated; they turn out to be not just without authorization but ‘fictitious’.

The Guidelines have provided a remedy very close to Chidambram’s heart – they require that Village Monitoring Committees and Special Monitoring and Inspection Units be set up; the CAG finds that in 14 states the committees are not holding regular meetings; 21 states have not nominated the required officials from the Health Department; 15 states have not established Special Monitoring and Investigation Units; in the remaining 11 states, these MIUs do not carry out field-level monitoring of quality of water, adequacy of service, etc.

Guidelines require that the central and state governments monitor and evaluate the works from time to time: in 22 states, no evaluation studies have been carried out at all; in 17 states, officials from state headquarters have not visited districts, blocks and villages for inspections.

A ‘flagship’?

Or the tattered rag covering a sunken vessel?

(To be continued)

For all stories visit www.indianexpress.com/arunshourie

'Action completed'!

Arun Shourie: Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Arun Shourie puts the Budget to the aam aadmi test and argues why the UPA fails miserably

The document is Implementation of Budget 2007-2008, and is one of the important documents that have been distributed with this year’s Budget. ‘In keeping with the endeavour of the Government of India to promote transparency and accountability,’ writes the Finance Minister, P. Chidambram, in his Foreword, the document has been compiled. It contains ‘the status of implementation of announcements’ that were made in the preceding Budget. ‘I am happy to place this brochure before the House,’ he writes.

The item for which those words appear in bold italics – it is one of the several items for which they appear in the same way – is ‘Mumbai as an International Centre.’

‘Action completed’? Has Mumbai become the International Financial Centre that the Government had said it would be made?

You will recall that over the last three years, three big announcements have been made for Mumbai – and each of them has been splashed across our papers in huge, bold headlines. Mumbai was inundated by a traumatic flood on 26 July, 2005. The Government announced a special package of Rs. 1,260 crore to ‘rejuvenate’ the Mithi river – this was to be one of the steps that would prevent that kind of a flood. Not one paisa has been disbursed since then.

Next, the Prime Minister announced that funds would be given to metamorphose Mumbai into another Shanghai. Not one paisa has been given since that announcement. A power-point presentation has indeed been made to the high-ups – it is a compilation of sundry projects that have been conceived and commenced by a succession of governments.

And then came the announcement that Mumbai would be made into an International Financial Centre. Another ‘special package’ was announced – to much fanfare: a ‘special package’ of Rs. one thousand crore. For months, my friend and colleague, Kirit Somaya tried to find out how much money has actually reached the Maharashtra Government. Nobody would tell him. But he is not the kind to give up. He filed an application under the Right to Information Act – just imagine the commitment of our governments to -- what was that expression of Chidambram? -- ‘transparency and accountability’ that to get to know how much they have given in their generosity for such a worthy cause, a citizen has to take recourse to the Right to Information Act! Kirit strained for two months. Eventually, he received the information in July 2007: the total amount that has been given by the Centre is Rs. sixteen crore sixteen lakh.

The proclamation? Rs. one thousand crore. Actually given? Rs. sixteen crore sixteen lakh.

Then how is the ‘Action’ ‘completed’?

That tract of transparency and accountability explains:

‘The Report of the High Powered Expert Committee to make Mumbai an International Financial Centre has been released. The full text of the report has also been placed on the Ministry’s website… inviting feedback from the public.

‘A presentation was made to the Prime Minister on August 24, 2007. The recommendations identified for priority implementation have been circulated to the concerned regulators/agencies for comments/views on the process of implementing the recommendations. An Action Plan has been drawn up and is being implemented.’

Thus,

Report received

Put on the Ministry’s website

A presentation made to the PM

Recommendations circulated to regulators/agencies for comments/views

Action completed!! Not that the project has been implemented. Not even that ‘the process’ by which it will be implemented has been settled. Just that the ‘comments/views’ on the process by which it is to be implemented have been invited.’ But ‘Action Completed’, it is!

And the sequence is typical. Given the concern of this Government for the poor, it is de rigueur to talk about the unorganized sector, and that is what Chidambram did in his Budget for 2005/06. ‘The unorganized or informal sector accounts for 92 per cent of the employment and absorbs the bulk of the annual accretion to the labour force,’ he said. The ‘possible solution’ is PURA or Provision of Urban Amenities in Rural Areas. A Commission has proposed action along these lines. And then the typical commitment, much praised recently for cleverness: ‘Once the proposals are firmed up, Government will take up the creation of a few growth poles, as pilot projects, in 2005-06.’

President Abdul Kalam was still in office. He used to propagate this idea of Professor PV Indiresen. Hence, a few ‘pilot projects’, but those also in the indefinite future – when the proposals have been firmed up. Kalam gone, PURA gone. No mention in subsequent budgets.

But commitment to the poor continues. The poor are at the heart of the Government’s thinking, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister have proclaimed times without number; to the poor, what matters most is food; for delivering food to them, the Public Distribution System is the key; and for making that system effective, the key is to improve the working of the Fair Price Shops.

‘Fair price shops constitute the backbone of the food security system for the poor,’ Chidambram told Parliament in his Budget for 2004/05. ‘We shall address the weaknesses in the system and strengthen public distribution,’ he promised. ‘I shall return to this subject a little later.’ That was in para 15. You had to wait for 60 paragraphs to learn what Government would do on this vital matter. An idea has been suggested, he said – that Government should distribute food stamps to the poor, and the poor should be able to go to any designated shop and procure the food. And so, another pilot: ‘I propose to introduce a pilot scheme for distributing food stamps, instead of distributing food through fair price shops, in two or three contiguous districts in a selected state. I sincerely hope that one of the States will come forward to associate with the Central Government in this experiment.’

Three years later, the pilot had disappeared, but more managerial types had alighted. Chidambram has continued to feel the urgency of improving the public distribution system. And so in the Budget for 2007/08, he took the definitive step for improving them: ‘A Plan scheme for evaluation, monitoring, management and strengthening of the targeted PDS will be implemented in 2007-08, and this will include computerisation of the PDS and an integrated information system in the Food Corporation of India.’

Come this Budget, and Government has moved higher up the technology scale: not mere stamps, not mere computerization and integrated information systems, an all together new, and technologically more advanced pilot. ‘An idea that has been growing,’ Chidambram says in this year’s Budget, ‘is to deliver subsidies to the target group through smart cards. Finally, I have found two willing partners -- the State of Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. They will introduce, on a pilot basis, a smart card based delivery system to deliver food grains under the PDS in Haryana and Chandigarh, respectively…’

And in the meantime, all the weaknesses of the Public Distribution System, to correct which Chidambram was going to revert later in his Budget of four years ago, continue unabated, all the leakages continue unchecked. In its report of April 2005 on the Targeted Public Distribution System, the Planning Commission records some of these ills:

The implementation of TPDS is plagued by targeting errors, prevalence of ghost cards and unidentified households;

Though the off-take per household has shown some improvement under TPDS, yet only about 57% of the Below Poverty Line households are covered by it;

Leakages and diversions of subsidized grains are large and only about 42% of subsidized grains issued from the Central Pool reach the target group;

Over 36% of the budgetary subsidies on food are siphoned off the supply chain: in several states, much higher proportions are siphoned off – 42% in Assam, 82% in Bihar, 42% in Gujarat, 56% in Haryana, 43% in Karnataka, 62% in Madhya Pradesh, 76% in Punjab, 61% in UP;

Another 21% of the food subsidy reaches households that are above the Poverty Line;

The cost of income transfer to the poor through PDS is much higher than that through other modes.

The Comptroller and Auditor General released his own findings in 2006. In his Performance Audit on Management of Foodgrains, the CAG concluded, first of all, ‘The results of the 59th round of the National Sample Survey of NSSO revealed that: almost 71 per cent of farmers had not even heard of the concept of Minimum Support Price. Even in Haryana and Punjab (which together contribute 56 per cent of all rice procured and 85 per cent of all wheat procured in the country), 37 per cent and 38 per cent of farmers respectively were unaware of MSP; and almost 81 per cent of farmers were effectively unaware of how to use the MSP programme.’ Second, the Audit once again laid bare all the holes with which we are familiar:

The number of households Below the Poverty Line in the records of the state governments is a third higher than in the records of the central Government. This has the effect of scaling down of rations, says the CAG.

Lists of beneficiaries are not updated, and this enables bogus cards to continue.

Large number of cases have come on record in which ration cards have been issued to households that are not eligible for them: cards issued far in excess of numbers who are Below the Poverty Line; cards issued to households whose income is far in excess of the poverty line; households managing to get food under one scheme as well as another one; ration cards issued on the recommendations of VIPs with no further verification; the cards issued in one state are almost double the number of households that have been found to be Below the Poverty Line by a survey of the Rural Development Department.

Foodgrains are distributed at lower than the prescribed scale of issue by four to 25 kg in several states and Union Territories.

Grains are diverted in state after state.

In Punjab and Haryana substandard rice is accepted on a vast scale.

It is not that ‘solutions’ have not been thought of. It is just that they have all met the familiar fate. To ensure proper monitoring of ration shops an Area Officers Scheme has been devised. The officers are to inspect the shops regularly. The CAG’s finding? ‘There was 96% shortfall in inspection by Area Officers under this scheme between 2000 and 2004/05…’ Vigilance Committees are to be formed, and they are to independently monitor the shops: in 24 states and Union Territories, the CAG finds, the Vigilance Committees have not been formed or are defunct and ‘non-functional’…

Nothing surprising in any of the findings – they are endemic. They have marred the Public Distribution System for decades. It was precisely to purge the system of them that Chidambram was flying all those pilots… The assurances are being implemented, the work is in progress, Chidambram’s brochure informs us.

The system, of course, remains as it has been.

(To be continued)

For all stories visit www.indianexpress.com/arunshourie

Hindutva and radical Islam: Where the twain do meet



Arun Shourie: Friday, December 28, 2007


Every set of scriptures has in it enough to justify extreme, even violent reaction. The tectonic shift in the Hindu mind, that has been going on for 200 years, is being underestimated


Your Hindutva is no different from Islamic fundamentalism’ — a fashionable statement these days, one that immediately establishes the person’s secular credentials. It is, of course, false, as we shall see in a moment. But there is a grain of potential truth in it — something that does not put Hinduism at par with Islam, but one that should, instead, serve as a warning to all who keep pushing Hindus around. That grain is the fact that every tradition has in it, every set of scriptures has in it enough to justify extreme, even violent reaction. From the very same Gita from which Gandhiji derived non-violence and satyagraha, Lokmanya Tilak constructed the case for ferocious response, not excluding violence. From the very same Gita from which Gandhiji derived his ‘true law’, shatham pratyapi satyam, ‘Truth even to the wicked’, the Lokmanya derived his famous maxim, shatham prati shaathyam, ‘Wickedness to the wicked.’

In the great work, Gita Rahasya, that he wrote in the Mandalay prison, the Lokmanya invokes Sri Samartha, ‘Meet boldness with boldness; impertinence by impertinence must be met; villainy by villainy must be met.’ Large-heartedness towards those who are grasping? Forgiveness towards those who are cruel? ‘Even Prahlada, that highest of devotees of the Blessed Lord,’ the Lokmanya recalls, has said, ‘Therefore, my friend, wise men have everywhere mentioned exceptions to the principle of forgiveness.’ True, the ordinary rule is that one must not cause harm to others by doing such actions as, if done to oneself, would be harmful. But, the Mahabharata, Tilak says, ‘has made it clear that this rule should not be followed in a society, where there do not exist persons who follow the other religious principle, namely, others should not cause harm to us, which is the corollary from this first principle.’ The counsel of ‘equability’ of the Gita, he says, is bound up with two individuals; that is, it implies reciprocity. ‘Therefore, just as the principle of non-violence is not violated by killing an evil-doer, so also the principle of self-identification [of seeing the same, Eternal Self in all] or of non-enmity, which is observed by saints, is in no way affected by giving condign punishment to evil-doers.’ Does the Supreme Being not Himself declare that He takes incarnations from time to time to protect dharma and destroy evil-doers? Indeed, the one who hesitates to take the retaliatory action that is necessary assists the evil to do their work. ‘And the summary of the entire teaching of the Gita is that: even the most horrible warfare which may be carried on in these circumstances, with an equable frame of mind, is righteous and meritorious.’

Tilak invokes the advice of Bhisma, and then of Yudhisthira, ‘Religion and morality consist in behaving towards others in the same way as they behave towards us; one must behave deceitfully towards deceitful persons, and in a saintly way towards saintly persons.’ Of course, act in a saintly way in the first instance, the Lokmanya counsels. Try to dissuade the evil-doer through persuasion. ‘But if the evilness of the evil-doers is not circumvented by such saintly actions, or, if the counsel of peacefulness and propriety is not acceptable to such evil-doers, then according to the principle kantakenaiva kantakam (that is, “take out a thorn by a thorn”), it becomes necessary to take out by a needle, that is by an iron thorn, if not by an ordinary thorn, that thorn which will not come out with poultices, because under any circumstances, punishing evil-doers in the interests of general welfare, as was done by the Blessed Lord, is the first duty of saints from the point of view of Ethics.’ And the responsibility for the suffering that is caused thereby does not lie with the person who puts the evil out; it lies with the evil-doers. The Lord Himself says, Tilak recalls, ‘I give to them reward in the same manner and to the same extent that they worship Me.’ ‘In the same way,’ he says, ‘no one calls the Judge, who directs the execution of a criminal, the enemy of the criminal...’

Could the variance between two interpretations be greater than is the case between the Lokmanya’s Gita Rahasya and Gandhiji’s Anashakti Yoga? Yet both constructions are by great and devout Hindus. Are ordinary Hindus nailed to Gandhiji’s rendering? After all, at the end of the Gita, Arjuna does not go off to sit at one of our non-violent dharnas. He goes into blood-soaked battle.

The comforting mistake

The mistake is to assume that the sterner stance is something that has been fomented by this individual or that —in the case of Hindutva, by, say, Veer Savarkar — or by one organisation, say the RSS or the VHP. That is just a comforting mistake — the inference is that once that individual is calumnised, once that organisation is neutralised, ‘the problem’ will be over. Large numbers do not gravitate to this interpretation rather than that merely because an individual or an organisation has advanced it — after all, the interpretations that are available on the shelf far outnumber even the scriptures. They gravitate to the harsher rendering because events convince them that it alone will save them.

It is this tectonic shift in the Hindu mind, a shift that has been going on for 200 years, which is being underestimated. The thousand years of domination and savage oppression by rulers of other religions; domination and oppression which were exercised in the name of and for the glory of and for establishing the sway of those religions, evinced a variety of responses from the Hindus. Armed resistance for centuries... When at last such resistance became totally impossible, the revival of bhakti by the great poets... When public performance even of bhakti became perilous, sullen withdrawal, preserving the tradition by oneself, almost in secrecy: I remember being told in South Goa how families sustained their devotion by painting images of our gods and goddesses inside the tin trunks in which sheets and clothing were kept. The example of individuals: recall how the utter simplicity and manifest aura of Ramakrishna Paramhamsa negated the efforts of the missionaries, how his devotion to the image of the Goddess at Dakshineshwar restored respectability to the idolatry that the missionaries and others were traducing... The magnetism of Sri Aurobindo and Ramana Maharshi... Gandhiji’s incontestable greatness and the fact that it was so evidently rooted in his devotion to our religion...

Each of these stemmed much. But over the last 200 years the feeling has also swelled that, invaluable as these responses have been, they have not been enough. They did not prevent the country from being taken over. They did not shield the people from the cruelty of alien rulers. They did not prevent the conversion of millions. They did not prevent the tradition from being calumnised and being thrown on the defensive. They did not in the end save the country from being partitioned — from being partitioned in the name of religion...

There is a real vice here. The three great religions that originated in Palestine and Saudi Arabia — Judaism, Christianity and Islam — have been exclusivist — each has insisted that it alone is true — and aggressive. The Indic religions — Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism — have been inclusive, they have been indulgent of the claims of others. But how may the latter sort survive when it is confronted by one that aims at power, acquires it, and then uses it to enlarge its dominion? How is the Indic sort to survive when the other uses the sword as well as other resources — organised missionaries, money, the state — to proselytise and to convert? Nor is this question facing just the Hindus in India today. It is facing the adherents of Indic traditions wherever they are: look at the Hindus in Indonesia and Malaysia; look at the Buddhists in Tibet, now in Thailand too. It is because of this vice, and the realisation born from what had already come to pass that Swami Vivekananda, for instance, while asking the Hindus to retain their Hindu soul, exhorted them to acquire an ‘Islamic body’.

Instigating factors

We can be certain that his counsel will prevail, our secularists notwithstanding,

The more aggressively the other religions proselytise — look at the fervour with which today the Tablighi Jamaat goes about conversion; look at the organised way in which the missionaries ‘harvest’ our souls;

The more they use money to increase the harvest — whether it is Saudi money or that of Rome and the American churches;

The more any of them uses violence to enlarge its sway;

The more any of them allies itself with and uses the state — whether that of Saudi Arabia or Pakistan — for aggrandisement.

Nor is what others do from outside the only determinant. From within India, three factors in particular will make the acquiring of that Islamic body all the more certain:

The more biased ‘secularist’ discourse is;

The more political parties use non-Hindus — Muslims, for instance — as vote banks and the more that non-Hindu group comes to act as one — ‘strategic voting’ and all;

The more the state of India bends to these exclusivist, aggressive traditions.

It has almost become routine to slight Hindu sentiments — our smart-set do not even notice the slights they administer. Recall the jibe of decades: ‘the Hindu rate of growth’. When, because of those very socialist policies that their kind had swallowed and imposed on the country, our growth was held down to 3-4 per cent, it was dubbed — with much glee — as ‘the Hindu rate of growth’. Today, we are growing at 9 per cent. And, if you are to believe the nonsense in Sachar’s report, the minorities are not growing at all. So, who is responsible for this higher rate of growth? The Hindus! How come no one calls this higher rate of growth ‘the Hindu rate of growth’? Simple: dubbing the low rate as the Hindu one established you to be secular; not acknowledging the higher one as the Hindu rate establishes you to be secular!

Or M.F. Husain. He is a kindly man, and a prodigiously productive artist. There is no warrant at all for disrupting all his exhibitions. I am on the point of sensibilities. His depictions of Hindu goddesses have been in the news: he has painted them in less than skimpy attire. I particularly remember one in which Sita is riding Hanuman’s stiffened tail — of course, she is scarcely clad, but that is the least of it: you need no imagination at all to see what she is rubbing up against that stiffened tail. Well, in the case of an artist, that is just inspiration, say the secularists. OK. The question that arises then is: How come in the seventy-five years Husain has been painting, he has not once felt inspired, not once, to paint the face of the Prophet? It doesn’t have to be in the style in which he has painted the Hindu goddesses. Why not the most beautiful, the most radiant and luminous face that he can imagine? How come he has never felt inspired to paint women revered in Islam, or in his own family, in the same style as the one that propelled his inspiration in regard to Hindu goddesses?

‘In painting the goddesses, he was just honouring them,’ a secular intellectual remarked at a discussion the other day. ‘It was his way of honouring them.’ Fine. It is indeed the case that one of the best ways we can honour someone is to put the one skill we have at the service of the person or deity. But how come that Husain never but never thought of honouring the Prophet by using the same priceless skill, that one ‘talent which is death to hide’?

‘Has Mr Shourie ever visited Khajuraho?,’ a member of the audience asked, the implication being that, as Hindu sculptors had depicted personages naked, what was wrong with Husain depicting the goddesses in the same style. Fine again. But surely, it is no one’s case that the ‘Khajuraho style’ must be confined to Hindu icons. Why has the artist, so skilled in deploying the Khajuraho motifs, never used them for icons of Islam? The reason why an artist desists from depicting the Prophet’s face is none of these convoluted disquisitions on style.

The reason is simplicity itself: he knows he will be thrashed, and his hands smashed.

Exactly the same holds for politics. How come no one objects when for years a Muslim politician keeps publishing maps of constituencies in which Muslims as Muslims can determine the outcome, and exhorting them to do so? When, not just an individual politician but entire political parties — from the Congress to the Left parties — stir Muslims up as a vote bank. When Muslims start behaving like a vote bank, you can be certain that someone will get the idea that Hindus too should be welded into a vote bank, and eventually they will get welded into one. Why is stoking Muslims ‘secular’ and stoking Hindus ‘communal’?

And yet perverted discourse, even the stratagems of political parties, are but preparation: they prepare the ground for capitulation by the state to groups that are aggressive. And in this the real lunacy is about to be launched, and, with that, the real reaction.

The fabrications of government


Arun Shourie: Wednesday, December 12, 2007
If energy security is what we are after, shifting to power dependency on imported technology, reactors, components, uranium, each of which is controlled by an even tighter cartel than oil, is hardly the answer

Explaining his assessment about the cost at which nuclear power would be available, the prime minister told the Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2006, “Arun Shourie asked me what calculations I have seen. I have seen many calculations in the Department of Atomic Energy. In the eighties when K.C. Pant was the chairman of the energy policy committee, a detailed study was done and it was shown that if you are talking of generating power and reaching it to a place 700 km away from a coal mine, nuclear energy is the right economic answer. Things can change. And I think the Planning Commission has done recent work, and they have also come to the conclusion that having the nuclear option is something which will give us a greater degree of security on the energy front.”

Actually, if energy security is what we are after, shifting from power dependent on imported oil to power dependent on imported technology, imported reactors, imported components, imported uranium, each of which is controlled by an even tighter cartel than oil, is hardly the answer. And, as we saw, even the Planning Commission’s Integrated Energy Policy acknowledges this.

As for some study done in the 1980s, the price of uranium used to be $7 per pound then. It is over $140 per pound today.

The change of much greater consequence relates not to the price of uranium, but to that of reactors. The US has not placed an order for a new reactor since 1978 — and that order was cancelled. The last order for a reactor was placed in 1970 — and it took 26 years for that reactor to come into operation. With this attenuation of demand for reactors, the capacity of the US nuclear industry today to build reactors is very limited. By contrast, see what that industry has to do just in the US in the coming years. The MIT report, The Future of Nuclear Power, 2003 — as well as the study by the University of Chicago published the following year — had already established that energy from nuclear sources would be one and a half times to twice as costly as that from coal and gas. Since then an all-important consideration has been the focus of analysis. The US has a total of 103 commercial reactors today. The original licensed life of US reactors used to be 40 years. This life has been extended for forty-odd of these reactors for 20 more years. Even with that having been done, every single reactor of the US will have to be replaced by 2056. Other countries too have plans to build reactors. Given the extremely limited capacity to build reactors, the price that will be charged by vendors is bound to leap up. (A recent study published in April 2007 by the most influential organisation on US foreign policy gives a succinct and authoritative account of the prospect in this regard: Charles D. Ferguson, Nuclear Energy, Balancing Benefits and Risks, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007.)

What of “recent work” by the Planning Commission that the PM mentioned? The most recent one is the Report of the Working Group on Power, which the commission published as recently as February 2007. The working group lists the cost per megawatt for generation projects. The report places the cost at Rs 4 crore per megawatt for coal based projects; Rs 3 crore per megawatt for gas based projects; Rs 4.50 crore to Rs 5 crore per megawatt for run-of-the-river hydro projects; Rs 5.50 crore to Rs 6 crore for storage hydro projects. And for nuclear power projects? Rs 6.50 crore per megawatt. And, recall, this group was straining to pad up the necessity for nuclear power to justify recourse to the deal.

But we don’t have to go just by estimates: there is an actual and current example. The new unit at Tarapur is supplying power at Rs 2.70 to Rs 2.80 a unit. What is the price per unit that has been accepted for power from the new ultra-mega thermal power project? Rs 1.19 per unit! The moment I recalled this contrast in the Rajya Sabha the other day, Dr Kasturirangan, who had just spoken in favour of the deal, interjected, “That price for nuclear energy is subsidised.” Others who have studied the matter intervened, “Actually the cost is Rs 9 per unit.” So, power at double or seven times the cost from other sources.

Indeed, even at these levels, these Indian estimates of the cost of nuclear power are gross underestimates. To cite just one fact, they do not build in the cost of disposing nuclear waste. The US itself is today plagued by this problem — having spent over $9 billion for developing a storage repository in the Yucca Mountain in Nevada, having striven for two decades to develop the site, the expectation is that the site will not become operational till 2015/2020 or so.

Nor do our estimates build in the cost of the more and more stringent and increasingly expensive security arrangements that will have to be made to prevent theft of fissile material as the number of reactors multiplies. Even countries that have exerted to the utmost to secure such material are experiencing insuperable difficulties. “The nuclear material currently unaccounted for at plutonium reprocessing facilities could make many bombs,” Ferguson notes. “For example, Japan cannot account for more than two hundred kilograms of plutonium at the Tokai-mura plant. In Britain, the Sellafield plant cannot account for about thirty kilograms of plutonium. According to the IAEA, only eight kilograms of plutonium are needed to make a bomb. But even less than that was used in the Nagasaki bomb, which employed six kilograms. More advanced designs could use as little as one to three kilograms.” (In addition to Ferguson’s study, for an instructive analysis of all this see the oft-cited report by Brice Smith, Insurmountable Risks, The dangers of using nuclear power to combat climate change, Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Md., 2006.)

But: “I have seen many calculations in the Department of Atomic Energy. In the eighties... a detailed study was done... And, I think, the Planning Commission has done recent work, and they have also come to the conclusion that...” says the PM. And that is the end of the matter.

The fabrications in regard to uranium

The argument that we need nuclear power would not have been enough to justify the deal — for the response could have been, “All right, use domestically available uranium to generate it.” Hence, two further myths were fomented: we are woefully short of uranium; such uranium as we have is of poor quality.

The authoritative compilation on uranium supplies is what is known as the Red Book of the IAEA and OECD. The latest one — published in 2005/06 — records India’s uranium reserves as being 94,000 tonnes. Of these, 64,000 tonnes are what are termed as ‘RARs’, Reasonably Assured Reserves; and 30,000 tonnes are EAR-I, that is, ‘Estimated Additional Reserves’. Currently we are using 1,334 tonnes a year. By every stretch, these are enough to see us through to the time we will master fast breeder and thorium technologies. What is probably the best available study of the potential of these reserves, Atoms for War? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006) has been done, in fact, by one of the architects of the deal, Ashley Tellis. In it, he shows that India has more than enough uranium — even if it were to aim in the coming decades at a nuclear arsenal of 2023 to 2228 weapons.

Now see how the twin myths are formented. The Planning Commission’s Integrated Energy Policy states: “India is poorly endowed with uranium. Available uranium supply can fuel only 10,000 MW of Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors. Further, India is extracting uranium from extremely low grade ores (as low as 0.1 per cent uranium) compared to ores with up to 12-14 per cent uranium in certain resources abroad.” Notice the sleight of words: our average — 0.1 per cent — is compared to other unspecified countries’ highest, their “up to...”

The facts are more reassuring! The most important suppliers of uranium are Australia, Kazakhstan and Canada — half the world’s output comes from them. The most recent account of uranium reserves, put out as recently as November 2, 2007, again by the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that it is only in Canada that the ore — about a fifth of it — is above the 1 per cent grade. “In Australia, on the other hand, some 90 per cent of uranium has a grade less than 0.06 per cent. Much of Kazakhstan’s ore is less than 0.1 per cent.”

Nor has the government ever explained why we are not able to get more uranium from countries that are not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group — Niger, Nigeria, Mongolia. Is it that we have been fixated on our traditional suppliers, like Russia? Is it that we have tried but found that, in fact, the governments of these countries are so weak that eventually they go by the dictates of multinational companies and the major powers that control the NSG itself, the US, France, Russia, China? Is it that these controllers have blocked the non-members from supplying uranium to us even as they themselves have blocked members of the NSG from supplying it? If that is indeed the case, how come we are putting so much faith in these very controllers as to place our future energy security in their hands?

That last question also arose in regard to what the prime minister said when he charged Yashwant Sinha with spreading falsehoods. Yashwant Sinha was asking why the deal with the Russians for four additional reactors had not been signed during the PM’s recent visit to Moscow. Was it under US pressure? The PM said that “it had always been understood” that this agreement would be signed only after restrictions had been lifted by the NSG. That was certainly not the impression he gave in the written statement that he read out during the joint press conference that he held with President Putin in New Delhi on January 25, 2007. In that statement he thanked President Putin for the help that Russia had given in ending the international restrictions that had been placed on imports of nuclear materials by India. He pointed to the memorandum of intent that had been signed by India and Russia for the construction of four new reactors at Kudankulam. There was not the shadow of a hint that further progress was contingent on anything that was to be done by the very countries that had imposed those international restrictions. And now, suddenly, “it was always understood...”

‘Why don’t you believe the CEO of America instead of some undersecretary?’

The Americans have been absolutely candid in what they intend to accomplish through the nuclear deal. To halt, roll back, and eventually eliminate India’s nuclear capability. To draw India into the non-proliferation regime. To have it sign up on other international protocols that the US, etc are crafting — the FMCT, the PSI, the Wassener Agreement... To make its energy supplies so dependent on imported uranium, imported reactors, that it would ‘on its own’ desist from testing. Provision upon provision of the Hyde Act speaks to this design explicitly. Statements upon statements of US Congressmen, Condoleezza Rice, Nicholas Burns and others testify to it.

Each time these have been cited by persons like me, government spokesmen have said, “But why relying on what some undersecretary has said? Why don’t you believe what the CEO of America, President Bush himself said when he signed the Hyde Act into law — that he would not be bound by the provisions? Did he not say that he would treat these as ‘advisory’ — that is, they shall be non-binding — and go by his own assessment?”

It just so happened that the very morning when the debate was to take place in the Rajya Sabha in December last year, every Indian correspondent in Washington received the statement — in hard as well as soft copy — and was urged to creed it to India post haste. Jaswant Singh received it from a correspondent in Washington and gave me a copy. The use to which the government would put it, and the construction it would put on it, were obvious. So, during my speech, I mentioned the statement, and said that before the debate was done, government would be invoking it. Sure enough, the minister for external affairs didn’t just invoke the statement, he read into it exactly what I had said government would. Since then, he has himself invoked it twice in Parliament, and of course sundry government spokesmen have been touting it to insinuate that the Hyde provisions are not really going to apply.

That is typical of what the government has been doing, with full confidence that no one will read or remember the original. In fact, what President Bush said can provide no solace to anyone concerned with India’s options in regard to its strategic programme.

The statement had to do only with a long-drawn tug of war between the executive and legislative in the US over who has the final say on the country’s foreign policy. Sticking to the position he has taken in invading Iraq, Bush said that the conduct of foreign policy is the prerogative of the executive and so he would construe the provisions in the Hyde Act that had a bearing on foreign policy as advisory. That is little consolation for us — the provision that prescribes penalties which must befall India should it test, for instance, is NOT one of these provisions.

For the same reason, he said that the provision in the Hyde Act that lays down that should NSG guidelines prohibit the export of some item to India, the US too would desist from exporting that item to India, would entail that the conduct of US foreign policy would be ceded to some international body, and this the executive could not do under the US Constitution. What use is this assertion of presidential powers to us? The provision of concern to us is the opposite one — it is the direction to the president, repeated more than once, that when the US terminates nuclear exports to India, it shall ensure that no other member of the NSG steps in to provide those materials components, fuel, and so on to India.

The third point Bush made was about information the executive shall collect regarding India’s nuclear programme. He said, the executive would not automatically disclose all of it. Again, no help to us. He did not say that the US government shall not collect the enormous amount of information about every aspect of our nuclear programme that the Hyde Act requires it to collect — including information about every bit of uranium mined, milled, used, the power produced from it, and how much is left over for weapons, and so on. The fact is that parts of such information are collected through US intelligence agencies also. The executive does not automatically make it public. Often, it gives the information to committees of the Congress in closed hearings. How does that help us?

Nor is it that the statement does not in the least say what the government has been trying to make us believe it says. The farcical thing is that it is seeking to find solace in the fact that on provisions regarding foreign policy — say, Iran — Bush will go by his own assessment, and not be constrained by the US Congress!

And then there is the obvious point: the law is not what a president says at some signing ceremony, the law is what the US Congress has enacted. Clinton specifically set aside signing statements of President Reagan and President Bush Sr. Will the next president, or one twenty years down the line, go along with the Congress in regard to even these provisions regarding foreign policy or with Bush’s statement?

Obvious. And yet the fabrication. In the full confidence that no one will read the original — even when it is as brief as Bush’s statement is, just 15 lines! How disheartening that the confidence is all too often justified in regard to our media.

The moral is simple:

Don’t run after secret documents;

Just read the printed ones;

But do read them;

Governments will be brought to heel.

editor@expressindia.com

Necessity is the mother of fabrication too



Arun Shourie: Tuesday, December 11, 2007


Cut through the hype on the Indo-US nuclear deal, and all you have is the possibility of a marginal contribution to our nuclear energy generation. For this, our strategic interest is being mortgaged in perpetuity

India’s uranium deposits are limited and of low grade,” Hindustan Times declared on December 12, 2006, in a large, prominently displayed, boxed item. “The uranium available today can fuel only 10,000 reactors...” Ten thousand reactors? The total number of commercial reactors in the entire world today is just four hundred and forty. With uranium enough for 10,000 reactors, are we short of ore?

In the same account, we were instructed that “the nuclear deal can save us from the increasing energy deficit by helping install up to 40,000 MW of new nuclear capacity by 2015.” Assuming reactors that generate 500 MW each — the size of our new experimental fast breeder reactor, double the size of several of our current reactors — that would mean eighty new reactors being commissioned in the next eight years: that is, one new reactor coming into operation every five weeks.

The account proceeded to declare that India’s “nuclear electricity capacity” shall “see a 10-fold increase” by 2020. The account noted that at present we are producing 3,310 MW electricity from our nuclear plants. The paper’s forecast would, therefore, mean that electricity generation from our nuclear plants will increase to 33,100 MW by 2020. Assuming a plant-load factor of even 80 per cent — a third higher than the one at which our plants are working today — to generate this quantum of electricity, would entail setting up a capacity for over 40,000 MW. Even in its most optimistic forecasts — and we will have occasion to learn a bit about these soon enough — the Department of Atomic Energy has been putting the figure at half that level!

But that was not the end. Polishing up the deal further, the Hindustan Times informed its readers that by 2050, an astronomical “200,000 MW of nuclear energy can be produced”. We would presumably have more reactors by then than the whole world has today. As my friend T.C.A. Rangachari once said, “Jo hyper-bole so nihal.”

This has been one of the main strengths of the government over the past two years — the utter innumeracy of our media exceeded only by its utter willingness to put out anything. “Killer amendments dropped, India’s concerns taken care of,” the papers proclaimed — when, in fact, as even the most cursory glance would have shown, each and every one of the clauses was very much a part of the Act. “Objectionable clauses non-binding,” they proclaimed — when, in fact, neither our government nor that of the US was able to furnish any list of which clauses were binding and which were non-binding, and, of course, the Act itself made no such distinction.

But the enthusiasts had a ready reason for not studying the Act! “Laden with numbing bureaucratese and legalese,” The Times of India declared on its front page, in its — what else should one call it? — “analytical report” of the Hyde Act on December 9, 2006, “littered with sections, sub-sections, clauses, sub-clauses and footnotes, it has enough statements, caveats and requirements to make heads spin”.

How much easier then to just concoct! For it isn’t the precise figure that propagandists count on remaining in the mind, nor the precise assertion but the general impression — in this case, that the nuclear deal will light up the bulbs, that the concerns which had been expressed have been met. How much easier to abuse: those who were pointing to the provisions of the US legislation were charged with being “obsessed with clauses and sub-clauses”, to be “anti-deal jihadis”. And to put out stories, ‘Advani softens’ ‘Rajnath says if concerns met...’ I had attended every single meeting of the BJP leaders at which the nuclear deal was deliberated upon. At no meeting at all had the leaders felt that either new evidence or new argument had surfaced which required that the assessment be changed. And yet, ‘BJP softens...’ And this after written statements were put out repeatedly over the signatures of the principal leaders themselves.

The press, of course, has been the instrument in all this — that itself is as deplorable as it is worrisome. The wielder of the instrument has been the government. And its fabrications can fill a volume.

The myth of power

As the desperation to justify the deal has swelled, in the government’s reckoning the contribution that nuclear power can make to our energy needs has swelled!

In the Approach paper to the 11th Five Year Plan, which was put out with the usual fanfare in December 2006, the word ‘nuclear’ occurs just twice. The first time is in the context of housing: we are instructed that, along with growing numbers, nuclear families are creating the need for more housing. The second time it occurs is just to state that policies must be evolved to ensure swift completion of hydro and nuclear projects.

But by the time we get to the Report of the Working Group on Power for Eleventh Plan (2007-12), which was put out in February 2007, imagineering takes over the Planning Commission and its experts. The report notes that nuclear capacity at the end of the 10th Plan is liable to be 3900 MW. Reviewing the projects that can be completed in the 11th Plan, the report concludes that capacity addition during the 11th Plan (that is, by 2012) shall be 3160 MW. And then comes a sudden leap: the report says that during the 12th Plan (that is, between 2012 and 2019), 13,500 MW of capacity shall be added.

Pause for a moment and ask, how has this figure — of 13,500 MW — been arrived at? One explanation is, of course, generic: the more distant the date for which you are putting out a figure, the more daring you can afford to be! The second is specific to the figure. You see, when asked what it can aim at for 2020, the Department of Atomic Energy has been in the habit of saying, almost as a reflex, ‘20,000 MW’. Hence, the working group figure: our present capacity is for 3900 MW; add to that what can be constructed at best during the 11th Plan: that makes, 3900 MW plus 3160 MW, that is 7060 MW. To jack the figure up to 20,000 MW by 2020, 13,000 MW or so will have to be added in the 12th Plan. So, that is what we will declare as added! QED!

But assume this sudden leap is executed in the 12th Plan. Another document tells the tale the government has conjured up because of the deal. This government’s main study on the energy sector has been the report of another committee set up under the overall rubric of that habitual legitimiser, the Planning Commission. The committee had the usual stellar cast. Its report is entitled Integrated Energy Policy and was put out by the Planning Commission in August 2006. At page 37, in Table 3.4, the report gives two sets of possible figures for installed capacity of nuclear power — a set for a ‘pessimistic scenario’ and another set for an ‘optimistic scenario’. The capacity for 2020 in the former is put near the usual DAE figure, 21,000 MW. Under the ‘optimistic scenario’, it is put at 29,000 MW — far higher, you will recall, than even the working group figure, but still not so high as to sell the deal. To locate the sabz bagh in the name of which the government has been marketing the deal, you have to look at the figures for 2030: 48,000 MW in the ‘pessimistic scenario’ and 63000 MW in the ‘optimistic scenario’.

That the credulity of even the authors of the report was being strained is obvious from the note they add to this table. They record, “These estimates assume that:

“the FBR (Fast Breeder Reactor) technology is successfully demonstrated by the 500 MW PFBR (Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor) currently under construction,

“new uranium mines are opened for providing fuel for setting up additional PHWRs (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors),

“India succeeds in assimilating the LWR (Light Water Reactor) technology through import and develops the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor for utilising Thorium by 2020.”

Anyone who has the least familiarity with what the Times of India would have called ‘bureaucratese’ will see through to the extreme skepticism that the authors — heavily pressurised reactors, if I may say so — are trying to convey. By the time three pages have passed, the pressure has taken the better of the reactors: in listing “some energy supply scenarios for 8 per cent GDP growth”, they go for “maximum nuclear”, which they say “assumes nuclear development as per the optimistic scenario of Table 3.4.” The “pessimistic scenario”? Press “Del” for delete!

That apart, what would we have to do to get from 20,000 MW in 2020 to 63,000 MW by 2030 — that is, how do we add 43,000 MW in 10 years? If we put up 500 MW reactors, that will require that we put up over 80 reactors in 120 months: that is, we bring into operation one reactor every one and a half months; if we put up 1000 MW reactors, that will require over 40 reactors — that is, we bring into operation one reactor every three months.

But take one more leap of faith.

Assume that the reactors are set up at this pace. What do we get at the end?

The report states, “Even if a 20-fold increase takes place in India’s nuclear capacity by 2031-32, the contribution of India’s nuclear power capacity to India’s energy mix is also, at best, expected to be 4.0 to 6.4 per cent.” (Integrated Energy Policy, Volume I, xxii.)

Notice what the experts are saying:

Even if —

There is a twenty-fold increase

The contribution to capacity — not to actual generation

Shall at best be....

For this marginal contribution, indeed for the possibility of this marginal contribution, our strategic interest is being mortgaged in perpetuity.

While the government peddles the deal as the magic lamp that will, as the papers have been putting it, “end the nuclear winter”, which will open “the nuclear trove”; while the government peddles the deal as the master-stroke that will ensure “energy security”, the government’s principal document on energy acknowledges the obvious: “If the sanctions by the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) are removed and India is able to import uranium and nuclear power plants, nuclear power can play a much bigger role in the power sector. The capacity growth then would not be constrained by Table 3.4. However, if energy security concerns are our primary driver towards nuclear (sic), then imports of LWRs (Light Water Reactors), even though more economical, may have to be limited to restrict our dependence on energy imports.” (Integrated Energy Policy, p. 48.)

Alternatives

Contrast this contribution with just three of the many alternatives that are available. Citing an Asian Development Bank study, Integrated Energy Policy states (on p. 81) that demand-side management has the potential for affecting a peak saving of “at least 15 per cent of total generation”. The report lists several methods by which these “megawatts” may be secured — every megawatt saved is a megawatt generated. In fact, I am instructed by Commission staff themselves, this is the order of saving that comes about merely from the adoption of more efficient end-use appliances. The correct figure of this potential is not 15 per cent but 19 per cent to 22 per cent: this is the difference between the efficient and inefficient energy scenarios projected on pages 48-49 of the report.

Consider a second alternative. The working group on power itself indicated that the potential of hydro power in just our northeastern states is 58,000 MW.

Add to this what can be secured through partnering with Nepal. The current cost of a reactor — a cost that is bound to leap higher, as we shall see — is around $2.5 billion per reactor. For generating the 35,000 MW that the government’s representatives had mentioned in Parliament, we will have to spend $91 billion. For those mythical 63,000 MW, mentioned by the Planning Commission’s Integrated Energy Policy, we will have to spend $158 billion. Now, the total budget of the government of Nepal is about $1.6 billion. You could offer to defray the entire budget of the Nepalese government for 60 to 100 years, and invite it to together build a string of hydro power projects with money raised from the market, and you will still come out better: you would have got power from a perennial, renewable source; you would have alleviated the problem of floods in UP, Bihar and the rest; you would have converted a neighbour into a friend.

But that is just half the story.

But who has that distant a horizon? III



Arun Shourie: Thursday, November 15, 2007


There is every likelihood that pseudo-reforms will be pushed, and little possibility of the fundamental reforms that are required in Pakistan, writes ARUN SHOURIE


It really is ‘crunch time’ for Pakistan, says a keen observer: the mere installation of a civilian government will not change the character of Pakistan. In a sense, even under Musharraf, a civilian government has functioned — there has been a cabinet headed by Shaukat Aziz, a Citibank executive, no less; there has been an elected assembly; a ‘normal’ political party, the PML-Q, has fronted for Musharraf; there has even been a free press. And yet things have reached the pass they have.

A much more fundamental choice confronts Pakistan as well as the West: Pakistan’s rulers and its props have to choose — to either have the country lunge for the jihadi option or to wage an all-out struggle to root out the causes of the jihadi culture; to either hand the country over to extremists or to crush them completely. The problem relates not to whether the government is military or ‘civilian’. Even in the latter, given the way things are in Pakistan, the army and agencies like the ISI will control all vital decisions and policies, as they have done in the previous civilian governments. It relates to the nature of such government as controls affairs. It relates even more fundamentally to the nature of the society from which the government must necessarily be formed and which it has to steer.

As we have seen, the nature of Pakistan’s society today — in which, to recall just one symptom, jihad and shahadat have such exalted status, in which enmity to India has such a central place — is the result of developments over 60 years and more. Three features of the ‘solution’ that is necessary are at once evident.

First, as analysts like Ajai Sahni, Sushant Sareen and others correctly point out, it will entail deep, very deep surgery, a complete reversal. It will require not just that jihadi groups be absolutely crushed; but, in addition, that the army is completely subordinated to civilian authority; that constitutional government, and the rule of law are instituted; that the ISI in its present form is virtually eliminated; that the curricula of madrassas and government schools are overturned; that the objective of wresting Kashmir is abandoned; that the premise, to use Musharraf’s enunciation, that terrorism and proxy-war are ‘instruments of state policy’ is shed completely; that Pakistan comes to reconcile itself to more realistic notions of the extent to which it can ‘project’ its power; that either the populace goes back on the basic article of faith, ‘Pakistan is an Islamic state’, or that Islam is so thoroughly recast as to be almost unrecognisable.

But such an about-turn requires leaders of the highest legitimacy, it requires an intellectual ferment, it requires robust reformers. None of the three is around. The leaders are dwarfs, especially when it comes to religious discourse — none of them could hold her or his own even in front of the run-of-the-mill maulvis who crowd Pakistan’s Islamic TV channels. There is no intellectual ferment within Islam as it is practiced in South Asia. As for reformers, Iqbal is long gone, Maulana Maududi prevails.

Moreover, there are so many coils in which the current world-view is entangled. Recall, for instance, the deep links that Middle Eastern regimes have with the jihadi groups in Pakistan. Will they forego the links and the options that the links give them? The option, for instance, of directing the revolutionary zeal of fundamentalists to regions outside their countries and thus saving themselves? Within Pakistan, such surgery will go against the indoctrination of the last 60 years. The difficulties entailed in doing so, especially in the rural areas, can scarcely be imagined. There is another factor: Pakistan has relied on and stoked Islamic identity to neutralise ethnic nationalisms — Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi, Mohajir. These will erupt even more ferociously than is already the case were the Islamic quotient in the concept of state to be diluted. In any case, such an exercise cannot even commence until the ruling elite of Pakistan comes to realise that it has no option at all except such a course. The fact of the matter is that, while they appear non-plussed today, the elite are far from such a point — on the contrary, they are confident that the West will, and that China and Saudi Arabia in the end will allow them, even assist them to go on as they have been doing. On the other side, with the breakdown of governance, security, even basic services, people are much more likely to leap for the messianic alternative that is being proffered by fundamentalists than to go along with such fundamental wrenching of everything they have been fed for 60 years.

The first point that stands out about what is necessary, therefore, is that, on the one hand, only deep surgery will work, and, on the other, there are almost insuperable difficulties in attempting it. The second feature is just as evident: even if it were to be attempted, such a solution will take one generation, if not two. And, third, neither the rulers of Pakistan nor the West — in particular not the US — have that far a horizon.

True, civil society has to be strengthened, the reasoning in the West is liable to go. But we need the army today, and the army feels that a strengthened civil society will necessarily weaken its hold... True, all these basic reforms should be initiated over the long run, the reasoning will go, but the army has to be humoured today — let us postpone these reforms till tomorrow — why not first start a pilot-project and see how things work out... And as the army will not be humoured by arms needed to fight the terrorists, we must give it the arms it wants — F16s if F16s are what they want — is it any surprise that of the eleven billion dollars that have been given to Pakistan as ‘aid’ since 9/11 by the US alone, only one billion are reported to have gone for ‘development’? Is it any surprise that, while military aid has been given ostensibly for fighting the Al Qaeda in the mountains, much of it has consisted of weapons systems that enhance Pakistan’s offensive capacities vis a vis a country like India?

This is exactly what the nostrums that are being pedalled today show once again. You must hold elections as you promised, Bush tells Musharraf. We can be quite confident that exactly that was Musharraf’s preferred option even when he was giving in to American pressure and striking a deal with Benazir. Get her to sign the deal. That will at once break the political configuration that the Charter of Democracy presaged. Then do the customary thing: rig the elections so that no party, certainly not Benazir’s PPP, wins an outright majority. The new ‘civilian’ government will then have to take your own surrogates on board. And you could certainly tell Benazir, “With a hung assembly, what can I do? I can’t amend the Constitution to remove the bar on your becoming PM for a third time...” Musharraf would have had little difficulty in ensuring this outcome — his Election Commission had already begun the process: the number of voters had suddenly fallen by several million, by so many that the number of voters for the elections scheduled for 2008 was less than the ones that were there in 2002; that the electoral rolls would have to be ‘corrected’ at top speed would give the agencies and the army all the opportunity they needed for ‘correcting’ them correctly! There would have been no difficulty, it is just that a random variable barged in, the chief justice and the suddenly independent court!

You have to give up your uniform, Bush tells Musharraf. Assume he does so, and Benazir becomes PM. As Wilson John and others have remarked, she will be one of a trio — Musharraf and Kiyani, the army chief, will be the two other members. She will almost certainly be kept out of the vital areas — foreign policy, in particular everything concerning relations with the West, India and Afghanistan; the fight against terrorists; nuclear weapons... This, after all, is exactly what was done in the past — and not just with her. In any event, the provision that allows the president to dismiss the elected government — Article 58(2) of the Constitution — would be still on the statute book, indeed it has been formalised once again in Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order — the precise provision that was used by a previous president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, to dismiss Benazir earlier. Even if none of this comes to pass, and the trio comes to function, she, or in her stead some other civilian prime minister, will be the weakest of the three. As has been rightly pointed out, to stand up to the president, she/he will have to seek the help of the army chief. Even if she/he gets this help, the hold of the army over governance will be reinforced. And yet, everyone is fixated on, ‘you have to give up your uniform,’ as if it were a sovereign remedy.

Thus, the ‘solutions’ that are being pushed are liable to turn out to be merely pro-forma. Others are liable to be worse. One of the problems always is that those who have a particular thing make themselves believe that that thing will turn the trick. Those who have superior technology think that technology will solve the problem — witness Iraq. Those who have money think that money will solve the problem: announcements from Washington suggest that $750 million are to be pumped into the NWFP and FATA to ‘develop’ them; as Jagmohan has documented in the case of Kashmir, as K.P.S. Gill has pointed out in the case of left-wing violence and other insurgencies, we can be certain that the funds will end up with the terrorist groups and will finance the insurgency further.

The other nostrum — ‘modernise madrassas’, introduce science, computers, English — will fare no better. Quite the contrary. As Ajai Sahni writes, such steps will only help close a ‘competence-deficiency’. Today the would-be graduate of these institutions has some difficulty, for instance, in blending into the country he is tasked to target. Having been taught English, being familiar with science and modern technologies, he will be all the better able to use those technologies, he will be better able to blend into western societies for carrying out the operations for which he has been primed.

Hence, there is every likelihood that pseudo-reforms will be pushed, and little likelihood of the fundamental reforms that are required. At each turn, the latter set of reforms will be begun nominally, and soon postponed to the indefinite future. And every step that will be taken to put existing realities to work will only reinforce the current configuration.

The other development that is likely in the coming two or three years, if not sooner, will be even more consequential for us. American and NATO forces will retreat — from both Afghanistan and Iraq. They will retreat in defeat. We must bear in mind that American forces did not lose a single engagement in Vietnam. Yet they had to retreat. The Soviet forces did not lose a single engagement in Afghanistan. Yet they had to retreat.

This retreat will provide a tremendous boost to fundamentalist forces. While they will continue to try to penetrate the US as well as target American installations abroad, their immediate targets are likely to be one or two regimes in the Middle Eastern — regimes that have thus far been buying security by exporting revolutionary impulses; Europe — which is still caught in effete notions of political correctness, and in which there now is a quantum of population that is large enough to be a political force, as well as to contain within it the few who will be hosts to and provide members for fundamentalist cells: intelligence sources state that volunteers who left for training in Iraq and Pakistan are now returning for carrying out operations in Europe itself. But the most likely of all potential targets will be soft states like India.

That is the prospect for which we must prepare — a Pakistan the nature of whose society does not change, and a triumphalist extremism.

A host of steps is necessary for meeting that prospect — from shedding the perverse nonsense that leads so many to lionise those who assault our country: witness the campaigns for Afzal Beg; to exhuming the ideological bases of Islamic extremism; to showing up the pretensions of ‘Islamic states’ — how come, as Pervez Hoodbhoy, the Pakistani physicist asks, that such states are among the richest in the world and yet their work in science and technology is so far behind? How come, as Maulana Wahiduddin has asked, while it is claimed again and again that no religion gives as exalted a place to women as Islam does, the position of women in every Islamic state is woeful? For exhuming the ideological bases and nailing such pretensions to reviving the Northern Alliance so that, even if the Taliban win, they remain busy within Afghanistan; to supporting groups that are struggling for the most elementary rights in POK, in Gilgit-Baltistan, in the northern territories of Pakistan; to ensuring honest and effective governance in Kashmir... first we have to clear our minds. First we have to give up what has become our fixed policy — hoping that something will turn up.

Till then, let us be clear, the best possible outcome for us, one for which we can do little, is that a discredited and besieged Musharraf continues in office — so that the fount of decisions remains preoccupied with his own problems. And that the Pakistan army remains encoiled in protracted and bloody hostilities with the extremists that it and ISI, and so on, have reared — so that the trust and working alliance between them is ruptured. If prayers are to be the only policy we are capable of, pray for these, not for democracy!

Pakistan beyond Musharraf II



Arun Shourie: Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Half of Pakistan’s territory is slipping out of the writ of Islamabad.

Pakistan has lost control over half its territory. In all probability it will regain that control at some time in the future. But the fact that half of the country’s territory is today outside the writ of the Pakistani state shows how far things have been allowed to fall.

Information that reaches India suggests that the troubles in Balochistan are much worse than what becomes public knowledge — a determined effort has been made to black out what is happening there. In the northwest, the Maliks and Khans were already losing out to the Taliban — the latter had begun replacing them even in governmental committees, a better way to route outlays to itself. Since then, these persons as well as the political mullahs through whom the area was being controlled have come to be viewed as instruments of the enemy. Hence, administration has crumbled. Two ‘accords’ and a third attempted ‘accord’ have come to nothing. Each ‘accord’ was seen as, and was in fact an acknowledgement that the Pakistani army was not able to contain the situation: in the Miramshah Accord, for instance, the most recent one to unravel, the tribals agreed not to attack Pakistani troops in return for the withdrawal of troops from the region. And in return for tribals being allowed to continue to bear arms, the government agreed to release 165 tribal militants and provide handsome ‘compensation’. Each ‘accord’ has been terminated at the will of the tribals and the army has been able to do nothing in the matter.

The sway of the Taliban has now spread to FATA. In this region, the three agencies most affected are south Waziristan, north Waziristan and Bajaur. But Talibanisation has started spreading from FATA to the adjacent ‘settled districts’ of NWFP. In places like Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Swat, and so on, the Taliban roam the streets freely and enforce their ‘values’. Barber shops and video parlours have been shut down. Men are required to grow beards. Music is banned. Girls have been prohibited from attending school: ‘the card’ is a dread — a postcard is delivered at the house with the photograph of a severed head on one side, and, on the other, a simple note: ‘your daughter XYZ, goes to school ABC, located at...’ Parents have to take their child out of school or risk her life or swiftly dispatch her to some other town...

To confound matters, the only instrument through which the areas could be retrieved, the army, is showing signs of strain. It has suffered major casualties and embarrassing reverses. In a series of the most telling events, large numbers of soldiers have ‘surrendered’. In the first instance, close to 300 were reported to have been ‘kidnapped’. They were led by a colonel at the time. There were four officers among them. Not one casualty occurred. The whole lot just got ‘kidnapped’ or they surrendered. Since then, the sequence has been repeated at least twice — with two differences: the tribals called the media over to photograph the soldiers they had captured, and, after making them swear never to fight fellow Muslims again, released them.

By now, the problem is structural. That is, it is not just the mistake of a Musharraf. A quarter of Pakistan’s army consists of Pashtuns. Not just that, major operations are being carried out by the Frontier Corps. This consists of locally recruited Pashtun soldiers, officered by Punjabi army officers. On the other side, earlier, the fighting was largely being done by foreign militants — Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs. They were being supported by the Taliban. Now it appears that entire tribes and sub-tribes are rising in revolt against the army. Pashtun soldiers are chary of fighting persons from their own tribe, and just as nervous of fighting Pashtuns from other sub-tribes or tribes, for they know that doing so could well trigger a cycle of revenge, a cycle that will last for generations. Nor would sending units of Punjabis help matters: quite the contrary, doing so would transform the hostilities into an ethnic conflict — Punjabis killing Pashtuns will stoke the flames even more vigorously.

But this development should not cause surprise, as my friend, Sushant Sareen, who follows developments in our neighbours almost by the hour, points out. The army is itself steeped in the culture of jihad, and so will naturally be reluctant to kill those who are, after all, sacrificing their lives in jihad. Even in 1971, the situation was not as grave from a soldier’s point of view as it is now: in that war, he, a Punjabi, was killing Bengalis. Today Pashtuns are being set to kill Pashtuns. Moreover, unlike the Bengalis in 1971, these groups fight back: they are well-armed; they are very well trained; their motivation is stronger than that of even the indoctrinated Pakistani soldier; they are masters of their terrain; they are not ‘primitives’. On the contrary, they are extremely sophisticated in their tactics and strategy.

Could there be more than just morale here? Could it be that because of its pervasive involvement in the economy and administration, because of the enormous collateral perquisites that are given to officers — from plots to control of ‘heavy’ enterprises — the army, in particular its officer class, has softened? The performance of the army in Kargil, in Balochistan and now in NWFP certainly suggests that this is possible. The main debility, however, is different: the army has been reared to kill and prevail over ‘imbecile kafirs’, and it must balk at killing fellow Muslims.

It is often suggested that after 9/11 and his decision to join the American war, Musharraf cleaned out the bearded generals. He may have shunted out some individuals. But the American war and joining it have certainly put the ‘moderates’ in the army on the defensive. The Islamists have been proven right. One minor indication of this was visible in the Lal Masjid incident. Here is a mosque not in the far away, wild tribal areas, but in Islamabad itself. The entire country is under army rule. The ISI as well as intelligence agencies of the army itself are in each nook and cranny of the country. How could such a vast armoury have been accumulated in the mosque and the adjacent madrassa without the complicity of elements inside these organisations?

So, we have, on the one hand, half the territory going out of the writ of Islamabad, and, on the other, the one instrument through which it would have to be wrested back, drooping.

To compound matters, the Taliban are a very different force from what they used to be. They have metamorphosed. Their modus operandi are now very different from what they were: as has been correctly noted, today, Pakistan is second only to Iraq in suicide attacks. Similarly, the Taliban used to hit and run. Now they engage in extended, fixed battles. More important, the aim of the Taliban now is not that of a local militant group. Nor, as Sushant Sareen writes, is their aim to undo Pakistan. Their aim is to take over Pakistan and Afghanistan, at least large parts of these. And from these areas as a base, to carry forward the jihad to convert lands farther and farther away that are today the dar ul harb into the dar ul Islam. Hence, there can be no doubt at all that, after consolidating their position in the trans-Indus regions, they will extend their ideology and operations into Punjab and Sindh. And recent attacks and explosions show that they already have the capacity to reach into the very heart of Pakistan. Incidentally, this has been a major strategic mistake of the West, one of many that is, to have shut its eyes to the fact that the Taliban was getting revived and transformed, and, instead, to have allowed itself to be diverted by the few ‘Al Qaida’ operatives that Pakistan has from time to time handed over.

There is an even more ominous transformation for Pakistan: the Islamic zeal of Taliban has got fused into Pashtun nationalism. Few of us realise that while there are 12 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan, there are 25 million in Pakistan. Historically, leadership has rested with the Afghan Pashtuns. But this is shifting to Pak-Pashtuns now — contrast the sway of warlords in FATA and NWFP with the shrunken, tenuous existence of Karzai: they roam freely, they dominate their areas while Karzai is confined to Kabul, and, even within Kabul, he is dependent on the Americans for even his personal safety. The Pashtuns have never accepted the Durand Line as a divide. Successive jihads — first against the Soviets and now against the Americans — have erased it on the ground. Even de jure, no Afghan government, not even the Taliban government that was the creature of Pakistani agencies, accepted it. In any case, the hundred years for which it was delineated are long gone. The Afghans have long demanded that the line should be further south, as far south in fact as Attock.

A potent mix: a Taliban fired by the zeal to establish Islam by fomenting the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ that others dread; Pashtun nationalism demanding a Pakhtunistan with territory from both Afghanistan and Pakistan; a quarter of Pakistan’s army and almost all of the Frontier Corps deployed in the region, Pashtun. And that is just one problem in one arena.

Today, even as the Pakistani army is sent out to combat them in FATA and NWFP, Pakistan continues to aid the Taliban in their forays into Afghanistan. And for the obvious reason: it is convinced — who would not be? — that the NATO forces, in particular the Americans will leave sooner rather than later; Pakistan would want its agents to take over Kabul and thus reacquire the ‘strategic depth’ vis a vis India, the acquiring of which a few years ago it had hailed as one of the greatest feats of its strategic planning. But Pakistan is not the only source from which the Taliban get aid. Information we receive suggests that, though they are fervent Sunnis, they are getting help even from Shia Iran. And for this too the reasons are obvious: for Iran today, any and every group that will hobble the US today is a confederate; second, while they are at it, Iran wants them to eliminate those of its dissidents who have taken shelter in southwestern Afghanistan. More than the aid they receive, the Taliban today have become self-financing: as has been pointed out in General Afsir Khan’s important journal Aakrosh, the Taliban are being much more nuanced about opium and heroin this time round. In their earlier reign, they had banned hashish, not heroin, as the former is what the locals were consuming. This time round they are allowing greater latitude in regard to both as they have realised that drugs provide income to farmers and thus relieve the Taliban of a responsibility, and at the same time, the produce are an unfailing source of revenue. Contrast this with the dilemma that hobbles American and NATO forces: they are not able to provide alternative sources either for employment or for income to the local population but if they stamp out opium cultivation, they alienate farmers; on the other hand, if they allow it to grow, they help finance the Taliban.

Thus, Pakistan is today feeding with one hand the Taliban it seeks to crush with the other; second, the Taliban receive aid and acquire resources from other quarters. But the main problem is different and goes deeper. With what legitimacy can the government in NWFP, FATA, Islamabad crush them? All that the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Mohammadi is demanding, after all, is that the shariah be enforced: with what face can parties that have come to power in the name of Islam in NWFP — the religious parties — crush them for this? Indeed, Pakistan having been proclaimed an Islamic state, shariah courts having been set up since Zia’s time, with what legitimacy can Islamabad move to crush the cleric who is enforcing the shariah in FATA? As it moves to kill them in any case, Musharraf’s army becomes an instrument of ‘the enemies of Islam’.

That problem goes beyond Musharraf and his army. It permeates every pore of Pakistan. Pakistan having declared itself to be an ‘Islamic state’, the ‘moderates’ on whom the West rests its hopes, as do the wishful in India, just cannot stand up to the mullahs: the latter have to merely keep reciting verses from the Quran and repeating hadis; they have merely to ask, as they do at every turn, “if the object was to establish Pakistan as a secular state, as a state indifferent to Islam, as one in which not the shariah but some alien law shall rule, what was the point of creating Pakistan, what was the point of partitioning India?” “How can preaching religion be terrorism?” they demand. Moreover, the ‘moderate’ politicians are themselves seen as nothing but, as has been correctly observed, ‘democrats of convenience’ — for each of them without exception has in the past turned to and been propped up by the army and ISI. Each has been as corrupt as the other. Each has turned to and struck deals with religious fundamentalists — and this includes not just Musharraf in whom our commentators discern so much secularism; it includes Nawaz Sharif and Benazir. The lawyers did not keep politicians away from their agitation without reason.

In a word, the Taliban are not the cause of the Talibanisation of Pakistani society. They are the result. The madrassas are not the only ones that indoctrinate their wards in extremism; as the excellent studies by the Pakistani historian K.K. Aziz in the early 1990s, and by Islamabad’s Sustainable Development Policy Institute more recently have shown, government schools indoctrinate students no less — from class 2 onwards — in the blessings and glory that accrue from jihad and shahadat.

It is obvious that Musharraf’s ‘emergency’ has had nothing whatsoever to do with the real problems that Pakistan faces. First, he has contributed as much to inflaming them as anyone. Second, if terrorism in the NWFP and FATA are the target, why remove the judges? Why throw human rights activists into jails? Third, look at what he and his ministers began saying the moment Bush and others called him: elections in February 2008, of course I will give up my uniform, ‘emergency’ will be ended within weeks — is it any one’s case that the tribals in NWFP and FATA will be brought to heel in a few weeks?

So, his ‘emergency’ has been just to save himself from the Supreme Court. But equally, for the kinds of reasons enumerated above, removing him is not going to solve the problems in which Pakistan finds itself today. Most certainly not for India.

For Pakistan is today a dictatorship in the grip of the army and ISI because of the neglect of institutions over sixty years. Pakistan is today a Talibanised society as the culmination of a choice it made sixty years ago — of being an Islamic state. Once the dust kicked up by Musharraf settles, whoever is in power in Islamabad will gravitate to the old, accustomed conclusion: there is only one way of coping with the jihadis — deflect them to India...

Where have all the general’s cheerleaders gone? I



Arun Shourie: Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Ulti ho gayin sab tadbirein, kuchch na dawa ne kaam kiya — every stratagem has boomeranged, no potion works. That’s Pervez Musharraf’s predicament today, writes Arun Shourie in a three-part series on Pakistan beginning today


The only persons who could have been surprised by what Musharraf has done are the Americans - who had invested everything in him, and as a consequence just would not see - and Musharraf’s acolytes here in India. Here is one of the most deceitful men we have had to deal with. It is not just that he was the architect of Kargil. Here is a general who insisted that the Pakistani army had nothing to do with Kargil, so much so that he did one of the most dishonourable things that any armyman can do: he refused to accept bodies of soldiers who had died in the operation he had himself planned. And yet the same man claims in his book that Kargil was one of the most successful operations of the Pakistani army! Here is a man who has repeatedly dishonoured his word — pledged to the people of Pakistan, to its courts — about sticking to his office. Here is a man who has repeatedly issued decrees exempting himself from law, from his pledged word. Here, then, has been a personification of deceit. And yet, what a buildup he has had in India — eulogising him has been almost a fashion-statement among many Indian journalists.

And not just among journalists. The very highest in this government allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Americans that we should do something that would strengthen Musharraf, as he was the best, it would seem the only option for us. Of course, they were nudged into accepting American ‘advice’ by that one mental ability they have in abundance — the ability to conjure wishfulfilling thoughts, thoughts that exempt them from standing the ground. This combination — American ‘theses’ and conjured rationalisations — led them to almost make a grand gesture of Siachin to bolster Musharraf, and yet again buy ‘peace in our time’, and that too under the exact camouflage that an American think-tank had stitched up. We have to thank Musharraf: by the morass he has created for himself, he has saved us from our do-gooders.

Yet his cleverness had convinced me long ago about the pass he would reach. For, in the end, few things do a ruler in as surely as cleverness. This is especially so when cleverness is combined with audacity, the ‘commando’s audacity’ that so many among our chatterati came to admire in Musharraf. For this audacity spurs the person to, among other things, lie outright. Soon, though not soon enough, karma catches up. A stage arrives when everything such a ruler does, recoils.

If he moves against the Taliban, he is in trouble. If he does not, he is in trouble. If he does not let American forces chase the Taliban into Pakistani territory, he is in trouble. If he lets them do so, he is in deeper trouble. If he does not storm the Lal Masjid, he is in trouble. If he does, he is in deeper trouble. If he does not remove the chief justice, he is in trouble. If he removes him, his troubles are just beginning. If he gives up his uniform, he can’t rely on the army. If he does not, he can’t rely either on his nemesis, the Supreme Court, or his sole prop, the Americans. If he lets Nawaz Sharif stay, he is in trouble. If he does not, he is in trouble. If he rigs elections again, he has to rely even more on the religious parties and fundamentalists, and he falls deeper in trouble. If he does not rig them, he is finished. Unless he throws the judges out, he is out. Now that he has thrown them out, even his patrons are insisting he bring them back — ulti ho gayin sab tadbirein — every stratagem has boomeranged — kuchch na dawa ne kaam kiya — no potion works!

Once a ruler reaches this pit, anyone and everyone who associates with him, gets tarnished. Americans and Musharraf got conflated: Musharraf came to be seen as the stooge of the Americans; Americans came to be seen as the ventriloquists. Whatever he did was attributed to them: ‘He could do none of this but for the fact that the Americans are behind him.’ And whatever the Americans did came to be pasted on him. As they came to be seen to be waging an out-and-out war against Islam, he came to be seen as the instrument of the enemies of Islam. Convinced, though, they have remained that he is indispensable for them, even the Americans came to realise the heavy cost that association with him was bringing upon them. But the Chinese came to suffer too: they were seen to have been the immediate trigger for the assault on the Lal Masjid, as it followed the kidnapping of Chinese women on the charge that they were running a brothel in Islamabad. (For their part, the Chinese have been increasingly concerned about the Uighurs who have been receiving training in Pakistani madrassas and terrorist camps.) The Saudis too, were shocked by the wave of resentment that hit them upon their being parties to the deportation of Nawaz Sharif. This was one of the main reasons for their subsequent decision to endorse Sharif’s proposal that he return.

And so did everyone within Pakistan who was associated with Musharraf. The ‘Q’ in the name of the faction of the Muslim League that had walked over to him — the PML-Q — came to stand not for ‘Quaid’ after Jinnah, but for an abuse. Look at Benazir till the attack on her procession. She lost heavily when it became known that she had struck a deal with Musharraf. Of course, the ignominy was compounded by two factors: as the deal was seen to have been authored by the Americans, it was contaminated from the very start. Worse, it became known that Benazir had been negotiating terms with Musharraf even as she was signing the Charter of Democracy with Nawaz Sharif — a charter in which both of them pledged that they would never have anything to do with a military dictator. It is only the attack on her procession, and the subsequent snuffing out of the Constitution that has helped restore some of her reputation. But no institution has suffered as much by association with Musharraf as the army: as he came to be seen as the instrument of the enemy, the army, which he controlled, came to be seen as the instrument of the instrument of the enemy...

What a pass for a ruler to reach.

And rulers are brought to this pass by their own stratagems. No ruler after Zia ul Haq gave as big a boost to religious parties and to terrorist groups as Musharraf. It is because of the way he rigged the assembly and provincial elections and the alliance he formed with them that the religious parties — which used to get 5 to 7 per cent of the popular vote — got to form governments in NWFP as well as Balochistan, and to become such a significant factor in the National Assembly. The consequence was as predictable as it has been disastrous. With governance in the hands of religious parties, for instance, the Taliban and Al Qaida acquired an open field in NWFP, and from there into FATA.

Similarly, his premise — one that he set out in as many words — that jihad is an instrument of state policy, and the way he patronised and facilitated terrorism in Kashmir, for instance, has had the same consequence. In her recent study, The Counterterror Coalitions, Cooperation with Pakistan and India, Christine Fair puts it well: one consequence of the jihad in Kashmir and that for the acquisition of Afghanistan, she writes, has been that ‘the concept of jihad has attained an unassailable stature,’ and ‘the political capital’ of groups engaged in it has multiplied several fold. And you can see the end result, even for Musharraf: recall the way he and his government remained paralysed for months in the face of what was being done in and around Lal Masjid. Second, she points out, it has meant that organised criminal groups have been able to extend their operations and reach within Pakistan itself under the banner of jihad. Third, over the past few years, new alliances and coalitions have come to be formed among the various groups. The operational consequence of the latter is just as evident, and it is one of the things that eventually led even his patrons in the US to conclude that he was not doing enough to curb terrorists: when the US or NATO allies were told that steps had indeed been taken against the terrorist groups whom they wanted brought to heel, they were soon disillusioned. And for the obvious reason: when one of the groups was targeted, all that its members had to do was to shift to the adjacent group in the coalition.

Two other features broke through during the last few months: that Musharraf was losing control, and that he had lost touch with what was happening. As for the first, recall how, for months and months, fundamentalists from the Northwest could go on piling up arms in the Lal Masjid right in Islamabad — and the military dictator with all his intelligence agencies should not have known. As for losing touch, recall how gravely Musharraf misjudged the way the public would react to the sacking of the chief justice.

Lessons for us

There has been a veritable industry in India urging concessions: when Pakistan or a ruler of Pakistan has appeared strong, when terrorism sponsored by it and him has been at its murderous height, concessions have been urged on the ground, “but how long can we live with a permanently hostile neighbour?” When he has been facing difficulties, the same concessions have been urged on the ground, “he is our best bet.” Such specious reasoning has almost prevailed when we have had, as we have now, a weak and delusional government, a government that does not have the grit to stay the course; when we have a government over which suggestions from abroad have sway of the kind they have today; when we have a government the higher reaches of which are as bereft of experience in national security affairs as in the government today. We must never sacrifice a national interest in the delusion that someone is the ‘best bet’ — he will soon be gone, and our interest would have been sacrificed in perpetuity. Nor should we ever sacrifice an interest in the delusion that doing so will assuage that ruler, country or ‘movement’.

The concession will only whet his appetite. To the ruler/country/movement, it will be proof that he can extract the next capitulation. Second, we should think for ourselves, and not be led by others, howsoever powerful they may be. One of the great strategic blunders of the US in regard to its ‘War on Terrorism’ has been to have believed, indeed to have proclaimed, that Musharraf is indispensable. The consequence has been predictable. Their having come to think of him as indispensable, Musharraf has done what suited him, not that war: look at the selective way in which he went after the terrorists. He first targeted only the Al Qaida in whom the Americans were interested; then, those who targeted him; then those who targeted the Pakistani state. The organisations that he, his army, the ISI had reared for breaking India, he left alone. The Americans had to shut their eyes. “You are putting all your eggs in one basket,” they were told. “But there aren’t that many baskets in Pakistan,” they said. Soon, they got their desserts too, and twice over. First, as was noted above, given the fungibility among such groups, the former set of terrorists had just to don the garb of the latter and continue to recruit, to rearm, to regroup. And then, Musharraf having come to be seen as merely their stooge, he couldn’t keep the system going — for them any more than for himself. In a word, powers, howsoever well endowed, can be dead wrong in their assessment even of their own interest. In any event, it is their own interest they shall be pursuing. Their own interest as perceived by a handful. Their own interest as perceived by a handful at that moment.

Today Saddam is good because he is a counter to Iran; tomorrow he is evil. Today the Taliban are mujahideen, freedom fighters, as they are necessary for throwing the Soviets out; tomorrow they are evil. Today the Kurds are good as a counter to Sunnis in Iraq; tomorrow they are evil as the fellows are dragging Turkey into the arena... This is not to blame the Americans or anyone else: through such twists and turns they are merely pursuing their interest. The lesson is for us: how very wrong, how very shortsighted it would be for us to outsource our thinking to others.

The even more important lesson is illustrated vividly by the relief we have had in Kashmir in the last few months days. As Balochistan, NWFP, and now FATA have flared up, Pakistan has had to withdraw its troops and other resources from its border with India to its western border. The killings and explosions in Kashmir have gone down. Just a coincidence?

Now notice two things. First, as Pakistan has had to move its troops away from the border with Kashmir, an orchestra has started in India demanding that we thin our troops in Kashmir: just another coincidence? Second, recall the ‘remedies’ that our secularists have been urging — ‘autonomy’ and the rest. “The Kashmiris feel alienated,” they have been declaiming. “That is the root-cause of terrorism... give them autonomy...” A formula-factory came into being: ‘Musharraf’s 7-regions’ formula...’

None of those ‘solutions’ has been put in place. Yet, the killings have gone down. Which is the medicine that has worked? The potion — ‘autonomy’ — we did not administer? Or the medicine that Pakistan has administered to itself? That it has got into trouble on its western borders? A lesson there...

‘Strategic partnership’ without a strategy



Arun Shourie: Sunday, August 19, 2007

123 PACT:a It is not the way to energy security; the way to that is to develop our own hydroelectric resources, to redouble our uranium mining, to redouble our work on fast-breeder reactors, on thorium

The one point on which there seems to be an advance is in regard to reprocessing spent fuel—alas, that too comes with caveats. The US has given us consent to process this in a dedicated facility that we are to set up, and which is to be under IAEA safeguards. But the same Article that grants us this consent provides that “the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility”.

The steps that this latter bit shall entail have been spelled out by Nicholas Burns—both during his briefing to the press on 27 July 2007, and during his interaction with the Council on Foreign Relations. During his briefing of the press on 27 July, 2007, Burns said, “Both of us—the United States and India—have granted each other consent to reprocess spent fuel”—that genuflection is nothing but a gesture to enable our Government to maintain that we have fulfilled the PM’s ‘principle of reciprocity’—the US has been reprocessing spent fuel without our consent for decades! “To bring this reprocessing into effect requires that India would first establish a new national facility under IAEA safeguards dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material. Our two countries will also subsequently agree on a set of arrangements and procedures under which reprocessing will take place. And for those of you who are steeped in this, you know that that’s called for by Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.”

In his interaction with the Council on Foreign Relations, he again pointed out that “US law states that while we can promise reprocessing consent rights, we have to negotiate a subsequent agreement. We will do that and Congress will have the right to review that agreement”.

That is, we will set up a dedicated facility under IAEA safeguards. Arrangements and procedures for using it will have to be agreed upon with the US which shall be bound by its national laws, policies, licence requirements. This new agreement, when it is made, shall be submitted to the US Congress for approval. Hence, while here we have a step forward, we have to see where it lands us by the time the sequence is completed even in regard to this one step.

The rationalisation

The rationalisation for the deal that as typical as it would be consequential if only it were true was first put out in the initial stages by K. Subramaniam. He wrote, “Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorise as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium production.”

Such rationalisations became an inconvenience for those who were lobbying for the deal in Washington: see, Senators like Senator Dorgan pointed out, Indians will use what they get from us to increase their weapons arsenal. Little was left of it after the Hyde Act was passed--the possibility was firmly scotched. And, therefore, I was doubly surprised to hear the rationalisation in a briefing from one of the highest persons: this Agreement, he emphasised more than once, gives ‘greater manoeuverability’ in regard to our weapons programme: we can use the imported uranium for electricity generation; this will leave our own uranium entirely free for our weapons programme.

What an—given the eminence of the person concerned, how should I put it?—innocent ruse! In fact, the Hyde Act specifically and emphatically directs US Executive to scotch this prospect.

It states explicitly that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains the vital objective, and that for this purpose, capping, rolling back, and eventually eliminating our nuclear weapons capability is the instrument. The idea of the exercise is to put heavy economic incentives in the country’s way so that, as Section 102(6)c puts it, India will “refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program”. The next Section begins by stating that the policy of the US is to “Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT”; in South Asia to “Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China”—China, not being part of South Asia, had surely been thrown in just for cosmetic effect; to “halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination”; furthermore, “Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium, or the treaty, encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities”. Towards these ends, Section 104c(2)(D) requires the President to provide “(D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty”.

These requirements are reinforced in the Section by binding the President to ensure that, in accordance with obligations of the US under the NPT, the US does nothing in cooperating with “a country that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices”.

Accordingly, the US President must provide the US Congress—(F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear cooperation with India is in any way assisting India’s nuclear weapons program, including through—

(i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;

(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United States technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and

(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased production by India of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;

(G) a detailed description of—

(i) United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;

(ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts.

Where is the scope for that ‘greater manoeuverability’ which our educators at the highest level tried to inveigle us into believing?

Won’t let American inspectors roam around

Persons like me had drawn attention to the fact that, under what was being agreed to, we would have to accept not just IAEA safeguards and inspections, but, in addition, inspections by teams of US inspectors. American Congressmen as well as officials like the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had been completely candid about this: we will ensure ‘fall-back’ safeguards, they declared time and again. I cited these declarations in the Rajya Sabha.

The Prime Minister was emphatic. He said, “There is no question of India signing either a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a type concluded by Non Nuclear Weapon States who have signed the NPT. We will not accept any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those contained in an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Therefore there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities.”

That last bit, “Therefore there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities,” drew loud applause from Government benches. Encouraged, the Prime Minister repeated this determination on more than one occasion.

That was in August 2006. Come December, and in Section 104 (B)(5)(A)(III), the US Congress provided:

“(iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason.”

Exactly the “fall-back safeguards” that they had declared they would ensure. And what does the 123 Agreement provide? Article 10(4) states, “If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.” This is to be read with Article 12(3) which states, “When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organisations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.” Inspectors become ‘experts’—and the assurance is fulfilled!

Even that is not the end of the matter. Article 16(3) provides, “Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.”

Thus, if even a little bit of the equipment, material, etc. are left behind, not just IAEA safeguards but in addition the right of the US to act on the fallback safeguards shall continue. It shall continue even if the 123 Agreement itself expires. It shall continue even if India withdraws from the Agreement. Read again the words with which this Article opens: “Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement.”

And yet the Prime Minister says in his new statement, “There is no change in our position that we would accept only IAEA safeguards on our civilian nuclear facilities.”

And do you recall what is provided in that other 123 Agreement—between US and China? “Noting that such cooperation is between two Nuclear Weapon States”, the Agreement begins, and again in Article 8(2), “The parties recognise that this cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is between two Nuclear Weapon States and that bilateral safeguards are NOT required.”

That is why the Government was so wrong in trying to scoff away our pointing to the insistence with which US spokesmen were declaring that India was NOT being recognised as a Nuclear Weapon State: its spokesmen insinuated time and again that we seemed to be stuck on a question of prestige! The fact was, and is that American insistence on this matter was directed at achieving vital practical consequences. The consequences are now upon us. And the Government is left redoubling its untruths.

Conclusion

On every other matter—testing; the effects on our strategic programme; ‘India specific safeguards’—the PM has repeated the assertions he has advanced in the past. They remain as misleading. The deal is not the way to energy security—the way to that is to develop our own hydroelectric resources, to redouble our uranium mining, to redouble our work on fast-breeder reactors, on thorium.

To make this deal the fulcrum of closer Indo-American relations too is a blunder. And the reason the Government has blundered is manifest: it has got swept off—should that be ‘flattered off’—its feet by talk of ‘strategic partnership’ without having a strategy. By the time the consequences of its details became evident, the deal had become a matter of ego and prestige. Hence, this uncharacteristic tenacity.

(Concluded)

Forward-looking farce


Arun Shourie: Saturday, August 18, 2007

123 Pact: Deal binds India to Hyde Act whose main objective is to ‘halt, roll back and eventually eliminate’ India’s nuclear capability


On March 7, 2007, while introducing the Separation Plan, the prime minister told Parliament that the US had assured India that we would have access to uninterrupted supplies of fuel throughout the lifetime of the reactors that we would place under safeguards — both from the US and from other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Elaborating on this assurance — the absolutely critical assurance on the basis of which the government justified placing two-thirds of our reactors under safeguards at the very beginning — the prime minister said: “To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India, the United States is prepared to take other additional steps, such as:

a) Incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would be negotiated; b) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement; c) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors, and; d) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.”

Prime minister or no prime minister, our Parliament or no Parliament, the US Congress completely stamped out this string of assurances:

— It scotched the PM’s assurance about “strategic reserves” — reserves on which we could fall back in the event of not just normal disruption of market supplies, but sanctions — as happened in the case of Tarapur — by specifying in Section 103(b)(10): “Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements”.

As for the PM’s assurance about joining India in convening a meeting of other suppliers to restore fuel supplies in the event of a disruption, the US Congress inserted not one, but five provisions in the Hyde Act to direct the US Government to ensure that, should the US stop supplies of fuel to India — for instance, in the event of India testing a nuclear device — no other member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) shall supply fuel to India.

To give just one string of examples, the US Congress enacted in the Hyde Act:

1. Section 102 (13): “The United States should NOT seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under United States law”

2. Section 103 (4): “Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved”

3. Section 103(6): “Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law”.

“Not seek to facilitate or encourage...,” ... “Institute the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members...,”... “Seek to prevent...”. What could be more emphatic? What could be clearer? But our Micawbers kept us hoping: “Something will turn up. We are not bound by a US law. The assurances will be in the 123 Agreement. That is all we will be bound by.”

We now have the 123 Agreement. It shows in the clearest possible terms that the US government has not moved a millimetre from its position about granting access to no more than the fuel that is required for the “operating requirements” of the reactors. For what do we read in the 123 Agreement? Here is Article 5 (6) (B) of the Agreement. Please do read it to see how smoke is fed into our eyes by this government:

To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

“The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress.”

But this is the 123 Agreement! In which future 123 Agreement will the US incorporate that assurance?

The Article continues:

“The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.”

“The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”

“If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.”

To enable the Indian government to save face, the words have just been cut and pasted. And in his new statement to Parliament, the prime minister hails this as an achievement: “The Agreement reiterates in toto the corresponding portions of the Separation Plan,” he says. Right! What was to have been assured in the 123 Agreement has been left to be assured in the 123 Agreement!

The Americans have already nailed that particular claim. The chief negotiator for the US, Nicholas Burns, was asked this very question during his interaction with the Council on Foreign Relations on 2 August, 2007. He was asked, “Some say that under the deal, if India holds a nuclear weapons test, the US would delay its own nuclear fuel supplies to India but the US would help India find other sources of fuel, which violates the spirit of the Hyde Act. What do you say to those concerns?” And he answered, “That’s absolutely false. I negotiated the agreement and we preserved intact the responsibility of the President under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that if India or any other country conducts a nuclear test, the President — he or she at that time in the future — will have the right to ask for the return of the nuclear fuel or nuclear technologies that have been transferred by American firms. That right is preserved wholly in the agreement.”

So, we remain at what the Hyde Act provides, “operating requirements”, and some assistance against “market disruptions”. And that too to be enshrined in some future 123 Agreement. But on the basis of such postponement, the prime minister claims, “Hon’ble Members will agree that these provisions will ensure that there is no repeat of our unfortunate experience with Tarapur.”

A very sad affair

There is just no end to such subterfuges — and that they should have been put out by the very person with whom the country associates honesty, makes it all a very sad affair.

“This Agreement further confirms that US cooperation with India is a permanent one,” the prime minister says in his new statement. “There is no provision that states that US cooperation with India will be subject to an annual certification process.”

How many times will such dissimulations be repeated? There is no provision in the 123 Agreement because there is no need for any provision in this Agreement. The Agreement is the first step in operationalising the Hyde Act. It clearly states that US actions under it shall be governed by the national laws of the US — among these is the Hyde Act. That Act sets out a long, long list of reports that the US president must submit to Congress — every year, and in addition as soon as material information becomes available. On the basis of such information and in accordance with the reports, the president must certify to Congress that India is fully complying with provisions and goals of the Hyde Act and other US laws. If he is unable to do so, the “cooperation” must cease forthwith.

Nor is this an idle apprehension. To give just one example, the 123 Agreement between US and China was signed in 1985. It could not be operationalised for thirteen years because the American president could not submit the certifications that were required.

And that is when there was no, and is no China-specific law — as there is the Hyde Act in our case.

Singular objective

The items on which the US president must report to the Congress have nothing to do with energy. They have one object and one alone: to see that this deal is not directly or indirectly helping India thwart the central goal of the Hyde Act — namely, as the Act puts it, to “halt, roll back and eventually eliminate” India’s nuclear capability.

A score of examples can be given. One will suffice — to show how those reporting and certification requirements have indeed been built into the 123 Agreement.

The Hyde Act provides that the US president must furnish detailed reports to the US Congress on, among a host of other things, uranium that India has mined, obtained, used, has in stock, and so on. It does so as part of the measures that it specifies to ensure that the “civil nuclear cooperation” is not indirectly helping India enhance its weapons capability.

Section 104(5)(g) of the Act lays down that the US president furnish “fully and currently” — that is, he must not wait for the mandatory end-of-the-year reporting — detailed reports on:

An estimate of a) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year; b) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices and; c) the rate of production in India of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices and nuclear explosive devices;

An analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices.

Not only is it the case that, irrespective of the 123 Agreement, the US president has to compulsorily satisfy Congress that the Indo-US deal is not enabling India enhance its nuclear capabilities in any way. The fact is that requirements about uranium, and so on are built into the 123 text directly. They stick out through the camouflage.

Article 10.7 of the Agreement: “Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.”

You realise the import of that requirement when you go back to the Article on “definitions”, Article 1. That Article specifies, among other things, what materials are “subject to this Agreement”. These include:

“Low enriched uranium”, which means uranium enriched to less than twenty per cent in the isotope 235

“Non-nuclear material”, which means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties

“Nuclear material”, which means source material and special fissionable material.

“Source material”, which means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine...

Each of these is a material subject to this Agreement. In regard to each of them, India will supply a comprehensive account of inventories.

And yet, the PM makes out as if the government has ensured some sort of dilution in the requirements that the Hyde Act has specified.

But that is the minor part — an entire tale of attempted deception hangs by it, something to which I shall now turn.

To be concluded

A word dropped, a word inserted and the assurances are fulfilled!

Arun Shourie: Friday, August 17, 2007

123 Agreement: Mind the gap between the PM’s assurances and the text of the deal
I had taken up with President Bush our concerns regarding provisions in the two bills,’ the prime minister’s website records Dr Manmohan Singh telling the nuclear scientists. ‘It is clear that if the final product is in its current form, India will have grave difficulties in accepting the bills. US has been left in no doubt as to our position.’

That was in August 2006, soon after his speech in the Rajya Sabha in which the prime minister had drawn the lakshman rekha below which India would not go in its negotiations on the nuclear deal.

When the US House of Representatives had passed its bill, and when the fact could no longer be denied that its provisions would jeopardise our strategic interests, we were all told, ‘But this is just the House Bill. Our concerns will be taken care of in the Senate bill.’ When the Senate passed its bill, and the fact could no longer be denied that its provisions made even deeper inroads into our strategic interests than the House version, we were all told, ‘But we have to wait for the Joint Conference of the two Houses to hammer out a final version. That will take care of our concerns.’ When the final version was passed, and the fact could no longer be denied that it had in it the harshest features of each version, we were all told, ‘But India is not bound by laws made by any other country. We have to wait for the 123 Agreement. That will take care of our concerns.’

We now have the 123 Agreement. It explicitly states in Article 2 that ‘Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.’

In the case of the US, the relevant ‘national laws’ include the original Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nonproliferation Treaty Act, and the Hyde Act of December 2006.

To take just one example, the very Section of the 1954 Act under which the ‘123 Agreement’ is entered into — Section 123 — states that, should any nuclear device be detonated for any reason whatsoever, not only shall all nuclear commerce be halted with the country, the US shall have the right to demand the return of ‘any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant’ to the agreement for cooperation as well as any ‘special nuclear material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive device.’ ‘For any reason whatsoever’, the Joint Conference of the two Houses made explicit, shall also include ‘for peaceful purposes’ — the ground we had invoked for the 1974 test! This provision is re-emphasised in the Hyde Act. Section 106 of the latter states explicitly, ‘A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.’

As for ‘applicable treaties’ the US Act to operationalise the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty binds the US not to directly or indirectly — and we shall soon see the significance of these two words, ‘or indirectly’ — assist any Non-nuclear Weapon State to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. That in devising its cooperation with India the US must adhere to its obligations under this Article is reiterated and emphasised in the Hyde Act. That is why Section 104 of the Hyde Act explicitly states, ‘Pursuant to the obligations of the United States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices...’

That is just one example of what that reference to ‘national laws’ entails. As is well known by now, the US Congress completely disregarded the assurances that our prime minister had given to Parliament and incorporated a slew of provisions that were even more stringent, even more intrusive than the provisions of the original bills which the prime minister had said India would have ‘grave difficulties’ in accepting.

So, what does the prime minister do now — especially in view of the fact that the 123 Agreement explicitly mandates that, in implementing it, the US shall be bound by these laws? Simple: in the long statement that he waded through on August 13, 2007, in Parliament, the prime minister just doesn’t mention any national law at all, not the Hyde nor any other Act!

Omission actually is deployed more than once as the device of choice.

‘All’ out, ‘associated’ inserted

The central imperative in our discussions with the United States on Civil Nuclear Cooperation is to ensure the complete and irreversible removal of existing restrictions imposed on India through iniquitous restrictive trading regimes over the years. We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy — ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing spent fuel, i.e. all aspects of a complete nuclear fuel cycle.’ The ‘complete and irreversible removal’ is just as important. But for the moment I am on the ‘all’ — in giving this assurance to Parliament, the prime minister used the word not once but twice.

In fact, a little later in his speech, he assured Parliament a third, and a then fourth time, ‘We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy — ranging from supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, reprocessing spent fuel, i.e., all aspects of complete nuclear fuel supply. Only such cooperation would be in keeping with the July Joint Statement.’

Persons like me pointed out that the ‘full cooperation’ the US would enter into could not but be ‘less than full’. The reason was simple: US authorities — including President Bush — have stated time and again that as reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water have to do with producing nuclear weapons, and not with meeting energy requirements, the US shall not transfer technologies, materials or equipment related to these three vital aspects. Sponsors of the Hyde Act, that is the ones on whom India was relying to see the legislation through Congress, themselves emphasised this in their speeches on the floor and in the Joint Explanatory Statement that they submitted while forwarding the reconciled bill to the two Houses.

And throughout the negotiations for the 123 Agreement, the US Government stuck to this stand. But how to save the Indian Government’s face? Through what our prime minister in his statement of August 13, 2007, calls, ‘forward looking language’! Article 5(2) of the 123 Agreement, which the prime minister claims as an achievement, is the result. It provides, ‘Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.’

Notice the two conditions: (1) ‘pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement’; and (2) ‘subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.’ And then too, ‘may be transferred’. When the Agreement which has not even become effective will be amended, no one knows! And how it will be amended when the ‘applicable laws, regulations and license policies’ of the US explicitly prohibit such transfers, no one knows! But the ‘forward look’ zindabad!

But what about that four-times repeated assurance to Parliament? The prime minister’s new statement, the one of August 13, 2007, deploys an ‘out-of-the-box’ solution. ‘The concept of full nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in this Agreement,’ the PM’s new statement reads. ‘The Agreement stipulates that such cooperation will include nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle, including technology transfer on industrial or commercial scale.’

Please read that again. Did you spot the word that is suddenly missing? ‘All aspects’ has suddenly become ‘aspects’! And ‘all aspects of the fuel cycle’ has become ‘aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle’ — that is, aspects associated with reactors that the US will supply: a manual describing safety procedures, for instance!

‘All’ dropped. ‘Associated’ inserted. Assurances fulfilled. And Parliament can go jump out of the box!

What the PM does not refer to

This is not the first time that we have had a 123 Agreement with the US. We had one for Tarapur also. The US signed that Agreement with us in 1963. It was to be effective for 30 years, till 1993. That Agreement provided that the US would give fuel for Tarapur as needed by India. It provided that the US would have the first right to spent fuel in excess of India’s needs for peaceful nuclear energy. And even for this part, just the first right. If it did not take back the fuel, we would have the right to reprocess it. There were no conditions. In testimony to the US Congress, US officials have themselves acknowledged that the US is not to this day sure that India violated any term of the 1963 Agreement. Yet, the US terminated all fuel supplies in 1974, saying that India had violated domestic US laws. Pressed about the laws, the US maintained that India had violated the intent of US domestic laws! For decades, it has consistently refused to either take back spent fuel or let us reprocess it. All this happened, even when there was no Hyde Act — no India-specific law — to govern that Agreement.

That is why the provision in the new 123 Agreement that, in implementing it, a party — the US in this case — shall be governed by, inter alia, its national laws becomes all important. And that is why the prime minister’s decision not to let any reference to this provision slip at all into his lengthy statement is so telling of this new culture — of spin; of the half-truth. Nor do we have to wait for the laws that the US may pass in the future. The three laws that are already on their statute books — the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nonproliferation Act, and the Hyde Act — are sufficient to keep India on the shortest possible leash.

To gauge the difference, contrast the provision in the 123 Agreement that the US signed with China in 1985. Article 2(1) of that Agreement specifies: ‘Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’ — so far, almost the same as the Indo-US text. But then comes the vital sentence which is missing from the Indo-US agreement: ‘The parties recognise, with respect to the observance of this Agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may NOT invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’

That provision shields China from the Tarapur-treatment. The text in the Indo-US 123 Agreement opens us to a repeat of that treatment — on an even longer list of ‘grounds’ than could be envisaged at the time of Tarapur, and at a time in future when, if the PM’s dreams are realised, we will be even less able to resist pressures than we were in the past — for we will be dependent on imported nuclear fuel for 35,000 megawatts of electricity and not just, as in the case of Tarapur, for just 300 megawatts.

To be continued

Reflection in the jigsaw



Arun Shourie: Wednesday, May 30, 2007


In the concluding extracts from his new book, Arun Shourie makes a case for a strengthened judiciary, compulsory voting and a reformed legislature
The judiciary

Just as the authority of Parliament vis a vis the Executive must be lessened, that of the Judiciary must be assiduously preserved... the methods of selecting judges, of transferring them, for verifying their conduct when the need arises, have all to be made more robust than they are — and several proposals have already been advanced for this purpose. But, as that discussion will also make evident, it is not enough to preserve provisions for judicial review. The judges have to act the freedom and independence that have been accorded to them by the provisions. The assault on them through alterations like the 39th and 42nd amendments was defeated. But ever so often, the judges themselves have leaned over to assist the Executive in its excesses. That is the point to which we return later in the book.

Elections and voting

So as to further minimise social influences, voting should be compulsory. Both the Election Voting Machine and the compulsory Multi purpose National Identity Card should have biometric identification marks.

Legislatures

For elections to legislatures, three modifications are necessary:

The size of the constituency has to be increased substantially so as to lessen the sway of one section or caste;

The link between the electorate and the winner has to be weakened; and

Qualifications and disqualifications for candidates have to be tightened.

Apart from scheduling elections simultaneously, the first step which is necessary was suggested by L.P. Singh in Electoral Reform. The rationale for a modified list-system is as follows. The present system of single member constituencies leads to the sorts of problems we have encountered earlier: for instance, the expectation, on the one hand, of the voter that the MP must attend to his personal problems; and on the other, the compulsion of the MP to put catering to voters and their controllers before all else. By contrast, if all of India were one constituency; parties declared lists of candidates; voters voted for parties and not for individual candidates; each party got to send members to parliament in proportion to its share in votes cast; in such a system, the link between the voter and the MP would be substantially reduced, and one set of problems would be minimised. But India is a continent. A person may have done exceptional service in Kerala and yet be unknown in the Northeast.

As for qualifications, candidates for the Lower House must be at least graduates. As for the Upper House, we need today not a Chamber of States but a Chamber of Talent. Therefore, in addition to being at least a graduate, a candidate must have distinguished himself in a profession including business and agriculture.

Disqualifications as they have been prescribed have become a farce: a list that lets criminals get into legislatures is actually worse than a farce — it is an accessory to a crime against the country... The first change that is required is that, from the moment charges are framed by a court against a person — whether he is a sitting member or not — he should cease to be a member and be disqualified from contesting an election till he has been cleared of the charges. For the one who has been falsely implicated, the incentive would then be the opposite: he will strive to ensure as expeditious a disposal of his case as possible.

‘But our opponents routinely implicate us in false cases,’ politicians say. First, the disqualification commences once charges have been framed by a court of law, not from the moment the police or some investigating agency has filed them. Second, this apprehension can be allayed by requiring that the charges be framed at the level of a sitting judge of the high court. Third, that such persons are inducted to man the courts as will serve the interest of the rulers of the moment, especially courts before which these cases are to come up, will only mean that, knowing that the next person could use the courts against them also, politicians will have an inducement to put more robust persons into courts.

‘The Parliamentary System: What we have made of it, what we can make of it’
By Arun Shourie

ASA/Rupa & Co, Rs 495

All the president’s persons


Arun shourie: Tuesday, May 29, 2007


Is the political class ready for reform? In his new book, The Parliamentary System: What we have made of it, what we can make of it, Arun Shourie makes a strong case for empowering the executive. Restructuring the system so that the president is elected by the electorate and is empowered to select his/her own ministers, he argues, will improve governance. Exclusive extracts from the book:


Today in India, two races are afoot. The first is the race between a creative society, a society that shows much energy and is surging upwards on the one hand, and on the other, the scaffolding of the state which is being hollowed by termites. The second is the race between those who are making the new India — primarily, the entrepreneurs and middle class professionals — and the political class that is stoking the old India — for instance, by pumping in the poison of caste — to keep itself in business.

If things are just left to proceed at will, the outcome may go either way: a dynamic economy and those forging it may be so hobbled by the worsening of governance that they may put enough pressure on the political class to mend its ways, to improve governance or let governance deteriorate to such an extent that Bihar and UP are generalised, and economic growth is once again pulled down.

Why is it that, to take the obvious contrast, in industry new leaders are emerging by the year, leaders who are doing better and more innovative things; but in public life second-raters are giving way to third-raters, politicians are giving way to politicians dependent on criminals, and the latter to criminals-who-have-become-politicians?

Why is it that while our entrepreneurs are venturing into newer and newer fields, that while they are registering conquests in more and more distant countries, that while they are thinking and planning farther into the future and transforming their operations today so that they may outdo the world in the distant future, why is it that while in one sphere we see these features, in the other sphere, our politicians are stoking ever narrower sections, why is their horizon becoming shorter and shorter?

This brief book is about features in the structure of the ‘parliamentary system’ — actually, that should be ‘in the structure of what we have made of the parliamentary system’ — which hurtle us into the kind of politics that we see today, which steer power into the hands of the sorts of politicians we see today. And about the structure that we may adopt as an alternative.

One structure will induce conduct of one kind; another structure will make some other type of conduct more profitable. Our tax system of the 1950s and 1960s, with its extortionate taxes, ensured neither higher revenues nor equality. It fanned the black economy. As the rates have been lowered, compliance has improved. Similarly, under the licence-quota raj, knowing the technology or the markets was not a fraction as important as knowing the minister for commerce and industries, and the civil servants in the DGTD and the Office of the Controller of Imports and Exports — yes, exports too; even to export something you had made and earn the foreign exchange the country so desperately needed, you needed permission which only these worthies could give. That structure induced one kind of effort, it brought one kind of entrepreneur to the top — the one whose core competence lay in his ability to manipulate the state apparatus. As that structure has been dismantled, we see an entirely different kind of conduct among our entrepreneurs, we see an entirely new type of entrepreneur rise to the top.

Pluck, as an example, a proposal that figures later in the book. We lament the fact that today elections are greatly influenced by the money that a candidate can deploy, by the castes that he can work up. We dread the advantage that dons now have over ordinary candidates because they have a network of criminals that they can mobilise. Suppose we dispensed with elections altogether, and instead selected legislators by lottery. That ‘X’ can throw out more money; that he is from one caste rather than another; that he has a whole posse of criminals to do his work — none of these ‘strengths’ would improve his chances. The influence of money/caste/criminality would be erased.

So, structures do affect the outcome. They do affect conduct. And therefore, the fact that there is no structure that cannot be perverted should not deter us from exploring alternatives.

The conclusions that this brief review urges are:

The key problem today is that the parliamentary system and the electoral system from which it springs are fragmenting the electorate on the one hand and, on the other, are not yielding persons who have the competence, integrity and dedication to govern a billion people;

Our legislatures, thus, are the root of the problems we face in governance today;

Accordingly, we should find ways to reduce the role and influence of legislatures;

Correspondingly, we should devise ways which improve the chances of getting a better type to man the executive;

Thereafter, we should tilt the balance away from legislatures towards the executive;

We should seek to secure accountability through institutions other than legislatures;

In particular, we should strengthen the powers and role of the judiciary

The alternative

The two basic elements we need are: an effective — that is, a strong and competent — executive, especially at the Centre, and a continuing sense of belonging among the population at large, a feeling that the system of governance is responsive. For achieving these twin objectives, we should, on the one hand, weaken the link between the executive and the legislature, and on the other, strengthen the local government.

To ensure the first of these objectives, two features in the Constitution should be recast to provide:

The head of the executive, the president, is directly elected

He is free to select as his ministers persons from within or outside the legislature

The term of the president should be five years. A person should be able to be president for a maximum of two terms.

The president must be elected by more than 50 per cent of the electorate. As many candidates as are qualified for the presidency and want to contest may do so. In case one of them gets the votes of more than 50 per cent of the electorate, she or he becomes president. If no one does, the election is held again, as in France, within a fortnight, and only the two who have scored the highest number of votes are allowed to stand in the second round. (Were it not for the fact that many of our voters may find it difficult to indicate preferences, one way to ‘economise’ is to have not a second round but to make provision for it, so to say, in the first round itself. Instead of the second ballot, voters can be asked to indicate a 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and so on, preference against the name of each candidate. If in the 1st round of counting a candidate wins more than 50 per cent of the votes, she is declared elected. If not, the candidate polling the lowest number of 1st preferences is eliminated; the second preferences of the voters who voted for him are then assigned to the other candidates — till one of them gets more than 50 per cent.

It should not be possible to remove the president except by impeachment, and that on specified grounds. In other words there should be no equivalent of the current ‘vote of confidence’.

The president may select anyone from outside or within the legislature to be his minister. Any member of a legislature who has been chosen to be a minister must resign his seat. She or he may attend sessions of the legislature, and participate in the debates. But he or she shall not vote on any measure on which the legislature is voting.

‘But how can we let outsiders participate in the proceedings of the House? An outsider cannot even enter the lobby.’ Such a reaction is yet another example of what the management experts call IRI — the Instant Rejection Instinct, a reaction by which we exempt ourselves from thinking or doing anything. Ministers are today appointed from both Houses. Ministers who happen to be members of one House participate as fully in the proceedings of the other House as ministers who happen to be members of the latter. They answer questions, they participate in debates but they do not vote in the House, of which they are not members. The most vivid example of today is the prime minister. He is a member of the Rajya Sabha. In that sense, he is an ‘outsider’ to the Lok Sabha. Does he not participate fully in the proceedings of the Lok Sabha? But does he vote there?

‘The Parliamentary System: What we have made of it, what we can make of it’ By Arun Shourie
ASA/Rupa & Co, Rs 495


editor@expressindia.com

The way out

Arun Shourie: Saturday, December 23, 2006


Looking at atomic power as the major component of our electricity supplies in the future has been India’s basic strategic flaw. As far as nuclear reactors are concerned, look to them principally for our weapons programme, not for electricity — for we do have other ways of securing electricity

But the Vajpayee government itself started the discussions for this deal,” the government’s apologists shout. Would the fact that Vajpayee’s government recommenced discussions with China on the border justify surrendering Arunachal to China tomorrow?

“But Vajpayee himself announced a voluntary moratorium on further tests,” they shout. A voluntary moratorium is one that can be ended at our discretion should circumstances so warrant. What is being done under this new law of the US is to convert a voluntary moratorium into a legally binding bilateral agreement.

“But Vajpayee himself told the UN General Assembly that India was willing to convert its voluntary moratorium into a de jure one,” they shout. The position the government took was that India would do so by signing the CTBT when forty four countries signed up to bring it into force. These countries included the US, China, Pakistan, and the 41 others that are listed in the draft. As the US Senate itself has rejected the CTBT, where is the question under that statement for converting our voluntary moratorium into a de jure one?

In any event, the government is bound by what the present PM assured Parliament. He emphatically told Rajya Sabha on August 17, “There is provision in the proposed US law that were India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to cease further cooperation. Our position on this is unambiguous. The US has been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the India-US Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation is not acceptable to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July statement.”

But the first step

In a word, the US Congress has not attached the slightest weight to the assurances the PM has given to Parliament. Instead, the most stringent features from the House and Senate Bills have been taken and incorporated into the final Act.

And this is but the first round. Remember what the two Under Secretaries of State, Robert Joseph and Nicholas Burns, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Pressed about the aspects that had not been covered, Burns and Joseph urged the Senate to “resist the temptation to take actions that will prejudice our ability to realise the important and long-standing nonproliferation objectives embodied in the initiative.” They urged it to see that “The commitments India has made under the Initiative are a significant gain over the status quo.” From four reactors being under safeguards, to two-third — that is, 14 — of the existing ones being under safeguards, to 90 per cent of them being under safeguards in the coming years. And they said, “We believe the best course is to lock in the significant gains reached and then seek to achieve further nonproliferation results as our strategic partnership advances.”

Since the Act was passed, we have witnessed lobbying more blatant than anything I have seen in the 35 years that I have followed Indian public affairs, the twisting and misrepresentation more shameless than I have seen. This feverish activity itself betrays that we should look closely at what is being done.

The way out

Yes, energy is an important objective. Yes, good relations with the US are important. One possible source was cooperation with the US in this field. But that cooperation, evidently, comes with an unacceptable price tag. Stop looking to this deal as the key to better Indo-American relations. Stop looking to Americans for nuclear energy. Stop looking to nuclear energy as a significant component of our electricity supplies.

This last factor — looking to atomic power as a major component of our electricity supplies in the future — has been the strategic flaw which has landed us in this quicksand. The sequence of the government’s reasoning has been:

We need huge quantities of energy.

Nuclear energy has to supply 35,000 megawatts of what we need — against the 3,500 megawatts it supplies today.

While we have the requisite reserves of natural uranium, we are not able to get enough of it out of the ground for the reactors.

Hence, the operating/plant-load factors of all the reactors have been falling since 2000. Therefore, we need imported uranium.

Therefore, we need this agreement.

Therefore, we have to accept the conditions that go with this agreement.

Now, it is true that with the quantities of uranium that we are currently mining and milling, we cannot pursue both — that order of power generation as well as our weapons programme — simultaneously. If for electricity one uses X amount of uranium, I was instructed, for weapons, one needs 7X. That is why we have had to come to two decisions:

Limit the weapons programme.

Go in for imported uranium fuel — whatever the conditions attached to securing it.

The way out is six-fold

First, as far as nuclear reactors are concerned, look to them principally for our weapons programme, not for electricity — for we do have other ways of securing electricity, but we do not have other routes to nuclear weapons.

Second, for energy look to other clean sources. For instance, clean coal; methane through coal; most important, hydroelectric power. I remember studies that have been done about the enormous potential for the latter in just the Northeast. The 5-6 stage Dihang-Subhansiri project itself has the capacity to generate 22,000 megawatts. NHPC is now executing one part of it, and this alone will generate close to 2,000 megawatts. I remember how for a decade the Dibang project had been languishing with the Brahmaputra Board; that board was almost comatose, in any event it did not have in its charter the authority to raise money for projects; we strove to get it transferred to NHPC; NHPC is now executing the project; even this project has the capacity to generate 3,800 megawatts... This is the route to energy self-sufficiency, to energy security. We have the technology. We can fabricate the turbines and ancillary equipment right here. The projects will generate jobs in the numbers that we need.

Third, intensify uranium mining and milling. A myth has been spread by interested parties as well as by those who have not been able to get the irritants out of the way, that we do not have adequate natural uranium. A good corrective to such propaganda is an excellent study done by none other than Ashley Tellis, one of the architects of this very nuclear deal, and one of its most persuasive advocates.

Entitled Atoms for War? it shows that we have much more than enough of uranium. (The study can be downloaded from www.carnegieendowment.org/publications). Tellis notes that India is widely acknowledged to have reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium — some estimates put the figure higher. Using the most optimistic plant-load factors, he calculates that all the reactors currently in operation as well as those that are under construction and the weapons programme over the entire lifetime of these plants will require 14,640 to 14,790 metric tons of uranium. He shows, next, that if the eight reactors that India has declared it will use for military purposes were to allocate a quarter of their cores for the production of weapons-grade material, the total amount of natural uranium that would be needed to run these facilities for the remaining duration of their lives would be between 19,965 to 29,124 tons. Finally, the fuel required to run over their entire life cycle the two research reactors that are used for producing weapons-grade plutonium will be 938 to 1,088 tons. The two last steps would yield India 12,135 to 13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium. This would be sufficient to increase our arsenal by 2,023 to 2,228 nuclear weapons. The total uranium required to run over their entire lifetime all these facilities, would thus use up just a third to one-half of the uranium deposits that are already known to exist.

Tellis writes that the present shortage of uranium is “a temporary aberration”, caused by impediments, removing which is within our capacity. Getting the courts, tribal leaders, activists to see reason. Firming up our land acquisition procedures. These are the sort of steps that are required. Is it not idiotic that we should close all options for the future; that we should mortgage our country’s security just because we cannot get around these self-created problems? Instead of going down on our knees for imported uranium, we should:

Invest the amounts that are required for increased uranium mining and milling

Solve land acquisition problems.

Fourth, we should spur DAE and AEA to be more focused. We should make them more accountable: if peer reviews are the way to spur them, government should institute such reviews.

Fifth, we must redouble research on the breeder programme. The key here is to have the reactors breed in a reasonable time — if the fuel is doubled in, say, five years, we can set up the second reactor in five years and we will have the fuel it needs; but if this doubling is going to take 30 years, we will have the fuel we need for it only 30 years from now. Kalpakkam notwithstanding, much work remains to be done. Once it is done, however, our reactors will be generating more fuel than they will be using, and we will be free of dependence altogether. That will be the time for looking to nuclear plants as a substantial source of electricity.

Finally, we are always being told that we have the largest reserves of thorium in the world. But it isn’t at all clear how far we are from the technologies that are needed for exploiting them. We need a new kind of robotics. We need automation that can withstand the enormously high temperatures that materials will attain.

In a word, instead of going on running after the Americans for reactors and fuel, these are the routes the government should set the country on.

(Concluded)

Facts versus the government’s fiction

Arun Shourie: Friday, December 22, 2006



A section by section analysis of the Act passed by the US Congress reveals stipulations that tie India down. Yet the fiction has been purveyed by the government through the media that these provisions have been dropped. The prime minister’s assurances to Parliament may not mean anything

Everyone who has studied the Act that the US Congress has passed sees that its provisions just cannot be reconciled with the assurances the prime minister has given to Parliament. Not only has each of these been disregarded, in several cases they have been brushed aside with condescension — I don’t want to use the word others might deem more appropriate, “contempt”.

Proliferation Security Initiative

Alluding to the requirement that we join international protocols like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the PM told Parliament, “The Proliferation Security Initiative is an extraneous issue as it is outside the framework of the July 18 joint statement. Therefore, we cannot accept it as a condition for implementing the July statement. Separately, the government has examined the PSI. We have certain concerns regarding its legal implications and its linkages with the NPT. We also have concerns with amendments to the suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea Treaty under the International Maritime Organisation.”

Section 103(b)(3) of the final Act requires that the US Administration ensure India’s “(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such initiative; (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the guidelines, procedures, criteria, and control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement; (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C).” Section 104 (c) (2) (F) requires that the president report the steps that India has taken in this regard.

Strategic reserves

The PM placed great emphasis on India’s right to build strategic reserves of fuel for the reactors. He told Parliament that the Americans had given the assurance that India would be enabled to do so. As he was saying this in Rajya Sabha, the two under secretaries handling negotiations with India, Robert Joseph and Nicholas Burns, were telling the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Our negotiators were very clear that, while the US would be willing to provide reasonable fuel assurances designed to counter market imperfections, fuel assurances are not a ‘condition’ to any of India’s commitments under the plan — including, in particular, safeguards in perpetuity.”

A formal clause, Section 103 (b) (10), was incorporated in the Senate Bill, and is now in the final Act. It says: “Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.” Enough just for “operating requirements”, not for building those pie-in-the-sky “strategic reserves”.

Uninterrupted fuel supplies

The PM told Parliament that India would be placing its reactors under safeguards “with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors... together with India’s right to take all corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted.” He repeated that condition four times. Even as he was doing so, American officials were telling the Senate Committee that India would have to and would be putting its reactors under safeguards in perpetuity.

Section 104(b)(2) of the Act lays down without any room for doubt that India will have to place the reactors under safeguards “in perpetuity.” This is how the pledge of the PM to Parliament about our right to build strategic reserves is disposed of in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the legislation: “On March 6, 2006, the Indian prime minister told the Indian Parliament that the US government had said that if a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the US would, with India, jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries, such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. The conferees understand and expect that such assurance of supply arrangements that the US is party to will be concerned only with disruption of supply of fuel due to market failures or similar reasons, and not due to Indian actions that are inconsistent with the July 18, 2005, commitments, such as a nuclear explosive test.”

Again, “India’s March 2006 nuclear facility separation plan stated: ‘The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.’ Congress has not been able to determine precisely what was said on this matter in high-level US-Indian discussions. US officials testified, however, that the United States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian actions such as conducting another nuclear test. The conferees understand that nuclear reactor facilities commonly have some fresh fuel stored, so as to minimise down time when reactor cores are removed. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, that there be a clear US policy that any fuel reserve provided to India should be commensurate with normal operating requirements for India’s safeguarded reactors.”

So much for the PM’s “strategic reserves”. So much for his “corrective steps”. So much for his solemn assurances to Parliament.

Parity in rights

Spinners of the government maintained that by recognising India as a state with advanced nuclear technology, and by recording that India would acquire the same rights as a country like the United States, India had been in effect recognised as a Nuclear Weapon State. The “India-specific” Additional protocol with the IAEA would formalise this position, they maintained. Section 110(1) explicitly states that the additional protocol will be in accordance with IAEA’s INFCIRC 540 — that is, the one applicable to Non-nuclear Weapon States.

Additional safeguards

The PM told Parliament, “There is no question of India signing either a safeguards agreement with the IAEA or an additional protocol of a type concluded by Non-nuclear Weapon States who have signed the NPT. We will not accept any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those contained in an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Therefore, there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities.” He repeated this declaration twice.

Even as he was telling Parliament this, American officials — in this case, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice herself — were telling the Senate Committee that the Administration will ensure that there are “fall-back” safeguards too — that is, in case the US determines that the IAEA is not being able to implement safeguards satisfactorily, there will be other safeguards in place that the US can implement.

Section 104 (B)(5)(A)(III)(iii) specifies: (iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are consistent with the requirements of Section 123 a.(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason.”

Notice, India will have to continue to comply with these “fall-back” safeguards even if the 123 Agreement with the US is terminated. The Joint Explanatory Statement rubs the point in: “Section 104(d)(5)(B)(iii) mandates that, in the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an agreement between the United States and India approved pursuant to this title, there be appropriate assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are consistent with the requirements of Section 123 a (1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason. Assurances that there will be such ‘fall-back safeguards’ if needed, are an important feature of agreements for nuclear cooperation; they enable such safeguards to exist more clearly in perpetuity... The conferees intend to assure that the requirements of Section 123 a (1) are fully met; they do not intend to impose a more intrusive regime than arrangements that have been used before in one or more US agreements for cooperation .”

Well, we must be thankful for small mercies — that the arrangements will not be more intrusive than are in place in other agreements!

How ‘full’?

The PM told the House that India has been assured of “full civil nuclear cooperation” — in particular, that we would get access to “all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle” “ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing spent fuel.” He repeated this assurance thrice, declaring, “... We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above... Only such cooperation would be in keeping with the July Joint Statement.”

During the debate on the floor of the Senate, the co-sponsor of the legislation, Senator Joseph R. Biden, disposed of the prime minister’s “full means full” claim. He told the Senate that the provisions in the Bill were designed to legally prohibit such transfers because “these technologies are all used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.”

“Some Indian officials are reportedly upset because (the then) Section 106 singles out India,” he continued. “But they have long known that it is US policy not to sell them these technologies, so this is a matter more of pride than of substance, which I hope they deal with.”

Section 103(B)(2)(E) lays down that, far from processing spent fuel itself, India will not be allowed to even ship it back to the US without specific approval of the US Congress. The Act turns aside the objection that India was being singled out in an ingenious way. It now lays down in Section 104 (c) (4) (B) that the sensitive nuclear technologies — those relating to the items that the prime minister had listed — may be transferred to India, only if they are to be used in “a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities”, etc., and only when the president is able to ensure that these would not in any way assist India’s nuclear weapons programme. Uthe har nigah lekin baam tak na pahunche...!

The restriction is elaborated at length in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the legislation. It states, inter alia, “The conferees note that the Administration has already stipulated that ‘full civil nuclear cooperation’,” the term used in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh, will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology. This is consistent with President Bush’s February 11, 2004, speech at the National Defense University, in which he stated that ‘enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’, and the fact that, other than in the SILEX arrangement with Australia, the United States does not currently engage in cooperation regarding enrichment or reprocessing technology with any country.”

Where does this leave the PM’s thrice-repeated assurance to Parliament?

Tests in the future

The PM was even more emphatic in regard to our right to conduct tests in the future, and in declaring his determination to fully shield the autonomy of our nuclear programme. He declared, “There is provision in the proposed US law that were India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to cease further cooperation. Our position on this is unambiguous. The US has been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the India-US Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation is not acceptable to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July Statement. The same is true of other intrusive non-proliferation benchmarks that are mentioned in the proposed US legislation. India’s possession and development of nuclear weapons is an integral part of our national security. This will remain so.”

Well, what will the government’s stand now be, because Section 106 of the Act states,

“A determination and any waiver under Section 104 shall cease to be effective if the president determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.”

The Joint Explanatory Statement states the purpose of the section: “Sec 106 states that a determination and any waiver under Section 104 shall cease to be effective if the president determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act. The conferees intend this section to make absolutely clear a point that already follows from Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2158). This title affords no waiver from Section 129 for an Indian nuclear detonation after July 18, 2005.”

It underscores the consequences again: “As further clarified in the section-by-section analysis included in this report, the conferees believe that there should be no ambiguity regarding the legal and policy consequences of any future Indian test of a nuclear explosive device. In that event, the president must terminate all export and re-export of US-origin nuclear materials, nuclear equipment, and sensitive nuclear technology to India. The conferees expect the president to make full and immediate use of US rights to demand the return of all nuclear-related items, materials, and sensitive nuclear technology that have been exported or re-exported to India if India were to test or detonate, or otherwise cause the test or detonation of, a nuclear explosive device for any reason, including such instances in which India describes its actions as being ‘for peaceful purpose.’

Notice, even the test for “peaceful purposes” which was